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

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
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

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
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AN ANALYSIS OF HUMAN MOTIVE

AN ANALYSIS OF
HUMAN MOTIVE

BY

F. CARREL
, , ,

LONDON

SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, HAMILTON, KENT & CO., LTD.

1905

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The objects of this treatise are to enquire in what manner human conduct results from certain fundamental motives; to investigate such motives; to seek towards what ultimate end they tend and by what course the best conditions of that end may be produced.

Since men are seen to act in certain ways under the influence of a certain number of broadly defined motives, it is relatively easy to determine by what main incentives particular actions are performed; but when it is required to discover in what manner they act under such influence, to what extent they are guided by one motive or another or by how many motives at a given time, the problem becomes less simple. If we can gain some knowledge of the working of a series of motives which mainly determine conduct, we shall be in a position to determine conduct within certain limits, once the motive which produces it is ascertained and to establish certain expansive principles in view of an end of conduct favourable to the highest interests of the race. The enquiry on such lines is partly psychological and partly moral, although its principal character is moral.

The motives of existence are primarily due to the needs of the human body in its relation to the conditions of terrestrial existence and proceed directly from the two factors of consciousness—sensation and thought. We are moved by a certain series of necessary pragmatic tendencies over which our personal will can exercise but a slight general control. These tendencies, however, may, by the exercise of the reflective faculty, be gradually divested of certain destructive elements which they contain and

brought into increasing harmony with the general well-being of the race.

The division of the motives into a series of six, although arbitrary, will, I believe, stand the test of experience.

In the course of the work the word moral is used in a somewhat more restricted sense than the word social. By moral conduct is meant more especially, right action which, performed by an individual is beneficial to those with whom he is brought into immediate contact. By social conduct is more especially meant that right action which, performed by individuals or groups, is beneficial to society in general. The two terms, however, tend to be convertible.

For the class of conduct which is neither moral nor immoral, social nor anti-social, the term neutral is used which, as regards the former category at least, is equivalent to the term *amoral* employed by some French moralists.

Where necessary, the neologism, 'motival,' has been introduced.

AN ANALYSIS OF HUMAN MOTIVE

CHAPTER I

FIRST CAUSES OF MOTIVES—ORDER OF MOTIVES

FIRST CAUSES OF MOTIVES

MOTIVES may be defined as volitional impulses determining the performance of acts conducive to the satisfaction of fundamental needs, desires or aspirations, and by extension, the mental inhibitions causing forbearance from acts. The relation of motives to acts may be stated in the following order:—

(1) The first causes of motives, (2) motives, (3) acts.

The first causes of motives are: (1) Cosmographical and geographical conditions. (2) The composition and construction of the human body. (3) The cerebral neuronie and muscular construction of the human body. (4) Heredity.

Each of these first causes is here taken as having an approximately equal share in the formation of motives.

1. *Cosmographical and geographical conditions.* The place of the earth in the solar system, its size and the light and heat which it receives from the sun, together constitute a first cause of motive. If the earth were nearer to, or farther from the sun, or even if its equator were not inclined to the plane of its orbit, the motivation of human life might have been different from that with which we are acquainted. A hotter, or a colder general climate might have produced a type of humanity still more differentiated from the present one than the races of the world are at present differentiated by the thermal conditions of their places

of origin and residence. Had there been no seasons on the earth, but an equal distribution of solar rays during day throughout the world, a change of needs might have considerably modified the existing scheme of motives. Had the physical geography of the world been different, inhabitants must have differed in their actions and consequently in their motives. More or less mountain or more or less water might, by altering vegetation and food as well as means of communication, have had marked effects on conduct.

If the atmosphere by which the globe is surrounded had been more or less dense, the conduct of its inhabitants would have been thereby affected; and it is evident that had the atmospheric disturbances been more frequent and stronger than they are, life on the globe might have been a continual struggle against their effects with the conduct which such a struggle would occasion. Man is a being essentially bound up with the planet which he inhabits, and whenever the normal conditions of any portion of the earth's surface are disturbed, his motives lessen in number and change in character. One of the first causes of the impulsions in obedience to which men act as they are seen to act, is to be found in the conditions of our planet. It is not probable that if life exists in other planets, the conduct of their rational inhabitants is diametrically opposed to ours. Through the agency of the telescope, and the revelations of spectrum analysis we have sufficient evidence of a similarity of form and of material in the universe to which our vision extends, to justify the belief that other worlds and other planetary lives (if such exist) must bear a certain resemblance to our own, and we may rightly attribute to our motives a certain universal character. However small our globe may be in comparison with the majority of the planetary bodies, we may reasonably consider that we possess a share of the general characteristics of the universe as regards the composition and the functions of our bodies and the acts which they perform; but we are obliged to conclude that in its particular aspect, our conduct is divergent and essentially the result of the precise position which we occupy in space. Generally, the character of our

conduct would appear to be universal, but specifically it is terrestrial and the logical outcome of the circumstances of man's environment and of the other conditions considered below. The universe proceeds from an unknown source; but there is in that universe a planet of comparatively small dimensions. There is rational life upon that planet and that life is moved by impulses which are directly produced by the particular position and construction of the dwelling place, and by the particular constitution of the dweller whose existence itself is dependent upon the maintenance of the atmospheric and physical conditions that have hitherto prevailed. The motives of men are the consequence of the state of life on earth. Nothing in human conduct itself is mysterious or transcendental so long as we confine ourselves to the constituted universe and do not seek to carry our scrutiny to the origin of things to which we cannot penetrate. We have not to enquire here in what relation our conduct stands towards an unknown source of creative power; but how, once our world originated, the acts of its human inhabitants had one of their first causes in the position and constitution of that world. We can judge of the influence of position, in some measure, by observing its effects upon the races which inhabit the globe and which are greatly diversified not only in their outward aspect, but also in the composition of their minds and in the motivation of their conduct. The needs of a hot climate are not those of a cold or of a temperate. Much that in Lapland is a necessity of life and therefore an object of attainment, is in South America, of little worth. The needs of the hotter climates being fewer, the acts are fewer and the inhabitants more idle and self indulgent. Food, also, the character of which varies with the latitude, has had a not inconsiderable share in the determination of motives. A people nourished with a sufficient proportion of carbohydrates, fats and proteids will be in a generally healthier condition than one in which either one or other of these essential elements are scarce; they will have more vitality and their motives will be more strongly and persistently pursued. Meteorological conditions have also an influence in the formation of motives and par-

ticularly in their deflection from a rational course, an influence, however, which varies considerably with the individual. When, in our climates, there is a long continuance of sunshine, especially in winter, there will be a general acceleration of capillary circulation and a stimulation of gland secretion which must tend to avert depression, to incline to the cheerful and consistent pursuit of the sustentative and other motives in a measure consonant with reason, in the majority of individuals. When, however, there is much experience of humidity and cold and the blood vessels and smaller arteries and capillaries are weakened, so that the proper working of the organism is impeded, there is much probability that the character of the motives will be less in conformity with the general interest of the race, and this will be especially the case in respect of persons of nervous temperament who will also be diverted from, or arrested in their normal motival course by stormy or unsettled weather. Barometric and thermal conditions and changes, therefore, enter as factors into the determination of motives. Heat and cold are not alone the causes of the death of individuals, but they also have an effect upon the nature of their acts. A sudden depression of the barometer in winter may be followed by a fall of snow and an interruption in the means of circulation which, by deferring it, may, other circumstances intervening, be the means of destroying or of converting a motive, the pursuance of which was begun in a normal temperature. An abnormally high temperature in summer may, by the physical exhaustion which it causes, be the means of impeding the play of motives or of substituting for all others that of procuring the greatest alleviation of the suffering. Again, when the barometer falls, that is to say when the air becomes lighter, the fluids and gases of the body expand; there is pressure in the vessels of the body and all bodily or mental infirmities being more acutely felt, there results a corresponding deflection of motives from their normal course. There is a diminution in the enthusiasm of existence and a decline of the general vital energy which is necessary to give to motives their full significance and strength. Although no means have as yet been devised to ascertain the effects on

conduct of barometric variations; it seems highly probable that such effects are neither slight nor few. If it were possible to compile statistics for the purpose of elucidating the results which proceed from barometric variations, such statistics would doubtless throw a great deal of light on conduct.

2. *The composition of the human body.* Researches have shown that the human organism is primarily composed of an immense number of minute, self-renewing cellules, each having an independent existence, performing a share of the common work of life. Aggregates of these cellules are also seen to take certain forms which constitute the organs and vessels of the body, the osseous frame-work on which the body is built and the muscular mechanism by means of which its movements are performed. A fluid composed of an equally immense number of globules circulates through the venous and arterial network of the organism, drawing from the air of the outer world, through the medium of the lungs, the oxygen it needs for the somatic process.

Now as the protoplasm of which the cellules themselves are composed is an essentially motive substance, particularly apt to conform its motivity to the exigencies of bodily life, and as the interior economy of the body is in continual activity; the question presents itself, whence is this inner activity derived? As it is not derived from the being himself, it must proceed from some inherent motive character in the physical and chemical composition of the world. And if this be the case, if there be action in the inner man, imperceptible or almost imperceptible to consciousness; then it seems admissible that there must be, in the outward actions of the being composed of the elements which enter most largely into the composition of the world, tendencies or dispositions to action which are the effects of his universal nature and that one of the first causes of the impulsions by which man is influenced in his pragmatic life, is to be found in the chemical composition, the muscular and vascular constitution of his body. For if we find first causes of motives in the construction of the human body, we must also recognise them in the elements of which that body is composed; that is to say in the carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen,

sulphur and phosphorus which form the basis of animal life and which, in other forms, are originally derived from the inorganic world. We cannot say that our conduct has one of its originating influences in the constituents of our bodies, without admitting also that in the sentence of matter, in that quality of affinity which renders one element akin to, or in sympathy with another and ready to combine with it, there is a remote but necessary causation. The evidence which chemistry furnishes, leads to the conviction that our actions are the expression in mind-directed movement of the ambient sensibility which pervades the whole of nature and which has its initial cause in the principle of animation contained in the inorganic portion of the world and brought into visible activity in the organic world under the influence of solar radiation. There is conduct in the behaviour of the iron in the furnace, in the growth of the vegetable in the field. Such conduct differs largely in degree no doubt from that of the lower animals, more largely from that of the higher animals and still more largely from that of man; but the difference is always one of degree. There is a terrestrial course of conduct which in the inorganic world depends for its manifestation on the meeting of the elements and in the organic world, both upon the meeting of those elements in the living body and upon the encounters in space of living beings. It attains its most complex and complete expression in the human species, owing to the cerebral superiority of that species. Acts are performed as well by the combining atoms of matter as by the living product man; but the difference between the two categories of action is such that while the former are either non-conscious or only partly conscious, the latter are conscious or only partially non-conscious. This characteristic of the latter phase gives rise to problems which were first recognised as independent problems by early Greek enquirers and by them named ethical. Provided man continue to be active—and the instinct of self-preservation compels him to be active—he may exist without any further principles of conduct than those which are dictated by the necessity of satisfying the needs which his material nature creates; but as soon as he desires to improve the

conditions of his existence and to regulate his intercourse with his fellow-men, then the study of ethical questions becomes inevitable. Just as many elemental substances, contained in the earth's crust, exist in homogeneous masses until they are brought into combination by extraneous means, so the human animal may exist in a state of pristine nature until he is brought by the force of circumstances into more elaborate conditions of existence and until, by intercourse with his fellow-men, he has learned the principles of social fusion. The laws of this social fusion or sociology may be as rigorous as that by which 2 grams of hydrogen combine with 16 grams of oxygen to produce water, but they have been less accurately studied, and they appear at present subject to constantly recurring exceptions due to forces acting upon the living organism, to the irregular working of the organ of thought and to the variations of individual wills. There probably exists in possibility a set of laws as rigid as those of chemical combination and in a highly developed and organised society, it is probable that such laws would be discovered and observed; but in the society with which we are acquainted there is no such accuracy and as its attainment would, in any case, be dependent upon the disappearance of mental imperfections or diseases of every degree, it does not seem likely that it will be attained. It seems that men will long be liable to act in a way contrary to their own and the race's interest, at certain times, owing to deflections from the normal and natural line of conduct, caused by the emotions, that is to say by those temporary affective phenomena which are produced by conditions of the exterior world and which generally cause deflections of conduct from the line of social expediency traced by the nature of man in his relation to the organic and the inorganic worlds.

3. *The cerebral and neuronie construction of the human body.* In the two great and complex nerve-systems the sympathetic and cerebro-spinal systems, the principal agent at work is the protoplasmic cellule, but it is that of the constituted nerves and ganglions, made of a hyper-sensitive material responding to the slightest stimulus. The means by which the nerve systems contribute

towards the formation of motive are as follows: by their instrumentality in transmitting to the seat of consciousness visual, tactual and olfactory impressions; by their transmission of internal sensations; by their share in the production of those emotions which give rise to motives and generally by the degrees of excitability which they receive from the outer world and communicate to the centre of psychical association. Experimental psychology has proved that the brain is at once the registering organ of all the sensations which are conveyed to it along the sensory nerves and the producer of the muscular reflex action which these experiences occasion, and it seems evident that the impressions thus conveyed act as suggestions to the mind of motives to be pursued. As soon as the mind has become penetrated with them, the motive which corresponds to them, which varies with the individual, but which is such as the experience of men has recognised as recurrent in humanity, is generated whenever the general conditions are favourable. An object witnessed may, according to the psychical and general conditions existing in the individual at the time, constitute, or aid in constituting, any one of the motives, and a sensation felt as the result of a thought or recollection, may have the same effect. In either case, when the sensation experienced, whether peripheral or internal, is communicated thus to the seat of consciousness by the sensory nerve, the motive formed may lead at once to action, that is to say to the employment of a motor nerve and of a muscle, or it may be stored up in the mnemonic centre, until the occasion presents itself for calling it into play. The *intention* is formed of pursuing a certain line of conduct in obedience to an impulsion proceeding from the inner seat of consciousness, doubtless from the anterior centre of co-ordination where the most complex psychical phenomena occur and where according to Flechsig¹ the personal conscience is located. The sight of riches or the feeling of penury or hunger may give rise to the sustentative motive, the audition of ecclesiastical music may occasion motives of religion; the smell of a certain perfume may originate a form of the pleasure or the sex motive. The nerves of the

¹ "Persönlichkeitsbewusstsein."

sympathetic system, furnishing the innervation of the stomach and intestines, are intimately connected with the motive of nutrition which is here included under the name of sustenance and when hunger is satisfied convey to consciousness a sensation of comfort which inclines to pleasurable or sexual motives, but which, when the stomach is empty, urge to the quest of food. The optic sensory nerve may convey to the male brain an image of female beauty and motor nerves may be thereby brought into action under the influence of the sex motive. A pleasure once experienced by any of the senses, may give rise to a predominance of the pleasure motive in the individual, either in respect of the particular pleasure or of pleasure generally, towards which, as the sequel demonstrates, all human aspirations tend, as soon as the sustentative necessity is satisfied. There is in every consciousness, a ground prepared in advance by heredity and environment for the production of motives and when to this ground is brought the stimulus of the impressions of the sensory nerves, then the decision to act in obedience to a certain motive is produced. Where any one of the senses is lost, as in the case of the blind or deaf, there is a diminution of motives. Life, of necessity, is conducted on a smaller and little changing scale and where both these senses are lost, an inertness is inevitable which reduces the motival field to a minimum. The relative fewness and similarity of the acts of the blind and deaf, are proofs of the restriction of their motives. In their case the sensory nerves lie largely dormant, and although the sense of touch acquires a great increase of acuteness it cannot, by the nature of things, replace the other two, either quantitatively or qualitatively. It is not contended that all motives are the result of visual, tactual or olfactory sensations. Far from it; but that these sensations constitute one of the first causes of the motival scheme, cannot well be doubted if we consider the work which they perform as reporters to consciousness of what is passing, not only in the outer world, but to some extent of what is taking place in the inner organism. Many impressions are conveyed to the reason which do not directly lead to the formation of motives, although it seems probable that if it were possible to minutely follow

the complex process of mental assimilation and co-ordination; the number that were totally devoid of indirect influence would be found to be small. If, for instance, an object of great beauty, let us say a landscape, be rapidly witnessed, but greatly admired by an individual, the impression made may not be followed by any apparent action, but it may nevertheless have the effect, when drawn from memory in an ulterior combination, of supporting a pleasure motive having for its object a sojourn in a place of equal beauty. The sight of any manifestations of sensuousness, whether in art or in reality, naturally tends to incline towards motives of sex indulgence, and undue exposure of the human form in public places from the beginning of civilisation has (except during certain pagan festivals) been severely prohibited, either by opinion or by law, because (among other reasons) it was recognised that such stimulations of the sex motive were destructive of the restraint which was necessary to the efficient working of society. The three senses are constantly conveying along the sensory nerves, subjective material for the formation of motive. Some of this material is immediately used, some is stored for future use and some is diffused in the general system of motivation. It thus appears that upon the manner in which the senses are acted upon by the total environment of individuals, a great part of their motivation depends, and as the environment, or to use a term which more accurately renders the present meaning, the experience of life, is in a large measure fortuitous; it is evident that the more in accordance with the social interest these sensorial encounters are, the better will be the conduct of communities. If, in the cerebro-spinal system, we have the series of nerves which exercise a directing influence over the movements of the organism, that which is most directly engaged in the production of thought and ideation, then we have a still more direct first cause of motives; for it would be largely owing to the working of this system that the impulsions of the ego would be effected. It is in the centre of consciousness, in that frontal portion of the brain which has been shown to be devoted to the purposes of association, that the decisions appear to be formed to pursue the motive towards which

the general neuronc feeling tends. In this spot, if the most recent conclusions be correct, is the point where our individuality is focussed and where proceeds the translation into action of the decisions, or in other words, the execution of the decrees which are there arrived at or prepared. Here, we must conclude, is the seat of the great synthesis in which every expression of our being is represented, both in relation to itself and to the outer world. This is the helm of the steering apparatus of our conduct. On the manner in which the helm is used (and the manner varies with the physical and mental perfection of the individual) depends the motivation of individual existences.

The nerves which spread themselves on either side of the spinal column are as the members of an executive committee presided over by the dictatorial and motory function of the brain. Together they execute the orders which have come from the superior council of the individual impulsions and hence their instrumentality in the formation of the conduct of existence.

4. *Heredity.* There exist in each individual, inclinations for, or tendencies towards the performance of certain acts which are in a large measure independent of environment or education and which proceed from transmitted characteristics in the germ-plasm, derived, not from the immediate parents only, but from several generations of ancestors. The evidence which has been collected as to the process of heredity, shows that not only are the transmitted characters anatomical, physiological and pathological; but that they are also psychological and moral. As an ancestor had thought and acted, so the child will, *at times*, be inclined to think and act. He will have tastes and propensities which may, for a certain period, lie dormant for want of a suggestion in the outer world, but which will eventually manifest themselves and to which no other cause than heredity can be assigned. In the motivation of an individual life, in the instinctive impulses which determine many of its acts, the influence of heredity is undoubted. The child of a bad father educated in an atmosphere of moral rectitude, may be so brought under the influence of education and environment that he may lead a moral life; but the chances are great

that he will eventually evince a disposition to fall short of the standard to which he has been raised, unless one of his progenitors was a person of an exceptionally strong moral nature and he had inherited exclusively from that progenitor. A child conceived by a father and mother whose life from early youth had been dissolute, whose intelligence had been principally employed in eluding punishment for their misdeeds, could scarcely fail to manifest, as he grew, certain tendencies to prevarication and deceit, if not to crime, however good his upbringing, and if the upbringing took place amid his parents, the evil tendencies would be a certainty or the nearest approximation to a certainty. In either case his motives would not be other than the fundamental ones, only in order to pursue their realisation, he would employ means which men for self protection have been forced to prohibit. The hereditary impulses, however, tend towards conduct which is termed good, or not bad, far more often than towards that which is considered bad, for the reason that the ancestors of the majority of men are engaged each day of their existence in performing acts which are either good or not bad and that the habit is transmissible.

Hereditary promptings are present in the motives of the most normal human act, and to find a time when they were non-existent, we should have to go back to the first parents of our race. But they occur specifically in certain actions more or less peculiar to the individual and impart a special character to the motive into which they enter, so that the resulting act is different from what it would be were this particular feature absent. In order to support existence, a man of inherited normal propensities will labour as his fathers laboured before him, in one of the permitted fields of industry; but a man of inherited criminal tendencies, may rob or murder in pursuance of the same motive of sustenance. General heredity, therefore, may be said to be always present in human motives; but specific heredity occurs as a factor of certain motives to which it gives a distinctive character. The hereditary quota is an unreasoned inclination. It is a manifestation of the inner bias of the individual which is not perceptible to reason, or rather concerning which the reason does not exercise its power, in the majority of men. A man finds

in his consciousness a partiality for a certain mode of conduct, an instinctive preference for the pursuit of certain motives in certain ways, and although that preference may sometimes be attributed to early training, it is often due to heredity. Hereditary aptitudes in academic and other families are not matters of doubt. Those to whom such aptitudes have been transmitted seek sustenance in the ancestral walk of life, and their success is generally assured. The sustentative motive leads them into the hereditary occupation for which they have inherent aptitudes, whereas had the heredity had no especial mental bent, they might have adopted one as well as another occupation.

If we knew the exact psychological elements contained in individual germ-plasms, it might be possible to foresee some of the acts of individual lives; but as such is not the case, any attempt in the direction of prevision must take the form of an enquiry into the history of ancestral acts. Such an enquiry, however, is not likely to be ever made with any great degree of accuracy under the prevailing conceptions of moral responsibility and the habit of either suppressing moral faults in the consideration of a career or of giving them undue prominence. Much good, however, might be derived from a consistent endeavour to correct in their offspring the faults which parents have observed in themselves, whenever such faults are reproduced, because education, although unable to entirely counteract heredity, is the only antidote to its deleterious effects. In the same way that an anatomical defect may be corrected by means of mechanical appliances in childhood; so psychologico-moral defects may be modified by a proper use of the instrument of education, wherever there is a normally constituted brain. It is seen that while some children of parents of average education and status are naturally disposed to acquisitiveness and even selfishness, as well as to mendacity and dissimulation, others are equally naturally inclined to generosity and unselfishness as well as to truthfulness and candour. Whence are these dispositions derived? Not to any appreciable extent from educational agencies, unless perhaps slightly from parental precepts. Little, presumably, from conditions of environment. They probably proceed from the ancestral source and have been

transmitted by one or both of the parents, or by one or more of those parents' ascendants. This is the conclusion at which we are forced to arrive, unless we are to suppose that both good and bad manifestations are the mere result of accident. But the common experience of men goes to show that the tendencies exhibited in childhood are continued in after life, and it is difficult to admit that they could be so persistent if accidental. Again, as features and form are transmitted to offspring by parents, it would be an arbitrary limitation to confine resemblance to those factors. If any further proof were needed, the practical observation of parents from the earliest times provides it. It has always been remarked that traits of character peculiar to certain members of a family are reproduced in children and when any unfamiliar disposition is evinced by a child, his parents frequently seek to discover from what ancestor it has been derived. There are, however, cases where the inheritance has been so general that few especial characteristics are observable, and in such cases a process of compensation occurs which results in a purely normal motivation.

It is, however, evident that as hereditary characteristics of conduct are derived originally from some inveterate habit on the part of an ancestor, formed probably in early manhood and under the pressure, in some instances, of external causes; such habits may occur at any time in the history of a family. It is highly probable that they all have only a limited period of duration and are replaced by others as the family increases in age. If accurate records were kept of the propensities of the members of well constituted families, it might be possible to obtain reliable data from which a law of origins might be derived, but such, for the reasons above stated, is not feasible. With the knowledge which we possess, we may, however, form general conclusions and these, as regards the present enquiry, establish the fact that heredity has a large share in the formation of motives. In the discussions which have taken place between the most recent exponents of the Lamarckian and the Darwinian schools on the subject of inherited organic characteristics, it has been contended, on the one hand, that movements of organism are caused by sensation and by conscious states; that habitual movements are

the result of experience. On the other hand it has been maintained that the movements of organism are, on the contrary, a survival, through natural selection, "from multifarious movements,"¹ and that habitual movements are due to natural selection. With regard to the question of organic movement, any one who has carefully watched the movements of an infant learning to walk should be convinced that in the human species, both inherited locomotory powers and acquired experience are manifested in such movements and it seems, for the rest, that both in movement or habitual movement, heredity is joined to practice. If this be so, then it is permissible to argue that in the formation of motives which are the subjective causes of physical motion, experience of the outer world is joined to the hereditary bent. The motive is in reality a motion of the mind followed by a motion of the body called an act. There is in what is called a personality, a double source of action: the innate ancestral prompting and the suggestion of experience. The former comes directly from the ancestors, the latter is the self-counsel of the individual and is the outcome of the human state.

ORDER OF MOTIVES

The fundamental motives, that is to say, those motives under the influence of which the greatest number of human acts are performed, are:—

1. Sustenance.
2. Sex.
3. Pleasure.
4. Self-love.
5. Sympathy.
6. Religion.

The order adopted is that of the relative importance of the motives in the general plan of conduct, but it is liable to be interverted in individual cases. The motives of sex and pleasure are often found to be parallel motives and the motive of religion is, as will be seen, supplementary and contingent. It is contended that this division is in accordance with the nature and character of human life as it has hitherto been lived.

¹ Cope. "The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution."

CHAPTER II

SUSTENANCE

THE motive of sustenance is that which leads to acts of self-protection, of nutrition, and of acquisition. It occupies the greatest share of human time and on its successful pursuit, the remaining motives are in a large degree dependent.

While however the sustentative motive is undoubtedly the most important, it possesses the characteristic of being exclusively an end to itself only in so far as it leads to acts of self-preservation alone, for when it is only concerned with acquisition, its ultimate end is the origination of the pleasure motive. When life is menaced, the efforts of individuals are exclusively devoted to its maintenance; but when there is no such menace and wealth is amassed or property acquired, the efforts made are designed not only to support existence, but to procure its pleasurable sensations.

The sustentative motive in relation to other motives may be compared to the stem or trunk of a tree, from which branches spread out on either side, that are dependent for their lives upon the life of the stem. Under varying conditions, one or more of the branches may be removed without occasioning the death of the tree. A man may desire to follow the motives of sex, pleasure, sympathy, self-love, religion; but the conditions of his existence may render the pursuit of these motives impossible. His death is not necessarily caused by such impossibility, although his social usefulness may be thereby impaired. The sustentative motive is that upon the pursuit of which all other motives depend, and it is for this reason that it must be given the first place in a classification of motives.

In the daily life of the majority of individuals, the influence of this motive is apparent. When a man wakes

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in the morning, rids his mind of the illusions of sleep, and brings it into the logical nexus of the exterior world, he begins, as soon as he has risen, to give effect to the diurnal series of motives by which he is influenced. His first motive may be considered as one of pleasure in obedience to which he will cleanse his body, and dress so that his health and comfort may be promoted. From motives of sustenance he will then partake of food, and if he be an earner, as the vast majority of men, he will leave his house for the purpose of performing his daily task. During the greater part of the day, his acts will be the effects of the sustentative motive, including the renewed partaking of food. When the work of the day is over, the pleasure or sex motives may determine their corresponding conduct, but the motive under the influence of which he will remain the longest will, under ordinary circumstances, be that of sustenance. This motive, therefore, represents in its different forms, the egoism without which life, as it has been hitherto conceived, could not be conducted. According to the system which has obtained in spite of all religious doctrines of self abnegation, each man is moved by an impulse which directs him to labour to maintain himself and offspring, and to labour the more strenuously, because he is aware that his existence is conditional upon the results of his industry, there being no common store from which he may derive sustenance in need. It thus occurs that the majority of men being continually under the necessity of pursuing it, this motive is always present in their thoughts and forms the main-spring of their conduct. Moreover, the term motive of sustenance being applicable to all motives of material interest whatsoever, including vital solicitude of every kind, its field is more extensive than that of any other motive. It is, in fact, predominant and it endures to the full extent of individual existences. From motives of sustenance men frequently confront the greatest dangers. Shortly after the volcanic eruption in Martinique while the mountain was still in a menacing condition, the governor of the island repeatedly warned the fishermen of the danger of approaching the coast at a point towards which dense clouds of vapour and ashes of a temperature higher than that of boiling water, rolled down at intervals

from the mountain. His admonitions did not prevent the fishermen, as he himself deplores, from pursuing their industry, although in imminent peril of their lives.¹ It is generally considered in France that the suppression of the right of primogeniture which took place after the French Revolution, has had the effect of causing a diminution of the birth rate among the owners of property.² The reason given for this decrease is the unwillingness of parents, possessing several children, that their fortunes should be divided into shares too small to provide sufficient revenues for any one of their heirs, and here we see a solicitude for the sustenance of offspring, conflicting with the sex motive. Thwarted desire for sustenance, either in its largest or in its most restricted sense, may be the cause of mental affections. It is hardly doubtful that many nervous diseases such as nervous prostration, timidity or, as a French psychologist³ has fitly termed it, intimidation, and even many cases of insanity are due to those conditions of society which place the attainment of adequate sustenance and satisfactions, out of the reach of considerable numbers of the community. Timidity, especially, is largely engendered by the evil, as well as by the severe conditions which sensitive and nervous men encounter in their daily intercourse. And this affection may be transmitted by parents to their children. An effect of the sustentative motive is to suppress the expression of independent convictions and this is no where so well exemplified as among writers in journals who are under the obligation of making the opinions they express harmonise with the particular tenets of the journal for which they write, under pain of loss of employment. It sometimes happens that where men are independently possessed of the vital necessities, they renounce their post rather than submit to the restraint to which they are subjected; but when no such independent means exist, then, from motives of sustenance, they are forced to suppress their own convictions and to express others which are opposed to them. Here the necessity for earning, gives rise to a species of self-treachery which is

¹ *Journal Officiel de la Martinique*, 23 Décembre 1902.

² Toutée on French Natalty, *Le Temps* No. 1621.

³ M. Dugas. "La Timidité."

only one of the moral bifurcations it occasions. In obedience to the sustentative motive, firms of ship owners, regardless of patriotism, are sometimes seen to place their ships under the flags of nations other than their own, because by so doing, they are able to derive certain material benefits. In their anxiety to preserve sufficient money for the purchase of food, the London poor are sometimes seen to sleep out of doors far into the winter at the peril of their lives. In America the men who work the rapid elevators in the high buildings of the cities, are said to succumb to heart disease and yet their places are continually refilled by other men eager to earn the immediate means of supporting life, even at the expense of its duration.

Now the end to which the sustentative motive immediately tends after the means of subsistence have been obtained, is the acquisition of property. Under its influence individuals, classes, associations and communities, continually strive for an increase of property, and devices both legitimate and illegitimate are resorted to with that end, while the possession or the non-possession of wealth has a vital influence upon conduct. In certain countries, marriages in all but the lower classes are decided without any regard to selection, but according to the property or earning potentiality possessed by the contracting parties, and that marriage is generally considered the most satisfactory in which an equation of property, in one form or another, has been established. The end or result of marriage being offspring, it has been considered necessary to make an adequate provision for offspring, and hence the system of dowries which, although probably unfavorable to conjugal morality, has been the means of avoiding the suffering sometimes consequent upon marriages contracted under penurious circumstances. In such countries where the endowment system obtains, there is a greater economy of human material, but on the other hand a smaller incentive to strenuous effort and in general a less vigorous strife for sustenance by means which are socially good. With a few exceptions, men grant esteem to each other in direct ratio to the wealth which each possesses. What are called straitened circumstances generally excite a form of contempt. The necessitous being unable to

confer benefits upon their friends are looked upon with little interest and the moral qualities they may possess are scarcely credited to them. On the other hand their moral defects are severely blamed. The motives of individuals and likewise those of associations and nations are guided by an egopetal zeal which, although in its general principle essential to the preservation of the race, is as at present practised, inimical to numerous portions of it, for the reason that the resources of the earth being developed in such a way that the most endowed physically and mentally or the most unjust obtain the ownership of an overwhelming share, a deprivation of the plain necessities must be inflicted on the remainder. It is in the pursuit of the sustentative motive that conflicts arise between the sense of equitable apportionment, or of just recognition of the rights of others, and the necessity of providing for the needs of a family. A man may and often does find himself placed in the alternative of acting in contradiction to his strict sense of honesty, or of reducing his family to want, and when such conflicts occur, integrity is often sacrificed. Again, a man from sympathetic motives or from those of self-love, may expend his total means in paying the debts of his father; but by so doing, although he may be rewarded by the general esteem, he may be reduced to such extreme poverty as to become a burden to his friends. In this case he would only have changed the sustainers of the loss which resulted from the misfortunes or bad administration of his father. Those who have pursued the sustentative motive advantageously, are privileged to avoid many of the dangers into which the needy fall, and so long as the former practise sufficient self-restraint to prevent them from indulging in excesses, their chances of long life are considerably greater. The long practice of this predominant motive has had the effect of causing men to compute qualities in terms of wealth or property. Thus superiority is often measured by the monetary rewards which it obtains. Wealth is considered to be the recompense of meritorious effort, either on the part of individuals or of their ancestors, and the possessors are therefore entitled to consideration or respect, although it is sometimes seen that consideration and respect, or a certain share of

both, are shown to persons whose efforts, though successful, have not been meritorious. In England it is considered that all important public officers, including the judges, should be highly remunerated, so that their sustentative motives may be satisfied. By implication it is held that to secure probity, a high remuneration is essential. There is in every nation, it is true, a satisfied class, the members of which do not generally consider that the acquisition of additional wealth is worth the loss of health and the anxiety of mind by which it is frequently accompanied, and the motives of these persons are not primarily those of sustenance. For this idle class, motives of a kind almost unknown to the worker may become important determining factors of acts. To prove the superiority of a breed of horses, a man may undertake to perform a feat of hurdle-jumping which may result in disablement or death, and the love intrigues of these non-earners are generally more numerous and more intricate than those of the workers, from the fact that the latter have less time at their disposal for love-making. But this class must, of necessity, always remain in the minority, the more so as the remuneration of safely invested wealth decreases. As it is, however, it excites the envy of a large number of workers who aspire to reach it, notwithstanding that the sight of its favoured existence, arouses in many of them a feeling of injustice. The determination to resist privilege which was first shown in the period preceding the French revolution, manifests itself to-day in an altered form in socialism which, in obedience to sustentative motives, proclaims the need for the adjustment of wealth as the source of life and happiness.

In the doctrines of the Positivist sect, wealth is regarded as a source, not only of power, but of moral good, and it would be useless to deny that the possession of it renders the possessor able to rectify, to some extent, the inequalities of the vital struggle. The faculty, however, of thus correcting both the injustice of society and the inclemency of nature, does not necessarily connote the will to do so. Hence we have the numerous sustentative endeavours of democratic politicians to force the surrender of the benefits which are frequently withheld.

In all the great commercial towns of Europe and especially in London, large numbers of men journey each morning to the commercial centre from motives of sustenance. They are generally the fathers of families and consequently it is incumbent on them to provide for a plurality of appetites. Their desire to gain is obviously intense and they have little to guard them from the temptation of enriching themselves from time to time by means not morally or socially legitimate, except the fear of loss of reputation; for many of the immoral practices of trade do not come within the scope of the law, although they are productive of considerable harm to those who are the victims of them. In the pursuit of this motive, men do not generally stop to weigh moral precepts. They do not continually enquire of themselves whether they ought or ought not to do this or that; but they act according to the exigencies and opportunities of the moment.

In the minds of the majority, the idea of excellence is contained in an idea of wealth. Where gain is the desire of all, the value of the contributions of each to the general needs will be in proportion to the remuneration received, or the extent of the hope of ultimate reward, and therefore those institutions on which the largest sums have been expended, are generally seen to afford advantages which the smaller and less endowed cannot provide. The former offer security against many contingencies which the latter, however honestly conducted, seldom give, and hence a higher standard of conduct is expected and generally found in the wealthier organisations than in the poorer. The sustentative motives of the directors of such organisations, in so far as professional morality is concerned, are of a more reliable and normal character, although it may also happen that the means by which they became possessed of their position were not morally good. For a man may by an injustice acquire sufficient wealth to enable him to found an equitably conducted undertaking. The sustentative motive may have prompted him to commit the unjust act and the same motive induces him to labour subsequently to build up a reputation for integrity. The knowledge of the original injustice may be confined to a very few, while, owing to its more

public nature, that of the honestly conducted enterprise may be wide-spread, and this adaptability of wealth to the purposes of right or wrong is to be met with continually in the field of experience.

Wealth, however acquired, by providing education, superior food and environment, is capable of changing class characteristics and hence it is often seen that the children of enriched artisans develop a degree of refinement and loftiness of idea which contrasts them strongly with their parents. In some cases the result is to produce a type both physically and mentally endowed, but in others, the type produced is of an inferior and hybrid kind. In some men the possession of wealth gives rise to feelings of solicitude for the less fortunate; in others it only excites solicitude for luxury and consideration. The general happiness is increased or diminished by such men.

When the possessor of a great fortune amassed in the pursuit of sustenance, gives or bequeaths a large portion of that fortune for some public good, he is moved by a desire to aid others in the toil for sustenance, through the human instinct of racial preservation which will be dealt with later, and his action is not only beneficial to the extent of the service rendered, but it has the effect of inspiring the non-possessors with more confidence in human nature and of averting the dangerous resentments excited in the struggle for sustenance; although it must not be forgotten that the moral value of such an act depends, in a considerable degree, upon the moral right of the donor to the possession. But when the holder of great wealth, uses his wealth solely for the purpose of increasing his power and of founding one of those families which, in most countries and especially in monarchical ones, occupy privileged positions for generations; then his sustentative motives may be said to be deflected from their social course.

The supremacy of the sustentative over the other motives of individuals is sometimes shown in a marked manner in international trade conditions. Patriotism is generally considered to require that the greatest industrial interests of a country should be owned by natives of that country who should resist overtures to cede them into foreign hands. It is seen, however, that when a sufficient

inducement is offered by foreigners to the proprietors of native enterprises which for political reasons should remain national, such proprietors accept such offers. Whether it is or is not to the advantage of the world that an internationalisation of property should be effected, is not to be discussed here; we are only concerned with the fact that when the occasion arises, patriotism gives way to personal interest. It appears that although patriotism excites at times the most vehement outbursts of enthusiasm among the mass of a people, it may be placed aside by individual possessors of wealth when the inducement to do so is sufficiently strong. If it were the custom of the conquerors in modern warfare to confiscate all the discoverable property of the conquered and to reduce its owners to serfdom, it is possible that the capitalists of a nation might determine to reject all proposals tending to foreign acquisition. But it is known with certainty that such is not the practice, and therefore the patriotic scruple is overcome.

Not a century ago, although theft was capitally punished, there were not wanting men and women who, in illicit pursuit of sustenance, were willing to incur the risk of the death penalty. They were generally of the class for whom employment is unobtainable, and as death by inanition seemed to them scarcely better than death by strangulation, they preferred to take the risk of the latter alternative which was averted if they were not discovered. Even to-day, traders are willing to risk their reputations, in some cases their freedom, for the prospect of great gain. It not unfrequently occurs that owing to the excess of competition, men of the best intentions are forced by the stress of circumstances to inflict loss on those who trusted them and the mental pain endured by conscientious creditors is often extremely great.

If it be true, as it is generally held to be, that the middle classes are the mainstay of society, the fact is due to the orderly conditions of existence created by the moderate degree of wealth which they possess and which enables them to pursue the sustentative motive in an efficient social manner. As they have neither an insufficiency nor an excess, they are preserved both from the dangers to which poverty exposes the poor and from those to which wealth

subjects the rich. Their moderate means are productive of a form of conduct which conduces to harmonious conditions of existence. Honesty which is a luxury favoured by a certain degree of wealth, is inculcated by early example, and in many children of this class there is no conception of dishonesty. It seems probable that a greater immunity from disease is to be found in the middle classes who not only are not exposed to the privations of the poor, but who also avoid many of the diseases of the rich which are due to excesses, although in the absence of statistics it is difficult to obtain documentary evidence upon the subject. Earners of various degrees of income are stimulated by the hope of increasing their earnings by their industry, and this hope maintains an activity among them which must be considered as generally healthy. The poor, however, have rarely such a hope and lack the incentive which it affords.

It is not towards equalisation that the sustentative motives of men have hitherto tended, except in the few instances of communal life which have been manifested from time to time, and hence we are obliged to accept the fact that inequality and the injustice inseparable from it, are the result of the struggle as it has been hitherto pursued.

Sustentative motives vary in character according to class. Thus the sustentative efforts of the destitute are chiefly directed towards nutrition, those of the well-to-do towards nutrition, acquisition and pleasure, those of the affluent towards nutrition, acquisition, pleasure and luxurious pleasure. Each of these objects of endeavour suffices for itself until its end is attained, when it is changed for the higher. In regard to the last, however, as no change for the better is possible, it finds its satisfaction in the consciousness of its unsurpassable position.

There are, of course, many more than three classes. Probably if the degrees were counted from the lowest to the highest, the number would be found to be eight or ten; but for the present purposes, the triple division is sufficient, for it is in these three grades: poor, moderately-meant, and rich—that the three distinctive modes of conduct created by the motives of sustenance are found.

In the poor class, let us see how morals are affected by

this need. As regards the criminal aspect of the case, there exists a large number of professional criminals whose sustentative motives are deflected from their normal course and who are determined to be maintained either at the expense of the state or of society. Almost immediately after each release from prison, they commit fresh thefts, and it is the opinion of all who have studied them that they are irreclaimable. Here, therefore, is a section of the poor (and these criminals are recruited exclusively from the poor) completely destitute of moral principle, who to remain alive, avail themselves of the most dangerous means. Then, among criminals, there is the crime of infanticide which is due, in the majority of cases, to solicitude for sustenance. There is that of drunkenness, infinitely greater among the poor than among the rich, which is largely due to the desire to escape the pain of destitution. With regard to common theft which the statistics record, the great proportion is to be credited to the poor, since none but they are forced to minor methods of obtaining sustenance, and the criminal judges are occupied during at least nine-tenths of the time they sit, in judging the poorer members of the community. And although it is true that the poor constitute the majority of the population, yet there is, notwithstanding, a great relative disproportion between the number of poor and the number of rich offenders, not only as regards offences against property, but also in the other branches of crime. It is to satisfy the desire of sustenance that the great majority of crimes are committed.¹ The sex morality of the poor is also largely influenced by the economic conditions in which they dwell and the influence is both restrictive and prescriptive. It is restrictive in the sense that in ordinary conditions of family life, the very smallness of means acts as a check against conjugal infidelity and debauch; but on the other hand, in certain conditions of destitution where the sexes are closely lodged; it tends to laxity. Realising the need for mutual assistance in their precarious position, the poor help each other, although amongst themselves

¹ Judicial statistics both in England and on the continent of Europe, continually show that the great majority of offences committed are offences against property.

the security of property is not extremely great. If when employed, moreover, they are generally seen to be worthy of the trust reposed in them, this is often due to the fact that their only asset is their reputation for honesty which when once lost, renders employment unobtainable. Their regard for the truth is somewhat less strong than that of the classes above them, as is seen in courts of justice when servants are called as witnesses. The lad who from sustentative motives steals a cake and who, when charged with the theft, denies it, is often called depraved; but if excessive hunger and insufficient knowledge of right and wrong be the causes of the act and the hunger and the ignorance be due to poverty, then the crime may be at once connected with the need of sustenance, and the question may be asked with whom does the responsibility lie; with the lad's ancestors or with society which has allowed him to be so hungry and so ignorant? The answer will probably be with both the ancestors and with society, and therefore the blame may be retrospective as regards society supposing that in the past it helped or allowed the ancestor to become a criminal. Among the well-to-do, the influence on morals of the working of the sustentative motive is more complicated. It cannot so easily be traced in criminal statistics. It must be sought in the less public manifestation of social life. While the poor are represented practically by the sign minus, this class may be denoted by the sign plus, and if there be truth in the contention that the possession of a certain amount of property is favourable to moral conduct, then we must look for a higher standard of conduct here. And not in vain. In every nation the middle classes are comparatively free from common crime, and although some of their members are often guilty of immoral practices in trade, the majority may be held to lead lives in conformity with the best rules of conduct of their times. In this class the institution of the family is brought to the greatest degree of perfection. Monogamous conjugal ethics are fairly good. Hygienic rules are well observed. Children are not neglected. Old age is not abandoned. Insobriety is rare. This class, although it has egoistic tendencies often of an excessive kind, has yet a system of conduct

which is favourable to national development. Its members have the privilege of leading orderly lives by reason of the material advantages which they possess. The motives of their acts are those of acquisition, but they are tempered by principles which are of as sound a social character as the circumstances of the competition for sustenance permit. In the higher branches of this class are the professions which being placed by the general consent and by law in privileged positions little subject to vicissitudes, are, with few exceptions free from crime. Their labour for sustenance is lighter and more pleasurable and their motives are often less directly guided by the need for acquisition. Their conduct tends to prove that, the anxiety of sustenance being allayed, the acts of men are of a higher moral quality. We cannot without much difficulty conceive a corrupt judge, but we can easily imagine an unscrupulous tradesman. The integrity of the former, however, is in a large measure due to the superior advantages of education and environment which his parents' wealth procured for him, and this fact must be duly weighed in estimating the moral worth of the individual. It is true that the unscrupulous tradesman may also have been afforded educational advantages and either failed to profit by them or having profited by them may not have been deterred in his anxiety for gain, by his superior knowledge, but cases of this kind are not abundant and they would be still less rare than they are, if education included a really efficient moral training.

In the minds of the middle classes, there are more prudential inhibitions than in those of the poor, and these inhibitions are generally salutary.

While the poor are driven by the immediate need of sustenance to commit wrong acts, the class above them enjoy a much greater immunity from such compulsion. In some countries where justice is not well organised and where judges are wrongly influenced by motives of sustenance, the possession of wealth and influence on the part of offenders has a considerable weight in the determination of their punishment, and it is frequently seen that rich offenders are absolved from offences for which poor delinquents are condemned. It also happens

however, especially in strictly governed countries, that the possession of superior advantages on the part of an offender is only considered as an aggravation of his offence. The knowledge of the excess of censure which they have to bear, acts as a deterrent on the richer classes in the same way as the necessity they are under of setting an example to inferiors, does so act. It is true that the obligation of setting an example is frequently disregarded by the richer classes. These, however, are generally careful that their departures from moral orthodoxy should be as little known as possible to those beneath them, and this is shown with clearness in the precautions which masters take before their servants.

If we now consider the rich; that is to say those persons who are securely possessed of revenues of sufficient magnitude to admit of luxury, we shall find conditions of a different character.

Affluence preserves its possessors from most of the criminal failings manifested in the struggle for sustenance, but on the other hand it exposes them to the temptation which wealth constantly places before its possessor. It is undoubted that the long continued possession of affluence tends to determine in its possessor a feeling of indifference to all considerations which are not those of pleasure, and hence the reproach which has often been cast upon rich men of taking no care for the welfare of the poor except by inadequate and demoralising almsgiving. If it be considered how small have been the voluntary concessions made by this class to those below them, the reproach will appear to be justified. It is true that in recent times, the rise of democracy all over Europe and the frequency and increasing cogency of democratic utterances, has caused many of the rich to make efforts to correct their vice of callousness; but such efforts have been isolated and without much bearing upon the general condition of the lower classes. Even from the standpoint of conventional morality, there is little doubt that the wealthy fall short of the standard attained by the moderately rich in those walks of conduct which are unconnected with money-earning, and this is frequently shown when, as in England, the proceedings of divorce courts are made public. Again, the possession of excessive wealth attaches

the possessor to the social status which it creates and causes him to consent to sacrifices to maintain that status. Thus, from motives of sustenance, marriages are frequently contracted by ruined persons without regard to affinity, sometimes in defiance of hygienic or natural laws. It also occurs, however, that wealth possessed by one or other of the marrying parties, may procure marriages of affinities which might not otherwise be effected, and it seems conducive to the maintenance of good social conditions, that affinitive unions should be as numerous as possible. Wealth, again, exposes its possessors to the error of seeking to associate with the rich, exclusively, with little regard to their moral or intellectual qualities and this error tends to narrow the scope of enlightenment of the class which commits it. It is not always seen, no doubt, that the rich refuse to associate with the less rich, but the pursuits and recreations of the former are generally of too costly a character to permit the latter to participate in them and thus firm lines of demarcation are drawn between the possessors of moderate, and the possessors of superfluous means, which are obstacles to an extended solidarity.

Fortunes of equal magnitude attract each other and their owners find the greatest enjoyment in each other's company. This enjoyment, however, being confined to classes, must be considered as unfavourable to the general development of society. Excessive wealth possessed by men who refuse to be guided by any principles of general justice, has frequently the effect of inflicting loss and deprivation on the smaller owners of property, as when offers to purchase property held in shares or divisions are made by large capitalists and are accepted in the fear of total loss possibly resulting from the changes which it is in the power of capital to cause. The power of capital used for a specific object is so great, that minor interests are carried away before it and great interference with and disorganisation of the means of subsistence of small possessors, continually results from the action of the all-engrossing capitalist. There is a process adopted by capitalists in obedience to the sustentative motive which consists in obtaining a temporary preponderating interest in enterprises for purposes which are rarely to the

ultimate advantage of such enterprises, and it would be easy to multiply examples of the manner in which the ethics of class are affected by economic conditions.

Thus, the sustentative motive, in the case of the poor, leads to considerable crime. In the case of the moderately rich, it leads generally to conduct socially good. In the case of the affluent, its object, acquired wealth or property, while promoting some social good, tends to be a source of social danger.

The severity of the struggle for sustenance is increased by the fact that in the majority of the cities of Europe, the economic conditions are such that ten per cent. of the population live in a state of half nutrition, ascertainably productive of physical degeneration, while about thirty per cent. of the population live in the depressing state of poverty.¹

Under these circumstances, it is no matter for surprise that the knowledge of the fate which awaits all those who fail to maintain themselves within the limit of physical efficiency, engenders a fear which increases in proportion to the destitution, until the callousness of despair is reached.

The desire of life being intense in most men, the effect of the sustentative motive under deficient social and economic conditions, is to cause a diminution of the sympathetic motive and of the emotion of pity which is connected with it. While under the influence of the former motive, a man may become unmindful of the interests or prospects of any of those with whom he may compete and may even conceive hatred of them. He may become indifferent also to the physical suffering of such competitors, for he is incapable of holding any other interest in any degree comparable to his own. Yet in misfortune, men of the most acquisitive natures experience poignant pity for themselves. There are probably few men also who, when under the influence of the sustentative motive invariably act with the strictest rectitude. Either by prevarication or suppression of the truth, endeavours are made to obtain an advantage or to maintain a supremacy, even when absolute mendacity is not practised. The issue is so momentous, that only

¹ See Rowntree, "Poverty," p. 299.

the strongest willed and most independent men refrain from some slight infringement of the laws of right conduct when pressed by the motive of sustenance.

From what has been said it will be seen that men in obedience to motives of sustenance act both in a manner favourable to the general interests of society and also from the same motive, in a way diametrically opposed to those interests and that the possession or non-possession of the immediate object of the motive, property, largely determines the manner in which the motive is pursued. When the motive is pursued in such a way that no grave injury is inflicted, either on individuals or on society by the pursuit; the conduct witnessed is normal. When it is pursued in a manner injurious to individuals or to society, it is deflected conduct. And thus we have two modes of acts proceeding from the same motival source—normal sustentative acts and deflected sustentative acts.

CHAPTER III

SEX

THE sex motive is that which tends or leads primarily to the satisfaction of sexual desire and secondarily to the perpetuation of the race.

Unlike the sustentative motive which affects almost the entire existence of individuals, this motive is only pursued during two thirds of the ordinary duration of life. In that period, however, and especially in the first half, it has an important influence upon conduct. From adolescence, in both sexes, a complex psychological process takes place, which, whether it be termed the instinct or sentiment of love, or as Schopenhauer defined it, the cogitation of future generations, produces the motive of sex which is the cause of acts of varying moral and social quality.

Normally pursued, the sex motive leads to acts favourable to the mating of the sexes in regular union and to the prudential reproduction of species. Abnormally pursued, it leads to acts which are unfavourable to such mating and to such reproduction.

Among males, especially in the north of Europe, the motive is somewhat restrained by the mental labour of education; but at the age of twenty, it has, in the majority of cases, taken rank among the principal motives of existence.

When the conduct manifested by man is that which leads to mating according to affinity and to the foundation of a family, the motive may be said to have been well pursued, socially because the course to which it leads has hitherto been seen to be the most favourable to health, social stability and the perpetuation of the race. As however this form of the motive needs for its pursuit certain conditions which are not always present and a certain restraint of sex impulses which is at times

beyond the power of the will, there occur in its pursuit, exceptions and deflections which are the causes of suffering or of social disorder. In general when the motive is of moderate intensity and is guided by the reason and the will, a social course is taken; but when it is of great intensity and is not so guided, an anti-social course is pursued. The strength of the motive and its conformity with reason, depend upon a series of causes, hereditary, physical, climatic and nutritional as well as upon environment or the occasions of sexual attraction.

When a normal course is pursued, the resulting conduct is that in which an even balance of the passions is maintained by the habit of conjugal living; when an abnormal is followed, then diversified modes of action are manifested which are below investigated.

From motives of sex, married men adopt settled habits of residence. They are tied to the home where their affections are centred, which they desire to maintain in a certain spot, and this desire promotes social and national stability. From the same motive, normally pursued, young men seek the society of maidens and endeavour by a display of qualities to win the consent to marriage of the object of their choice, displaying bravery or even heroism when necessary to obtain such consent and this, not only in civilization, but also in barbarism. When the sex motive is highly idealized, men are seen to make poetic declarations, to profess a cult for the woman they prefer and frequently to allow themselves to be guided by her will. The episode of chivalry was the strongest expression of this tendency. Again, from motives of sex, husbands sometimes pardon both ill temper and infidelity on the part of their wives rather than break the physical and mental habit of association by a separation. From the same motives, wives also pardon the same faults on the part of husbands. Sex motives are generally pursued in our civilization in a somewhat narrow area and this fact is not conducive to the attainment of especially selective unions. Men who possess, or have acquired substance, have in a large measure the choice of mates, but that choice is generally exercised in a comparatively narrow circle, owing to class divisions and in many countries to the lack of

opportunities of meeting due to deficient social conditions. There can be little doubt that in pursuit of the sex motive, men do not always obtain consorts who are altogether congenial to their tastes and although in married life, a certain equalizing process takes place between the couples, there would seem to be a prejudice done to society by the fact of imperfect mating.

Under the influence of the sex motive, abnormally pursued, the most prudent of men are sometimes seen to expend more than their means permit, moved by the sense of gratitude which love arouses and which makes them unmindful of the consequences of undue expenditure when such expenditure increases the pleasure and affection of the woman for whom it is incurred. Under the same influence, acts of jealousy are sometimes committed which effect, or are designed to effect, the destruction of the object of desire. It is possible that in such cases the immediate motive under which the man acts is that of self-love wholly or partially, but the motive which was being pursued when the jealousy intervened having been the sex motive, it is difficult to separate the act from it.

In such cases the mind is for a time so completely dominated that it is incapable of performing its normal function, and the irrational action results. It is not generally seen, however, that violence is resorted to as long as the relations between the sexes have not assumed an intimate character, the habit of cohabitation creating ties which are not so harmlessly broken as those which exist between lovers between whom no intimate relations exist.

In most European capitals and large towns the extra-matrimonial pursuit of the sex motive by men, is productive, principally among women, of irregular, non-hygienic and unhappy conditions of existence, instances of which are constantly placed before the eyes of observers. The motives which have rendered such a condition possible show extreme deflection, since the existence of a class of female outcasts from society for whom society is responsible, cannot be regarded as otherwise than socially bad. But the question involves physiological considerations which lie outside the present scope and this phenomenon must continue to be wit-

nessed, so long as the habits of luxury and the cost of life in large cities render early unions difficult of realization and so long as the maintenance of social status, due to exaggerated self-love, is a desire of increasing strength.

It might have been expected that with the progress of civilization the evil would have tended to disappear, but sex motives on the part of men, and sustentative motives on the part of women, have been strong enough to maintain it without any sensible diminution, since the earliest civilizations.

In pursuit of the sex motive, young unmarried men frequently injure not only their present and future health, but also in certain cases, that of their eventual offspring in regular marriage by contracting temporary unions in non-hygienic conditions and it is highly significant that even a full knowledge of the danger to which they expose themselves, does not deter them from incurring such danger.

The motives of normally constituted men have alone a value in the present inquiry, but it is instructive to notice in the works of Kraft-Ebing, Lombroso and others to what extent an excess of deflected sense impulses may lead. That many of the men whose proclivities are described in the works of these inquirers have cerebral lesions has been proved, but there are cases where the cause is "temperament" of abnormal sense intensity acquired often through heredity and probably originally produced by an excess of indulgence on the part of an ancestor. Such examples, therefore, would tend to prove the necessity of restraint independently of others which nature has provided.

The daily press abounds with instances of conduct apparently due to sex motives and to thwarted sex motives, and although such conduct is seldom accurately described, there are some accounts which, owing to strong internal evidence, may be taken as very near approximations to the truth.

The young parish priest of a small town in the south of France had become intimate with a young girl of good family. His ecclesiastical superior, having learnt the fact, ordered his removal to another town. Thereupon the lovers resorted in the evening to the belfry of the

church and there the priest, after shooting the young girl, put an end to his own existence. In the two letters which the girl addressed to her parents and in which she recriminated against the harshness which they had shown towards her, she laid stress upon the facts that faults are often extenuated by circumstances and that the moral value of her lover was proved by his willingness to sacrifice his life rather than live separated from her.¹ We can hardly suppose that there can have been any other cause for this tragedy than that of thwarted sex motives, although it is just possible that there may have been a certain element of vanity or rather of desire to prove consistency of conduct in view of a posthumous restoration of social consideration. It is instructive to observe also that there was a realisation, on the part of the young girl, of the failure of society to pass a correct judgment on her case. Her knowledge of the stern, yet illiberal nature of public opinion in the locality in which she dwelt, had caused her to regard as hopeless a situation which might have been amended had a moral code existed based upon more rational conceptions.

Mr X, a gentleman described as of considerable means, and fifty-two years of age was powerfully attracted by Miss Y, a young lady of twenty-eight. After a short time he became so indifferent to his family, that when his wife announced to him the success of one of his sons in an important examination, he failed to evince pleasure, vituperated both wife and sons, intimating to the former that if she and they did not make Miss Y welcome, he would cause them to repent. When the wife remonstrated at his intimacy with Miss Y, he was unable to refrain from striking her with considerable force. Shortly afterwards, Miss Y visited the family at their home, when Mr X insisted on his wife's making a friend of the young lady, threatening that if she failed to do so, he would break up the household. On one occasion he threatened to strangle his wife, and trample on her. Later he ceased to speak to her and at length, in a letter, he told her that if she would accept what he termed the inevitable, a *modus vivendi* might be found. Finally a climax was reached when in an excited state, a revolver in his hand,

¹ *Le Temps* Nos. 15,203 and 15,204.

he informed his wife that Miss Y was destined to become the mother of a child, the paternity of which he acknowledged. The next day he left the house with Miss Y and did not return. A divorce was subsequently pronounced.¹

In this case the evidence of an attraction strong enough to lead to irrational conduct was clearly furnished. It increased in intensity by steps which were marked by the augmentation of the irritation of Mr X towards his wife, the obstacle to its uncensored gratification, and in this instance both connubial habit and the parental instinct were overcome by the stronger sentiment of sex in respect of a new object of attraction. The attendant circumstances of the case are not given in the report; but whatever they may have been, the motives of his acts are seen, beyond doubt, to have been those of sex attraction in its most acute and unmistakable expression.

A married man of twenty-eight years, described as a clerk² and the father of one child, became intensely attracted by "a young woman who had visited at the house." After his wife had made inquiries and obtained what she considered as sufficient evidence of an intimacy between her husband and the young woman, she remonstrated with the former, intimating that she would apprise his father of the circumstance, whereupon he threatened to kill her if she did so. Not long after this, the clerk's wife was shot in the head and dangerously wounded by (as the jury found) her husband.

This is another instance of the consequences of thwarted sex attraction. As in the previous case, the fixed idea of the man seems to have been to rid himself of the obstacle to the gratification of a new passion. Up till the time he became acquainted with the girl, the wife is reported to have stated in her evidence, they had lived on the most affectionate terms, "the prisoner being a good husband and the best of fathers," so that the act committed, must be considered as entirely due to the motive here ascribed to it.

Among women, sex attraction gives rise to conduct dissimilar to that to which it leads among men. As women are required by universal opinion to wait for matrimony until sought in marriage by the other sex,

¹ *The Times* No. 36,042.

² *The Times* No. 30,713.

without making any advances of a more direct character than those which are postulated by the adornment and the embellishment of their persons, the practise of alluring speech and gestures and in some countries, the use of perfumes; their part in the plan of life is to a considerable extent a passive one and under the existing conditions of education, their sex conduct is in a large measure contingent upon that of the men with whom they are associated, although temperament, in their case also, is an important factor in the determination of their acts. Women however are less affected than men by the physical intensity of the sex motive. They are often ready to forego their affinitive inclinations for the sake of luxury or comfort and they are not generally led to crime or misdemeanour from motives of sex impulsion.¹ When they abandon reputable living, it is nearly always for the sake of greater comfort or of luxury together with idleness, and this is proved by the fact that those who possess a competency, however small, or whose parents are able to support them, rarely become outcasts. It is therefore indisputable that the permanent abasement of women is in a large measure due to an economic cause, and it seems probable that a better distribution of wealth must have the effect, if not of increasing virtue among women generally, at least of lessening the number of those who live by infringing its precepts. In spite of some evidence to the contrary, there seems little doubt that the sex motive is strong enough among married women to ensure the general permanency of monogamous relations and such women are frequently seen, especially in the lower classes, to submit to the worst of treatment rather than separate themselves from the man with whom they have cohabited for a lengthy period. This characteristic may be due, to some extent, to the fear of not finding a new protector, but it is highly probable that reluctance to relinquish the habit of conjugal life, is the chief cause of their disinclination to break the marriage tie, and here we see the sex motive at work as an agent of social stability.

¹ In all countries the number of female offenders is very greatly inferior to that of male offenders. Through history women have been less violently criminal than men.

Married women also experience more compunction for a breach of conjugal fidelity than men, because the part which they take in the propagation of the race is one that in monogamous society renders imperative the fidelity of women to their husbands in the interest of homogeneity of family. If there were no monogamous institution, and if unions were of only temporary duration; the morals of sex attraction would be considerably modified. Although there might be disputes among males for the temporary possession of females, such as occur in the lowest strata of the Parisian population, and varying in character with the social status of the disputants, much less importance would be attached to the circumstances attending the relations of the sexes. The greater number of the domestic dramas which are enacted under the present system would not be witnessed, although there might arise another series which might be of a graver nature.

Rivalry in the pursuit of sex motives is the chief, and almost the only cause of enmity among women. A friendship of long standing between two women is frequently broken when both are attracted by the same man. Under the influence of this form of jealousy, women lose almost all sense of pity. They tend to become vindictive and cruel and this tendency is intensified in the cases of the less favoured towards the more beautiful. When one woman experiences this feeling in respect of another, she is guided by a sentiment of a complex character which may be thus decomposed:—1. Apprehension for a possible loss of participation in the pleasure of the love sentiment and in the work of propagation; 2. Fear of diminution of the feminine *ego* by the success of the rival; 3. Regret for possible material loss; 4. A general sense of frustration of the vital purpose. This quadruple sensation has sometimes the effect of impairing the character of the woman who experiences it, of affecting the normal balance of her mind and occasionally of giving rise to acts of violence. There are certainly cases in which it is only experienced in a slight degree, others where a proud indifference is the habitual characteristic of the individual; but whenever it is only slightly felt, or not at all, there is undoubtedly a diminution of the vital incentive which is not conducive to the maintenance of

the impulsion on the strength of which the vigour of the race depends under existing conditions.

It is not impossible that by long education the sentiment might be modified; that another of a less personal character might be substituted for it, as for instance a self abnegation in the interest of the race; but it is impossible to calculate how long would be the initiation of society before such a result might be obtained. In polygamy, no doubt, the sentiment in question must have been considerably repressed or polygamous life would not have been a possibility; but if we may judge from the reports of female travellers there still exists in the harems of the East, considerable evidence of jealousy. It would appear, therefore, that the primordial sentiment may be modified, but not suppressed.

A laundress of thirty-two, so ill-treated and underfed her son of sixteen *by a first marriage*, that he was reduced to the verge of death by the privations and injuries which had been inflicted upon him. His stepfather did not approve of the brutality and threatened to leave his wife if she continued to practise it.¹

There can be little doubt that the ill-treatment was due to the irritation caused by the presence in the house of an obstacle to the enjoyment and development of the second connubial life. The boy was unprofitable and embarrassing and the vexation which his presence caused, almost cost him his existence. Here the actual sexual and parental sentiments are in strong opposition to a previous series, already effaced by time and changed conditions, and we see this indifference constantly among the females of animals, whose solicitude for progeny is only manifested during the period which extends from one parturition to another.

In the classes where chastity is the rule for unmarried women, celibacy or frustrated sex motives tend to render women addicted to calumnious or to over censorious speech and thus to impair their social value. On the other hand the example of restraint which female celibates offer, has a somewhat beneficial effect upon communities. When the motive of sex is satisfied there is, provided the conditions in which it is satisfied be

¹ *The Times* No. 31,972.

harmonious, a softening of the feminine character and a greater sympathy with society at large, although this is somewhat marred, at times, by the special pride which matrimony is liable to engender. When it is not satisfied, there is a limitation of natural aptitude which, though not generally productive of grave consequences, either to the individual or to the collectivity, is yet unfavourable to the harmonious working of the social scheme.

It seems that a belief in supernatural religion may conquer the asperity produced by celibacy and at the same time render women impervious to the influence of the other sex; but we see that in the case of nuns an attempt is made to satisfy sex attraction by the fiction of a mystical union, and it may be mentioned incidentally, that the sentiment of jealousy is not altogether absent from the cloisters. Nuns, however, lead a frugal life with occasional fastings, and by this means the ascendancy of the passions is restrained. Again those women who engage in higher studies are generally seen to be less under the influence of the sex motives than others, to bestow less care in the adornment of their persons, to be free from the form of jealousy above alluded to (at least in its acute form) and to lead lives of social value. So that it appears that the evil incidental to female celibacy, may be greatly mitigated when the thoughts of celibates are centered on some extraneous theme.

That the whole of living nature may be objectively modified, has been shown conclusively by the researches of zoologists and biologists and by the practical experiments of gardeners and breeders, and consequently there is reason to suppose that subjective changes may also be effected in human beings which may mitigate, but not destroy, the influence of sex in favour of some less material impulsion. The perpetuation of the race depends upon the will to perpetuate, and if by some extraordinary phenomenon that will should one day cease, the morals of the world would have but small importance, since the race would have but a generation more to live. Such a consummation, however, may be safely held to be impossible.

It is certain that our civilization has produced an average type of woman who by her behaviour fulfils the

part which naturalists have traced as being that of the female throughout the animal kingdom, a woman whose chief aim in life, that towards which nearly all her thoughts converge; is the satisfaction of the love-instinct in the most favourable conditions possible. Her principal employment outside that of her domestic duties, is that of attracting the other sex. That she achieves her purpose always by the best methods, cannot be affirmed. That she may do so in the future by such methods depends upon the progress of moral education.

The sex impulse has always formed, and still forms, the principal theme of imaginative literature; for the reason that it is the motive upon the maintenance of which the continuance of human life depends and that it is that, the description of which most interests women who are the principal readers of fictional narratives and for whom, on account of their position as the mothers of the race, it has a paramount importance. The effect produced by the mass of literature dealing with sex motives in a narrative form, must be of a nature to promote and stimulate such motives, although, undoubtedly, there are limits beyond which the perusal of such literature cannot extend without danger to the restraint necessary to a prudential system of existence.

In countries where there is no endowment system, a competition takes place among men for wives in which case the woman's choice is made sometimes according to sex, but often according to sustentative motives, and it is not easy to determine by which choice the race is most benefited. The inclination of the woman may not always be in strict accordance with the principles of selection; for the feminine mind is often attracted by semblances which some men intentionally cultivate; but whenever it is unerring and reciprocated, it seems that the enthusiasm and the profundity of the mutual attachment must do much for the production of offspring mentally and physically equipped for the life of the world.

The pursuit of the sex motive may often temporarily, but seriously impair the character of individuals and give rise to mendacity where it would not otherwise exist. The stern and generally necessary laws imposed by parents for the safety of their daughters, or by married

persons for the preservation of conjugal fidelity, engender a form of fear which gives rise to prevarication after the smallest departure from orthodox conduct and where secret extra-connubial sex relations are maintained by one or other of the married persons or by both, a constant need is experienced for perversion of the truth. In the case of married persons, it sometimes happens that the truth is learnt by the injured party, and when this occurs a rupture of the marriage ties ensues which is generally prejudicial to the interests of offspring, when such exist, and which creates in others the uneasy sense of social failure. Although sometimes accompanied by malignant joy, the sense of failure is seldom free from an element of regret or disappointment at the falling away from the standard of conduct which the offending parties had hitherto professed to observe and for which consideration had been granted. When the truth does not become known, however, it may happen that the irregular association may in time be dissolved by reason of the difficulty of maintaining it, or for some other cause and the married life maintained.

Generally, it may be said that the pursuit of the sex motive and the circumstances by which it is surrounded, give rise to a sensitiveness which although not necessarily innate, has been cultivated and developed in the different civilizations of the world and rendered especially acute by the Christian religion. This sensitiveness manifests itself in respect of deviations from the prescribed code which society detects in the conduct of members of one sex towards members of the other. It is due to the injunctions of early education, to envious irritation against those, who, while disregarding the restrictions to which others are subject, gratify their passions freely and to a general desire of social stability.

When the censure which this sentiment produces is manifested in regard to real deviations from conduct, it must be considered as socially useful, but when, as frequently occurs, it is expressed on insufficient grounds or for purposes of revenge, as by the circulation of false rumours; then it must be held to be socially injurious. The observance of the prescribed conduct in sex relations develops, moreover, a pride which renders many persons

unable to extend any consideration to those who have given evidence of laxer principles and when condemnations are pronounced for an indefinite period and are not withdrawn when the offenders have shown a desire to reform, they must be considered as anti-social.

The views of society in regard to the working of the sex motive have undergone some change in the course of time, and although by the disappearance of such crimes as adultery from criminal jurisprudence the blame of public opinion has by no means been removed, such blame has undoubtedly been modified as the laws prove which tend to make divorce more easily obtainable. The greater freedom accorded to young girls, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, points, if not to an indifference regarding the danger to which liberty exposes them, at least to a certain decline of apprehension for the consequences which may ensue from it, and such modifications of ancient judgments must be attributed to a decline of religious sanction and to the general widening of the scope of life which scientific principles have introduced. The modern tendency in regard to excessive sex impulses, is to seek, not by what means they may be punished according to ancient legal or moral codes, but in what way society may best be preserved from their effects. The subject must be approached in a manner entirely free from prejudice and the fact borne in mind that for some natures, indulgence is a condition of existence. Scientific moral education, connoting an unequivocal presentation of the psychological and physiological facts, may do much towards checking over indulgence; but the possession of a strong will will probably always be the best factor of restraint.¹ Strength of will however, is generally found in healthy subjects, and the conditions of existence of a large number of the inhabitants of towns and even of the agricultural population are not conducive

¹ Kraft-Ebing says:—Trotz aller Hülfen, die Religion, Gesetz, Erziehung und Sitte dem Culturmenschen in der Zügelung seiner sinnlichen Triebe angedeihen lassen, läuft derselbe jederzeit Gefahr, von der lichten Höhe reiner und keuscher Liebe in den Stumpf gemeiner Wollust herabzusinken. Um sich auf jener Höhe zu behaupten bedarfes eines beständigen Kampfes zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Sittlichkeit. Nur willensstarken Charakteren ist es gegeben, sich ganz von der Sinnlichkeit zu emancipiren, und jener reinen Liebe theilhaftig zu werden aus der die edelsten Freuden menschlichen Daseins erblühen.

to the production of healthy subjects. The depressing effects of pauperism, or of precarious living, have a great effect upon the will, rendering it frequently incapable of offering sufficient resistance to the temptation of sense indulgence as an antidote to care, even when the reason is convinced that such indulgence is destructive.

The young are seldom adequately warned of the struggle which awaits them and the outburst of the passions finds them unprepared to offer what resistance might be in their power had they been sufficiently acquainted with the danger, both to themselves and to others, which their ignorance occasions.

In the sex motive of both sexes there is an element of possession. When men seek wives, and women husbands, in addition to the natural attraction, there is a desire of exclusive proprietorship in a member of the other sex which, at times, is almost as strong as the sex motive itself. Certain men of naturally conjugal tendencies, feel an absolute need of being the exclusive appropriators of other human beings whose presence in their households they deem indispensable to the proper ordination of their lives and such men, when widowers, seldom fail to seek remarriage. In the case of women, the desire of exclusive appropriation is equally strong, if it is not stronger, and widows are often seen to consent to considerable sacrifices to obtain it. Married women in all countries are especially fond of speaking of their husbands in the possessive case and they are generally envied by unmarried women, who have not that especial consciousness of ownership. In a last analysis, the instinct, to give it the only name which seems appropriate, is one of sustenance. In both cases the motive of the desire is one of mutual material support.

The motive of parentage is closely allied to that of sex of which it may be considered as an extension. Parental motives act as powerful incentives to good. Maternity is usually the means of attaching women to their homes and of dispelling thoughts of sex attraction of an extra-conjugal nature.¹

¹ "The birth of offspring gives rise to feelings in the minds of its parents so active and so general as to be regarded as constituting a secondary instinct." Wake, *Marriage and Kinship*. 1889.

It is often seen to improve their dispositions, to increase their sympathy and to moderate their fondness for self-adornment. Those women in whom maternal motives are strong, who devote the most time to the education of their children and who endeavour to educate themselves for the purpose, perform a task which is of the highest racial value, whilst those in whom the maternal motive is slight, and who devote but little time to the rearing of their offspring, are deficient members of society. In general, the maternal solitude is shown efficiently in respect of physical health and nourishment and inefficiently in respect of mental and moral training which is confined to a few traditional exercises and precepts, varying with the degree of intelligence of the parent. As the mother, however, is the first and in many respects the most important of moral teachers, it is evident that whenever there is not, on the part of a mother, either sufficient self sacrifice or sufficient knowledge for the task of early tuition, there is a loss of opportunity for social improvement. For a reason which is not easy to explain, there are generally seen to be stronger maternal motives in countries which do not habitually contract marriages of affection, than in those which do. Thus there is a considerable effort made in France by parents to provide for their children and the attachment of French mothers to their offspring is well-known. In England where marriages of inclination are more numerous, there is much less self sacrifice on the part of parents and a certain apathy in regard to the children's lot which, however much it may promote self-reliance, does not tend to promote feelings of filial gratitude.

In healthy women who nourish their children and who sacrifice to a certain extent their strength and form in doing so, the parental motive is advantageous as the means of preserving the child from extraneous nourishment which may or may not be wholesome or hygienic; but it happens in most countries of the West, that substituted human nourishment is resorted to by the rich and artificial nourishment often by the poor, so that here both wealth and poverty appear as agents of racial harm, although it must be admitted that in the case of the poor the necessity of performing work frequently

renders natural nourishment on the part of mothers difficult if not impossible.

Women exhibit fierceness when any blame is cast upon their children, when any wrong is inflicted upon them or any punishment, even when such punishment is deserved, and among the people, where children play together in the street, the children's quarrels are often angrily espoused by the mothers. Again mothers shield their children from their husband's anger and as long as they live, support their sons against the opinion of the world. This maternal solicitude not only operates as a real protection to childhood, but it also has the effect of giving confidence in human nature to children and even to adults. When the son finds himself unjustly treated by society or even too severely blamed for faults, it is salutary that there should be one person in existence upon whose sympathy he may rely and it is highly probable that many suicides are averted by this feeling.

As regards the crimes of infanticide the first fact to be noticed concerning them is that they are far more frequent among the poor than among the rich. Among the former there is abundant evidence to show that if offspring are destroyed to avoid the blame attached to childbirth outside marriage, the destruction is frequently practised both before and after birth to avoid the loss of earning power which childbirth occasions and also to escape the obligation of providing sustenance. In some countries the danger of suppression, owing to the extreme poverty of parents is so great, that institutions are maintained at the expense of the State for the gratuitous rearing of children; but such institutions can only be considered as palliatives of the evil in question. The infanticides directly due to a deflection of the maternal motive, are probably very few and if the blame diminishes which is bestowed upon girl-mothers, and pauperism decreases, this crime must tend to disappear. None of the females of the higher animals destroy their young and if infant destruction were practised by the human species with any frequency, such destructions, wherever they were manifested, would prove a nascent antagonism to the designs of nature and a consequent drift towards extinction. It is certain, however, that the parental sense

is seldom strongly experienced before the birth of children either by the father or the mother and thus population is restrained, especially in countries attached to comfort and well-being, in the interest either of parents, of existing offspring or of both parents and offspring. In a world the resources of which are not unlimited, this restraint must be considered as generally beneficial and although it may, in some cases, be practised at the expense of individuals, it must not be forgotten that excessive parturition is frequently destructive to the health of mothers. There can be little doubt that an irreflective gratification of the desire for offspring and even such as has been practised since the Reformation in protestant countries, must increase the acuteness of the strife for sustenance and tend to render war and spoliation almost inevitable. Certainly the evil is less serious as long as new lands are available for surplus population, but the time must come when even what are termed new countries will have their complement of citizens.

It is a somewhat remarkable effect of the parental affection that it is capable of being divided among many offspring without losing a great degree of its intensity and although in large families it is frequently more strongly manifested towards one child than towards the rest, there is undoubtedly a sense of equity in the maternal mind which forbids a too marked demonstration of the preference, and here the maternal instinct tends towards social good by the avoidance of the conflicts which might otherwise arise from the jealousy of children. Among men the paternal motive is certainly less strongly developed than the maternal among women. In married life the father, in the higher classes, aims at giving his son an education at least equal to his own and with this end frequently practises considerable self-denial. To secure advantages for his sons, he cultivates friendships, conquers aversions and pays regard to the consideration due to others. He solicits protection for his offspring and, when his own position is a good one, the protection is generally granted as a reward for his attainments. When the son is gifted, the task of the parent is as light as the satisfaction is great at the progress which the son seldom fails to make, but when the son is mentally

deficient, then the conditions are completely changed and the parent is at a loss to know to what cause to attribute the child's deficiency; whether to his own heredity or to some accident of childbirth. The parents of the intelligent child find their parental motives amply satisfied by his success in life and the aid which he may afford them in the time of need; but the parents of the dull child have no such satisfactions or security and it is even incumbent on them, whenever possible, to make a greater provision for such a child than for one more fitted for the struggle for existence. No doubt if it were the intention of society and of parents with society, to abandon the mentally deficient and to allow them to drift to death or crime, the question would present no difficulty, but such has not hitherto been declared to be the case and the duties of society towards the deficient is one of the greatest problems which future generations must resolve.

It appears that the paternal motive is frequently insufficiently strong to overcome displeasure or offended dignity, as when fathers disinherit their sons in countries where the rights of offspring are not established by law and certainly in such fathers the paternal motive is extremely weak. It is scarcely less so when, under the influence of sex attraction, a man disinherits the children of a first wife in favour of the children of a second. Such acts clearly tend to increase the number of malcontents who are a source of social danger. When the parental motive is thwarted, as in childless matrimony, it is often seen that couples endeavour to gratify it artificially by the adoption of a foster child. Thus the parental motive, if it is to be productive of good, must not conflict with that of sex, but must harmonise with it. There must be a sense, on the part of parents, of the parental duty as a fundamental obligation which few, if any circumstances, can alter, and whenever this, the normal sense, is weak or is willingly suppressed, social injustice, in one of its many forms, results.

When the mother of a family dies young, the husband is confronted with a problem, the solution of which presents excessive difficulty. On the one hand he may be solicited by the sex motive to contract another union, on the other he may be restrained by a knowledge of

the fact that the new union will be prejudicial to the children of his first marriage; since there are not wanting proofs that, the nature of the maternal instinct forbids many women from extending solicitude to the children of another. Women of exceptionally egoistic characters, frequently aim at and achieve their eventual expulsion from the household and in the case of girls, especially in the lower ranks of the middle classes, the consequences of such expulsions are often seen to be disastrous. There is, in such cases, a conflict between the duty to self and the duty to offspring, which is not generally decided in favour of the latter. It is worthy of remark that men who have a less personal share than women in the rearing of children, generally experience but little difficulty in adopting the children of a wife by a previous marriage.

The filial sentiment is probably less strong than the maternal and not more so than the paternal. In infants it takes the form of solicitude for sustenance or protection. Children generally evince less distress when parting from their parents, than their parents do when parting from them. On the other hand there are few sons who neglect their parents when the latter are in need and the number of parricides is small even among the most immoral classes. The filial sentiment is common among the higher animals and although it has taken some very dubious forms among certain Polynesian savages who permit the self suppression of aged parents for the good of the family, it must yet be considered as a natural proclivity, increasing the value of existence, which man could only lose if he lost all sense of conduct.

As a motive this form of the sex motive is not of great importance. Unless in exceptional circumstances, it does not lead to any special activity and occasions rarely present themselves in the present civilisation where a son is called upon to sacrifice his life for his father or mother. Although many sons benefit materially by their parents' death, very few if any desire that event. They are restrained from doing so by a sentiment which has its source in the sense of identification with the life-giver which the condition of life itself creates. The feeling existed before the Decalogue made respect towards

parents a condition of long life and has existed in all previous civilisations. Its general effect is to promote the happiness of society, to preserve aged persons who by their experience are able to afford advice which is sometimes of some value, and to set an example of social clemency and harmony. It is best recompensed when there is a certain voluntary surrender to children of advantages possessed, by parents too aged for their enjoyment.

Whether the filial sentiment is altogether non-existent in cases of orphans who have never known their parents, owing to the death of the latter in their infancy, or in the case of abandoned children, is somewhat difficult to ascertain; but it seems to be a fact that the manageresses of institutions where such children are reared, are frequently considered by the children as mothers on whom filial affections may be bestowed, and such children are generally seen to be happier where the matrons evince towards them parental solicitude. A filial affection may thus be artificially produced, but that it is not innate is proved by the preference which children often evince for nurses. No child, also, could instinctively recognise as his parent, a person whom he had never seen. The filial sentiment is for these reasons in a large degree an acquired habit and it is fostered by gratitude for solicitude evinced by the person or persons who assume towards the child the parts of protectors and guides. It has always been considered natural that such feelings should exist and when a child fails to manifest them, he is called unnatural and the opinion of society is against him. He is held to be guilty of injustice towards those who, after having brought him into the world, performed the task of his upbringing. When, however, parents shirk this duty and abandon their offspring, it is seen that it is the children who experience a sense of injustice which not infrequently is the cause of revengeful acts. Such acts however are generally confined to cases where the parents are in the enjoyment of material advantages of which the abandoned offspring are deprived; so that they may be connected in a considerable measure with the motive of sustenance. Where the parents are in excessive poverty, the abandonment of their children to

society is generally to the children's advantage and in such cases, if resentment were experienced by an abandoned child, it could only arise from the fact of his having been brought into the world at all, under conditions which rendered home-rearing impossible. Youth, however, seldom considers life a burden under normal circumstances and recriminations of such a nature are seldom made. Nevertheless, when sons or daughters inherit pathological defects which are clearly traceable to the ignorance, folly or imprudence of their parents, then those who do not possess the power of tracing effects to their first causes, and some of those who do, must not improbably experience a sense of injustice at the disability to which they have been subjected through no fault of their own.

Finally the motive of sex and parentage is productive of conduct which although generally favourable to the principle of social good, is at times the negation of that principle.

So long as it is pursued in the manner which experience has prescribed; that is to say, according to hygienic laws and in stable conditions of union, then it is favourable; but whenever the laws of health are infringed, or the regularity of union destroyed, then it tends to be unfavourable.

CHAPTER IV

PLEASURE

THE pleasure motive is that which leads to acts generally gratifying to the senses and either beneficial or prejudicial to the welfare or physical or mental health of the individual or of society. In intensity, it comes next to the sex motive which partakes of its nature. Its principal manifestations are in the forms of recreation, hygiene and luxury. It serves as the leading motive of a large number of existences, and for many men it is the chief source of energy.

From motives of pleasure, men are seen, on the one hand, to act in ways that are opposed to rational principles of living; to injure their health by excess of sense gratification; to squander their fortunes; to indulge in violent and dangerous exercises and on the other, to seek with the greatest pains the most agreeable conditions of existence; to study the preservation of their health and the refinement of their sense gratifications.

And it frequently happens that in a conflict of motives, especially between those of sustenance and pleasure, the pleasure motive prevails, as when a man drawn by inclination towards the performance of a sustentative or money-earning act and at the same time towards an act of enjoyment, decides in favour of the latter and the choice is dependent upon the hereditary tendencies, the education and the physical and mental constitution of the chooser. When once the pleasure motive has become predominant, it is generally seen to be of a sufficiently strong nature to outweigh all other motives.

When a man is "bent" on pleasure, and an obstacle arises which impedes the pleasure; an irritation is experienced which varies directly with the hedonistic tendencies of the individual. When there are two methods of performing the same task, a man from the

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motive of pleasure, frequently chooses that which is the most agreeable, even if it be not always the shortest or the most advantageous from a material point of view, and it is certain that that man in whom the pleasure motive is primarily predominant, is at a disadvantage in the struggle of existence, since the pursuit of pleasure occupies the time of life to the exclusion of that required for the quest of sustenance. The principle of the man whose primary motive is sustenance is pleasure subsidiary to work. The principle, not always avowed, of the man who is by nature eager for sense gratification, is work subsidiary to pleasure.¹

In general, however, a man under the influence of the pleasure motive, suffers from a mental blindness and often performs acts which he would not perform were he able to reason clearly concerning them. Thus he may continue to absorb alcohol long after he has been made aware of its deleterious effects upon his constitution, because at a certain period of his life, generally in the second decade, he perceived that the absorption of alcohol produced a temporary sensation of exhilaration which was of a pleasurable character, and the habit was formed of repeating the agreeable experience. It is not necessary to mention here the conduct which results from the gratification of the alcoholic or narcotic taste, for when the pleasure motive assumes this form, individuals are no longer rational.

In this case, however, it is necessary to notice that the pleasure motive leads to acts which result in pain to those who perform them for any length of time and although during the obtainment of the pleasure, such persons may be stimulated to the performance of acts of benefit to themselves or to society which they might not have otherwise performed, yet it is not doubtful that the total gain from this source is never equal to the total loss. For instance a man may, under the influence of alcohol, perform a feat of physical or mental endurance which may procure sustentative advantages for his family; but if, on his return home, he ill-treat his family and acquire a reputation for brutality, he may, by turning the current

¹ Such a man will endeavour to find pleasurable work and refuse arduous or disagreeable tasks.

of public opinion against him, eventually suffer both materially and socially.

The pleasure motive may sometimes be strong enough to keep in abeyance all sympathetic motives, as when a man absents himself from the sick-bed of a friend to indulge in an appointed pleasure, or when a man spends the greater part of his income upon his own enjoyment and allows his family to want.

It is not needful to prove that gambling is an anti-moral occupation and that gambling places of whatsoever nature, should not be encouraged by any whose task it is to govern or make laws and yet it is seen that in obedience to the pleasure motive, statesmen and leaders of public opinion, do not refrain from frequenting gambling rooms when travelling for recreation and that they encourage horse-racing, a pretext for gambling. It may be said that the end of gambling is a sustentative one and certainly an element of gain enters into the gambling acts, but there can be little doubt that the motive is, in the main, a pleasure motive. What the gambler comes to love is the emotion of the constant expectation of gain; the amusement and circumstance of the game or race and the mental excitement which it creates. For if his motive were purely sustentative, he would certainly be deterred by the knowledge which he possesses of the rarity of ultimate gain and would desist. In spite of that he is frequently seen to continue playing until his resources are all spent. To call this tendency and others of like nature a distinct passion, is not to designate it adequately. In its entirety it is a series of acts performed under the influence of the pleasure motive and it has not, in reality, a separate existence. It is a specialised form of the pleasure motive and whenever the inclination or temperament of the individual is so disposed, it prevails over the remaining forms and gives rise to conduct leading to the obtainment of the gambling satisfaction. Minor forms of gambling such as that afforded by the games of chance played in private houses, are also indulged in from motives of pleasure and among elderly persons, especially, constitute a form of recreation which is frequently preferred to all others, and such persons sometimes arrange that the pleasure may be daily or periodically renewed. Such

games, as well as games of skill, are often played without stakes for the sake of the pleasure they afford as mental relaxation.

The pleasure motive may lead persons to pass time in witnessing theatrical performances, and when the taste has been formed and the habit acquired, to spend more of their resources upon such amusements than their means justify. As it is to-day with the playgoer and the spectator of the Bull-fights, so it was with the Roman circus lover.

It is the character of particular methods of gratifying the pleasure aspiration, that they often suffice as incentives to energy. The prospect of the particular pleasure at the end of the week, is sufficient to stimulate the sluggish to labour and here the pleasure motive aids the sustentative, to the advantage of the individual. It is for this reason that public holidays are considered to be of advantage as stimulants to work.

The motive which leads to the pleasure act may exist, not only in combination with one other, but with several. Thus, in the planning of a country excursion, the main motive may be pleasure, qualified by sympathy, for the majority of those who take part in it, but for some the motive of pleasure, as represented by the enjoyment of pure air, of scenery, of exercise, may exist in conjunction with sympathy, as social intercourse, with sex attraction as produced by the presence of the two sexes, and even with sustenance as represented by the food provided or the opportunity of advancing material interests through intercourse. For the present analysis, the first category has alone specific meaning. It is needful to observe, however, that the motives leading to the pleasure act, are in some instances of a separable nature and that not only, is this the case, but that they may be so intricately connected, that the individual himself is but barely conscious of their separability. When this occurs, they form part of the class of general or complex motives which are productive of many acts and which appear to have their origin in a welding of primary instinctive impulsions with reflected tendencies.

A pleasure in perspective may give rise to a special line of conduct leading directly or indirectly to its realization and such conduct will be controlled by the pleasure

motive and may contain both moral and anti-moral acts. It may contain moral ones, such as the enforcement of a certain hygienic discipline to enable the pleasure to be indulged in, or anti-moral ones such as dishonest practises to obtain the means of gratification. Future enjoyment is therefore a stimulus to energy which is only not moral when it transgresses moral or social laws, and it is very doubtful whether society could exist without it. If we imagine a life without any of the satisfactions given by (1) palatable food; (2) fresh air; (3) liberty of movement; (4) sex indulgence; (5) social intercourse; (6) recreation; the life of a convict is immediately suggested and convicts tend to revert to the animal state, if not to a worse one and not unfrequently destroy themselves when they obtain an opportunity of doing so.

The pleasure motive is therefore essential to the maintenance of existence, for without it, the zest and patience necessary to sustain the burdens of life would be wanting. If there were no sports, no games, no sense indulgence, there would be little or no good work. For sustenance, although the first object of existence, is not alone sufficient to maintain enthusiasm.

Pleasure brings happiness independently of moral principles although permanent happiness is dependent upon such principles. If the motives under the influence of which pleasure is habitually sought, are of moderate intensity and do not tend to injure the individual or society, they will generally lead to happiness; but if they are of excessive strength, or of a nature liable to work personal or social harm, then they will eventually produce unhappiness. The distinction between pleasure and happiness is not always very well defined. Some sense gratifications are happiness and some happiness is sense gratification. Sense gratification is happiness in a harmonious connubial life and an affluent assured position which is usually happiness is also, in most cases, one of sense gratification.

But, in general, happiness may be held to be the more permanent sensation of satisfaction which results from the moderate indulgence of legitimate pleasures, as distinguished from the more acute sensation experienced at the time of gratification of such or of illicit pleasure.

Thus the motives which lead to pleasure, lead also to happiness, or to pain, according to the nature of the pleasure indulged in.

In their origin, the motives which lead to both rational and irrational pleasure, are of the same nature; but they diverge widely at a certain point of realization. For instance, if an individual under the influence of the pleasure motive, procure a vehicle for the recreation of himself and friends, and either drive or cause it to be driven at a moderate pace, his motive is only productive of good, both to his own and his friends' health; but if while driving, he become intoxicated with the sense of speed and then drive at such a pace that he maims or kills a man upon the roadway, then the effect of the motive, or in other words the act, assumes a totally different character. There is a change of the resulting action from good to bad, and that change has taken place at the moment when the motive, ceasing to be rational, becomes irrational. The pleasure, in the first instance, though moderate, would produce happiness; in the second, though more intense, would not. For the driver, even if he eluded justice, would not, unless as hardened as a criminal, escape the remorse of his action. To what is the psychological change which gives rise to the altered character of motive to be attributed? To the following causes, either of which may suffice to produce the change. (1) To an hereditary or acquired tendency to irrational ideas, increased at a given moment by the circumstances. (2) To the influence of imitation. (3) To indulgence of will power. (4) To inferior judgment in presence of a temptation.

Undoubtedly there are other minor causes, such as special neuronic conditions at a given moment, the influence of alcohol, rancour or suicidal mania (since in the special case under consideration the driver is endangered by the speed) but these are not of primary importance. It is sufficient to know that by four principal causes, a motive which at the origin may be of the innocuous pleasurable order, may be changed, as regards its effects, into one of a noxious kind.

It is true that in its inception, the motive may not be other than noxious, as when a man is moved by a pleasure

motive which he knows will lead to acts prejudicial to himself or his neighbour; but such pleasurable motives belong to the distinctive class best exemplified by those of the intentional inebriate.

If it be needful to adopt classification for the principal forms of the pleasure motive, and it often appears that such a classification is required, then, the following may be employed:—In the first class should be included those pleasure motives which lead to rational acts not harmful to the individual or to society. In the second those which though leading to rational acts in their origin, degenerate and lead to irrational acts prejudicial to the individual and society. In the third may be placed those which lead to irrational conduct destructive to the individual and having a reflex deleterious effect upon society.

The first class may be said to be the normal as well as that which in the majority of instances tends to happiness. In it, the pleasure motive leads to the needful enjoyments such as wholesome recreation after work, social intercourse, moderate sport or exercise, the obtainment and dissemination of knowledge, travel and the enjoyment of scenery—all pleasures which tend to maintain the energy and zest of life and are not harmful to society. Here, however, it is necessary to draw a distinction between what is not directly harmful and what partakes of the nature of harmfulness by reason of its egoism. Several of the pleasures enumerated in this first division are self-indulgent, require the expenditure of money or leisure for their gratification, and demand that certain individuals should be the recipients of these gratifications and that certain others should be excluded from them. Thus a husband who has the control of the household purse and who is addicted to a particular form of sport, may devote so much time and money to the practice of such a sport, that he may be unable to provide for his wife and family sufficient pleasure to maintain their zest of life at the same intensity as his. Again, in the case of two partners in a business undertaking, the one who has invested the most capital, may claim and take longer holidays than his associate, although the health of the latter may require more restoration than that of the former. From another

point of view, the pleasure of some may be observed to mar the pleasure of others, so that in order that some should have perfect pleasure, others must either abstain or content themselves with imperfect pleasure.

Thus in order that any "place of amusement" or sojourn may afford the quietude and comfort which are necessary to health and to the enjoyment of most persons, especially of the refined, it is essential that large numbers should be excluded from it, and this result is obtained by an elevation of the price of entrance above that which the possessors of small or moderate incomes are able to afford, as well as by other methods of selection. The privileged persons who thus enjoy these more exquisite gratifications, do so to a certain extent at the cost of the less fortunate and their enjoyment, however legitimate it may be, contains inherent egoism. It is for this reason that the pleasure motive, with the rich, has generally led to acts which have excited the envy of the poor, notwithstanding the fact that the poor have the advantage over the rich of taking their pleasures more readily and simply, of being more easily amused. But the acts which are the result of this class of pleasure motive, are only free or almost free from egoism when the pleasure itself is derived from sympathy; from an act performed for the express purpose of benefitting another. Then, unless the performer of such an act be accused of egoism from the fact that he possesses the means of gratifying the pleasure of altruism, we must admit that this is the form of pleasure act the most socially perfect, although it is very doubtful if it would ever suffice to preserve the life enthusiasm of any but a small minority of men. The motive, therefore, which leads to the moderate and innocuous, although somewhat egoistic pleasure act, is the highest form which such a motive can assume in our present relationships towards one another. But inasmuch as human motives are in a certain degree influenced or modified by the moral conditions of the age in which they are experienced, there are some grounds for believing that in an altered condition of society, a condition which would favour a more even distribution of wealth as well as a more careful consideration for the total health and happiness of the community, an improvement in the class of motives here

in question, might be effected, although it seems probable that there will always be a competition for the most refined pleasures.

But the pleasure motive must be judged from the point of view of its effect in promoting the energy and mental and physical health of society. It is this class of motive which brings forth the greatest energy of the greatest number, which stimulates the worker in every grade of life, whether the prospective pleasure be a modest gathering on the village-green or a reception in a drawing-room. By similar prospects, *tedium vitæ* is avoided and the burden of work less felt. Certain employers of labour, recognising the necessity of pleasure for the human being, organise occasional fêtes, and there is little doubt that they are better served than those who fail to recognise this need. Certainly the sustentative motive is alone sufficient to maintain energy of a mechanical kind, but cheerful and intelligent labour is performed chiefly in the expectation of pleasurable rewards. The prospect of meeting his betrothed again, stimulates the young man to zealous work and although his motives for strenuous labour may be mainly those of sex, there enters into them, nevertheless, a considerable element of pleasure. The whole success of this class of pleasure motive, consists in the moderation of the acts to which it leads. In other words, its success is in direct ratio to the moderation of its acts.

The second class, or the motives which, though leading to rational acts in their origin, degenerate and lead to irrational acts, prejudicial to the individual and to society, are those in which pleasure, ceasing to be a reward, becomes not only an end, but a destructive servitude. They are those by which the pleasure seeker entraps himself and whether they begin with the beneficial use of alcohol and end in drunkenness, with game-playing for small stakes and end in gambling, in locomotion at moderate speed, and end in dangerous velocity, in sufficient palatable nourishment, and end in epicureanism or gluttony; they are, as has been said, deflected from the first class at a point of its development and to them is to be attributed a large share of human misery. At a certain point of the abnormal extension

of the pleasure motive, the power of restraint is lost and pleasure becomes harmful. It is, in reality, a question of quantity. Just as many drugs, when taken in small doses possess therapeutic qualities, and when in large, are poisonous; so the pleasure motive becomes noxious as soon as the limit is exceeded which separates the necessary from the superfluous indulgence. When two persons marry, they have, as a rule, but a scanty knowledge of each other's tendencies and little or none of their respective heredity, but in the course of a few years, when sex attraction has ceased to exercise its full influence, it may happen that certain pleasure impulses manifest themselves in one or other of the parties, or in both, the indulgence of which eventually becomes the dominant motive of existence. When this occurs, there accompanies the pleasure motive a volition which is in direct opposition to the laws on the observance of which the efficient conduct of life depends and the recklessness and disregard of prudential principles which result, inflict suffering and hardship and injure society by the example which is thus offered for imitation.

There are certainly many cases where the progress of disintegration is arrested, where, owing to the timely intervention of reason or to extraneous circumstances, a reversion is made to the normal state, if not to an austere sobriety, and institutions founded for the purpose of effecting such reversions perform service to the community, even if the number of permanent cures which they obtain be small.

The third class is composed of those pleasure motives which lead directly to acts prejudicial both to those who perform them, and to society and this class only differs from the last stage of the second, by the fact that the motive leads to the act without passing through the primary stage. This form is peculiar or almost peculiar to those persons who yield to the temptation of pleasure readily and commit irrational acts under its influence not only in respect of a special pleasure, but of any that may present itself at a given moment. They are however usually persons of weaker judgment and their errors may and should be corrected by an efficient education.

We have, therefore, three forms in which the pleasure motive operates. From their consideration and from the previous enquiries we may conclude that according to its intensity and the hereditary or acquired tendencies of the individual, this motive sustains energy and vital enthusiasm and is therefore equal in importance to Sustenance and Sex. Not only is there in the human mind a constant desire for pleasurable emotion, a ceaseless expectation of increased felicity; but if such aspirations be not granted in a certain measure, the mind itself suffers from the deprivation and the body, inasmuch as it is dependent on the mind, is also injured. What in figurative language may be called the salt of life, is wanting and not even the immense incentive of the sex impulse is sufficient to preserve the individual from despondency when all other pleasures are denied. This is especially true in the case of women who take great pleasure in scenery, flowers, personal adornment, and who experience bitter disappointment when they are required by circumstances to forego a promised enjoyment.

For a sufficiently large class of women, the pleasure motive takes precedence of the sex motive. Such women who are deficient in amateness, generally possess an abnormal taste for the embellishments of life, its luxuries and refinements, and when beautiful, are apt to consider their beauty too precious to be subjected to the impairment of maternity. As, however, the pleasure motive, pursued as they desire to pursue it, occasions great expenditure of means, the sustentative motive is usually strongly developed in their motival scheme, and as they are usually dispassionate, the sex motive becomes subordinate to the two others and determines the corresponding conduct. They are preserved from the deleterious effects of pleasure by their strong desire to preserve themselves from physical injury and although they undoubtedly succeed, in the majority of instances, in presenting agreeable pictures to the eye; yet if the world's life is to be preserved, they cannot be held to be the most efficient members of society, since they are not generally productive and take no part in the serious business of existence, although a certain proportion of them may possibly serve to enliven daily life. The

æsthetic pleasure which they may afford to some of those who behold them, is however counterbalanced by the envy they excite in others, and generally they offer an example which cannot be much followed without danger to the industry and prudence which are necessary to the conduct of existence.

There are also men of epicurean tastes in whom the pleasure motive predominates. Their number is probably less than that of the women of the same tendencies, but they are equally careful and prudential in the indulgence of their pleasures, so that the duration of enjoyment may be prolonged. This prudence, however, necessarily causes limitation of the pleasure and such limitation is only possible to certain individuals. In order that the pleasures of the table may be indulged in to the full extent, some epicures submit to long and often tedious and exhausting courses of mineral waters or other treatment. Their desire, in doing so, is to regain the power of high living which had been diminished through excesses. Others in whom the taste for intense pleasure is less strong, go through the same course for slight derangement of bodily functions, so that they may experience an increased sense of health or comfort. The course pursued depends upon the physical, and to some extent, upon the mental constitution of the epicure; but in both cases the motive is the same. The aim of the first category is the obtainment of health *for* pleasure, and that of the second the obtainment of health *as* pleasure. The one method tends to shorten, the other to lengthen life, since health cannot be indefinitely maintained by an alternation of excesses and cures and there comes a time when the latter are no longer efficacious. Such epicures may be assimilated to those of the second class while those who seek health as pleasure or as the first condition of pleasure may be considered as standing in a separate class. There is also another class which consists of those who, indifferent to all considerations of the order above mentioned are determined to obtain from life its full measure of enjoyment. They are prepared to use their human material to the extent of its resistance in the enjoyment of pleasure and as they are usually sustained while doing so by violent, though temporary restoratives, they seldom feel

the process of decay, death being generally sudden. If it be true that individuals have an absolute proprietorship in their own persons, and if it be also true that the premature death of a certain proportion is of no especial import to the community, then such conduct would seem to be legitimate; but if, on the other hand, the community has a claim to a part proprietorship, however small, in such existences and an interest in their prolongation, then they must be held to be reprehensible. It is a characteristic of the pleasure motive that it persists as long as the pleasure sense endures; often to extreme old age. Hence for men who have outlived their children and their friends, a few modest daily satisfactions constitute the greater part of the attraction of existence. They live to tend a garden or to smoke a pipe, to behold the sunlight and the sky, and although they are aware that their death may not be long postponed, these few enjoyments are sufficient to satisfy the craving for felicity which is inseparable from human consciousness. Sometimes there is a nervous anxiety lest the pleasures, the maintenance of which is dependent on others, be withdrawn; then the pleasure motive gives rise to measures of protection against any action on the part of society which might aim at deprivation, and this anxiety is proportionate to the life zest of the individual.

Aged women sometimes derive great pleasure from small attentions on the part of those who surround them and are pained and disappointed when such attentions are withheld or discontinued and the legacies they leave often show their appreciation of the pleasure afforded them by sympathetic and even by interested persons.

Special pleasure motives are superinduced by special events such as the opening of a great exhibition, of a route of travel, of a place of entertainment or the inauguration of any novel species of enjoyment. There occurs on such occasions, specialised contagious hedonistic impulses, the hedonism of which, though not always unallied with vanity, as when the new pleasure is indulged not altogether for its own sake, but also for the sake of boasting of it, is yet, in the main, of a pleasurable character.

And in general such occasions for pleasure are productive of a quickening of the social pulse which is bene-

ficial in its action, provided that the innovation be of an innocuous kind and that it be not pursued to the prejudice of necessary sustentation. Great European fairs such as the Exhibition in Paris specialise the pleasure motive throughout the world, beneficially. They constitute perspectives of innocuous pleasure which for a time at least may deter from others of a less harmless character.

Another effect of the pleasure motive is to attract dwellers in the country districts towards large cities where facilities for sense gratification are more numerous and varied. The loss of pleasure through ill health consequent upon crowded habitations and insufficiency of oxygen is not realised before the emigration towards the towns takes place: for a pleasure in perspective, except to the experienced, forms a mental picture the colours of which are often brighter than reality reveals them. The desire for pleasure being constant as well as the conviction of an imminent increase of pleasure; the most unfavourable prospects are frequently mistaken for the most favourable. A country lad has been told that in the capital some delicacy which he has only tasted at rare intervals upon especial occasions is procurable in the capital on any day for a trifling cost and he hastens to conclude that life in that capital must be far more auspicious and agreeable than in the country. The pleasure motive, then, leads him to take the step which in the majority of instances removes him for ever from the green fields and the pure air and his subsequent fortunes depend largely upon his adaptability. It is doubtful, however, whether he often succeeds in obtaining the increase of happiness he seeks. His children are probably less strong than himself and their children less strong than they, although it is true that they all may be immune from maladies peculiar to certain country districts, and in any case they are able to obtain more scientific treatment in disease. Pleasure motives are also stimulated by governments and by municipalities.¹ Rulers in some countries sometimes grant public holidays and relax certain urban rules in order that they may gain the favour of the populace. Municipalities on the continent sometimes give entertainments which are designed to bring some measure of

¹ In France the State supports three theatres.

public contentment. Both stimulate the pleasure motive and earn favour by so doing and these examples go to prove how universally recognised is the need of pleasure as an incentive not only to effort, but also to patience under burdens.

There is finally a category of pleasure motives which is purposely omitted from the foregoing classification. This is the artistic, and the reason for such omission, as regards many of those who indulge in it, is that it forms part of sustentation, that it does not generally lead to acts having a very well defined effect upon conduct and also that it is of a less active kind than the remainder. It is moreover, subjective rather than objective in result, and as a sense gratification possesses some resemblance to the religious. It differs in character in those who are the producers of art and in those who are the enjoyers of the art produced, and it is seldom the cause of irrational or self-destructive conduct.

As regards those who are not creators of artistic work and for whom art is in no way sustentative, such persons under the influence of this form of the pleasure motive, devote time to visiting art collections, often submit to considerable pecuniary sacrifice to secure or witness beautiful objects, to hear good music or for other varieties of æsthetic pleasure and the effect of such conduct is generally a pleasurable sensation satisfying the taste for beauty of form, colour and sound which men have derived from the contemplation and study of nature. The effects of experiencing artistic pleasure are, in the main, beneficial as adding interest and zest to life, diverting the mind from care, and maintaining a perhaps necessary idealism of life. Under normal circumstances æsthetic pleasures are not carried to a very great excess, but when they are, there is a danger of mental affection leading to more or less harmful forms of irrational conduct, as when the artistic pleasure motive leads persons of certain temperaments to become so much engrossed in art that they grow impatient of the commonplaces of existence, if not disdainful of them and indifferent members of society by reason of their disinclination to perform the ordinary duties of daily life efficiently; or again, as when from an excess of the special indulgence

they lose sight of the true ratio which it should bear towards the other pleasures and interests of life and become engrossed enthusiasts. The motive is confined chiefly to the higher classes, for the lower, especially in the more northern countries of Europe, are little influenced by it. It is manifested chiefly in persons of culture and of leisure and independently of material resources. Wealth, in fact, although it permits the acquisition of works of art, rather hinders the development of the true artistic spirit and rich men for whom the whole series of pleasure is available, are only occasionally moved by æsthetic pleasure motives. For poor but cultured men, æsthetic pleasure is frequently one of the few pleasures permitted, and hence, in their case, it tends naturally to become the dominant one and to exercise, when moderately pursued, a sedative influence somewhat similar to that exercised by religion.

Among persons of slight or inefficient education, however, the æsthetic pleasure act is apt to be vague or weak, and to be represented by the acquisition and display of objects of no real beauty; but in such cases it is doubtful whether any pleasure is experienced. It is probable that the action taken is no more than a mere compliance with the custom of decoration.

There are certain persons whose æsthetic pleasure motives lead them to seek the beautiful in nature rather than in human imitations of nature, and the quest may be considered as superior, because more hygienic and direct. It may be stimulating to the æsthetic sense, and to the intellect to see a picture or series of pictures illustrative of the country, in a gallery; but it is more invigorating to the body and consequently to the mind to behold a real landscape in the open air, and before the technical processes of imitation were invented, early men had no other means of æsthetic pleasure.

We are not well acquainted with the degree of intensity of the pleasure sensation experienced upon witnessing a work of art, but it cannot be very large, or a collection of masterpieces of painting or of sculptures mould produce some visible sign of excess. It is probable that the real feeling is that of a calm satisfaction. Through the medium of the sight, the object of beauty is brought

to consciousness, a process of judgment and comparison follows (of short duration when the execution is perfect), and then a realisation aided by the memory of previous beauty witnessed either in the real world or in artistic presentments of it. The final stage is one of mental satisfaction that reality has been faithfully imitated, and when the subject treated by the artist appeals to the emotions, there is, in addition, a mild and more or less pleasurable emotional sensation. But the artistic pleasure motive will not lead to any of the destructive conduct which is sometimes seen under the influence of the other forms of pleasure motive. Those who practice art as a means of subsistence do so obviously under the influence of the sustentative motive, but there is no doubt that there enters into their labour more pleasurable sensations than are usually called forth by most other methods of earning. It is the exceptional pleasure derived from artistic manifestations that usually determines artistic vocations, and that pleasure continues throughout the artistic career and is as keen as the skill of the artist is great. This is shown by the tenacity with which the artist clings to his work after his power of good execution has become weakened by age, and although an element of vanity may enter into his obstinacy, pleasure must be a considerable factor of such tenacity. The pleasure of doing what can be done well is always considerable, but it is more acute in the case of the consummate artist than in that of most other men. In the professional artist the combination of the pleasure and the sustentative motives is such that the work produced is primarily produced for the sake of æsthetic excellence with a knowledge that a reward will be bestowed upon it if success is attained, and in cases where the work is produced solely in view of the reward, it is not often that a great degree of excellence is reached.

In all pleasures in which there is an element of skill, including sports and athletic exercises, there is joined to pleasure motives a desire of approbation which differentiates them from those in which pleasure is indulged in solely for the sake of personal sense gratification, and therefore they have generally and rightly been considered as of a higher type. For their indulgence

necessitates assiduous labour and the bodily discomfort which it causes, together, frequently, with self-denial. It must not be forgotten, however, that they too cease to belong to a higher type as soon as the limit is passed which separates rational from irrational indulgence.

From what has preceded it appears that the effects of the pleasure motive are both good and evil; good in so far as the cause pursued is innocuous to self or to society, evil in so far as it is self destructive and harmful to society.

CHAPTER V

SELF-LOVE

MOTIVES of self-love are those which lead to acts enhancing, or designed to enhance, the qualities of individuals or groups, either in their own estimation, or in that of society, and also to protect the reputation of individuals or groups from the effects of disparagement in regard to qualities.

The term self-love is here taken to include both the manifestation known as vanity and that to which the term *amour propre* is usually applied, although the latter term is used to signify a justifiable love of self, while the former is understood in a less justifiable sense. It is not necessary to make a separate classification for the present purposes, and the term self-love is here taken as a generic one in which all the manifestations of self esteem are contained. The motive of self-love may have had its first expressions in the necessity which men experienced of protecting individual rights against the hostile enterprises of the neighbour. As society developed and as progress was made in the arts and in knowledge, generally, it grew in strength from the consciousness of additional worth derived from the accession of new qualities, although there must always have been, in the individual, a fundamental love of self, due to the character of his nervous organisation, its antipathy to pain and sympathy with pleasure and to the habitual satisfactions of existence.

In all who still preserve any reasons for continuing to accept existence, the consciousness of self is inseparable from the love of self, and increases rather than diminishes with age.

Motives of self-love are closely allied in many of their expressions to motives of sustenance; but they may also occur in opposition to them. From self-love, a man may

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strive to attract the attention of the public to his achievements with a knowledge at the same time that in doing so, he is advancing his material welfare by the increase of prosperity which an increase of reputation brings. On the other hand, he may, from motives of self-love, commit an act detrimental to his interests or abstain from committing an act which might be to his material advantage. If, prompted by self-love, a man make strenuous efforts to place himself in a prominent position on all occasions and exacts the full degree of consideration due to his social status, he undoubtedly aids his material prospects; but if a necessitous man when offered remunerative employment of a kind not socially esteemed, though honourable, refuse such employments from motives of self-love, then the motive and the resultant act are in opposition to his direct material prosperity.

In the relations between men and women, especially between unmarried persons, it frequently occurs that in order to preserve self-love, one or other of the persons, if not both, refuse to enter into a projected marriage of inclination on account of some point of dispute, in reality trifling, but enhanced by the peculiar sensitiveness which prevails in sex relations and such effects of self-love may occasion regret of long duration. In either case there is an instinctive desire to maintain the value of the ego as the person has learnt to value it, and as he deems or hopes that it is valued by others. In support of this desire there is a sentiment of personal worth which is generally found, even in the least worthy, and which appears to be as necessary as pleasure to the maintenance of energy and contentment. When this desire is weak, there is generally a lack of vital zest and although it may exist feebly, in the sense of absence of pride, in men of high intellectual attainments who are the impersonal instruments of the advancement of knowledge, it is generally an indication of a want of vital efficiency, and the person who evinces such a weakness is in danger not only of falling into dissolute habits, but of being deprived of his rights by the more self-loving.

When self-love is wounded, what takes place is, approximately, this. When by a sign, a word or an action, one man, from motives of sustenance, sex attrac-

tion, or from some minor motive, interrupts the self-loving composure in which most men live, by an aspersion upon the other's qualities, or conduct; a shock is produced which, no matter how slight the offence given, may lead to estrangement or to action adverse to the offending, by the offended person. A caterpillar will crawl slowly but surely in a straight line on an even surface and will neither be deterred by noise nor by moving objects before it. But if it receive the slightest touch upon its sensitive body, it will immediately stop and shrink into itself. Its expansiveness is momentarily suspended and it awaits results in the most concentrated attitude it can assume. A cat which is a sensitive animal, contracts when offended. Its body hardens and it remains motionless in an unsympathetic attitude. It is much the same with the man whose self-love has been wounded. His expansiveness is stopped, he becomes taciturn, suspicious, and his feelings harden towards his aggressor, if not towards the world at large. When the shock is received, there is frequently a flow of blood to the head and brain, as is evidenced by the flushing of the cheeks and there is an unpleasant feeling of loss of vital power consequent upon the blood-flow from the heart. In persons of calm temperaments the effect produced may not create any circulatory changes; but there is never wanting a sudden alteration of mental process immediately following the realization by the reflective faculty of the disparagement or insult. When one of such shocks is produced certain acts usually ensue which are caused by the motive of self-love. Such acts may be the withdrawal of the offended person from the society in which the aggressor is to be met, or it may be the adoption of certain measures of protection against renewed attacks and the feeling excited may develop into actions of revenge. It is true that actions of a retaliatory nature may suddenly cease when the aggressor, moved either by sustenance, as when he fears the effects of such retaliation upon his material prospects, or by sympathy as when he has realised the anti-social nature of his act. Such reparations will depend greatly upon the justice or injustice of the implied accusation; but there is a general feeling that it is necessary to the harmonious working of society that self-love should be

respected. Motives of both sustenance and pleasure contribute towards the maintenance of consideration for what are termed the feelings of the neighbour and so much is this the case that when, through a shortcoming of an individual, a wounding of his self-love is considered indispensable in the interests of knowledge or of sustenance, great precautions are frequently taken to disguise the reason for which, let us say, the removal from office has been made. It happens also that men of highly sensitive natures and unbending principles, resign honourable and renumerative offices when they meet with opposition to their views on the part of those with whom they are connected, or from whom they receive their mandate, or when their character is vehemently assailed. From motives of self-love they perform an act which, in the play of opportunities, has frequently the effect of relegating them to inactivity for a considerable period, sometimes for the remainder of their lives. It is also true, however, that the scrupulousness which they exhibit may, if publicly appreciated, be a cause of their reinstatement or promotion when the occasion presents itself.

From motives of self-love, otherwise truthful men sometimes prevaricate, as when in order to escape the suspicion of ignorance such men simulate knowledge which they do not possess, or when, to avoid incurring loss of consideration, they pretend to be richer or less poor than they are. It seems that in such cases the disapproval of the neighbour mortifies the inner consciousness of self so deeply that a perversion of the truth is irresistibly produced and frequently when the sensitiveness of the individual is extreme, an instinctive mendacity is shown, such as that which timid persons manifest when suddenly confronted with an unexpected situation.

As self-love is a personal patriotism which refuses to admit any disparagement or disrespect, it does not weigh the justice or injustice of the accusation which the disrespect connotes, and it is subject to much the same errors as patriotism itself.

Under the influence of the motive of self-love, men often labour zealously in order that they may attain popularity and notoriety, so that their actions may be commented upon, their opinions and movements noticed and

the press has been the means of largely increasing this form of self-love.¹ The labour is often performed without any direct prospect of material benefit as in the case of certain unpaid offices, but the influence obtained thereby affords a satisfaction which is directly gratifying to self-love. Some men carry the desire for popularity and notoriety to the extent of directing their energies rather in view of posthumous, than of present fame; but the number of such men appears to decrease as the pleasure and sustentative motives obtain the ascendancy in the scale of motives.

When motives of self-love and of sustenance are so combined that it is difficult to separate them, the effect produced is usually called ambition. The proportion of self-love in an ambitious act, depends upon the age of the individual who performs it, upon the quota of self-love in his character, and upon the material circumstances in which he is placed at the particular time. In youth, before the money-earning period has commenced, the sustentative factor is nearly absent, unless under the form of a desire of successful study for the obtainment of earning power; but it attains to intensity between the ages of thirty and fifty. During this period ambition is pursued with as much admixture of self-love proper as there is intensity of individual pride and vitality and according, in a considerable degree, to the material wealth of the individual, since among the poor, self-love is largely subordinate to sustenance.

When self-love is continually repressed, as in the case of persons occupying subordinate or menial positions, there is generally a diminution in the number of the acts which this motive produces and a modification of its intensity, while continued want destroys them altogether in favour of the dominant sustentative impulsion. We can scarcely imagine a starving man, unless of suicidal propensities, refusing, from motives of self-love, to perform a task of a lower grade in public estimation than that to which he had hitherto been accustomed; but we have no such difficulty with regard to one who, in the enjoyment

¹ A few years ago a married couple in a town of the United States committed suicide for the reason, as they stated, that in spite of ceaseless efforts, they had been unable to obtain the publication of their portraits in the local journal.

of a competency, declines to accept a renumeration office, somewhat below the standard of the social and intellectual plane on which he lives. It is true that there are men whose self-love seems to be rather developed than subdued by poverty; but such men are rare in Europe and tend to belong to the category of those who are generally prepared to accept death rather than self-depreciation.

Extreme poverty, as we have seen, leads naturally to anti-moral acts under the influence of the motive of sustenance, and we now see that it is generally conducive to a loss of self-love in the sense in which self-love is here understood. Physical defects give rise to a special class of conduct which is mainly dictated by motives of self-love, especially in women. If a member of either sex be ill-favoured in form or feature, or in both, such a person will be denied many of the satisfactions which the gratification of self-love brings, and there will result a tendency to acts of an anti-social character, although these may be non-existent in cases where self-love has been satisfied by intellectual, or other pre-eminence.

In women who are thus disqualified, the absence of favour in the eyes of the other sex, the inability of deriving æsthetic pleasure from the contemplation of their own image, produces a permanent injury to self-love which gives rise, in many cases, to the formation of harsh judgments and to corresponding acts which may be indirectly attributed to the self-love motive. The injury reaches its culminating point in deformed persons who, unless highly and specially educated, are naturally inclined to rancour and to the acts to which it gives rise. Motives of self-love sometimes contribute to the good of the community, as when a man for the sake of notoriety, subscribes to an institution for the relief of the necessitous, or when, for the same reason, he founds an educational establishment; although it is probably seldom that motives of sympathy are altogether absent from an act of this description. In cases where the self-love is unalloyed, the benefit afforded is generally as great as the means of the benefactor permit, since inadequate munificence fails to earn the desired praise.

Motives of self-love, therefore, although they are in the main antagonistic to those of sympathy, do, in certain

conditions, conduce to the same social end. It must also be noticed that when through motives of self-love, men refuse advantages offered to them, such advantages pass to men who are solely actuated by motives of sustenance, so that what is a loss to one class, is a gain to another from these causes.

Vanity as a form of self-love, leads to a large number of acts which differ greatly in their social effects. Vanity which must have found its first outward expression when the first man adorned himself with plumes or beads, leads certain men and the majority of women to display themselves in costly and luxurious clothes, to wear jewelry, to whiten their faces by means of ointments and powder, to boast of superior attractiveness, achievements or accomplishments, to affect certain peculiarities of speech, and gait, to compress their bodies, to give gratuities beyond their means, to affect the manners of a caste above them, and in other ways to endeavour to increase their prestige in the eyes of others. Such conduct leads in the majority of instances: (1) to an economic result; namely to expenditure beneficial to industry; (2) to a moral and an anti-moral one, that is to a self respect, *sui generis*, which is favourable to a certain discipline and at the same time to the excitement of envy, to the defilement of the human form and to the maintenance of a generally anti-social pride.

Persons moved by any one of these forms of self-love, do not furnish an example which can be imitated generally without danger to the common dignity of life; but they do succeed in stimulating a certain energy having for its object the obtainment of the advantages which they possess and whatever stimulates energy must, in a life which is conditional upon the production of energy, have a certain social value. To all manifestations of ostentation is attached a certain amount of ridicule to which those who display it are insensible, but which acts as a deterrent to many. If a vain man, in order to gratify vanity, wear an exceedingly ungraceful though costly article of dress, it is evident that he will not be imitated by any except vain men. If, however, he wear one which while costly, harmonises with physical characteristics, his example will certainly be followed not only by vain men,

but also by others according to the law of imitation, and when this result is produced there is an æsthetic gain which must be classed with pleasurable benefits. Women, however, who are beautiful and who in order to gratify this form of self-love display upon their persons every form of embellishment which ingenuity can devise, are not altogether moved to do so by vanity. There enters into their love of ornament an æsthetic desire of suiting the beauty and rarity of their dress to the beauty and rarity of their form and features. When they are successful, as generally happens, the effect produced is pleasing to the majority of minds and it may increase their power of sense attraction in the eyes of men of luxurious tastes and in some cases, no doubt, the picture presented is designed with the sole object of attracting such men, so that what in some proceeds purely from the motive of vanity, may proceed in others from that of sex and even from that of sustenance. Even in the case of affected speech, a form of vanity which at first sight would seem to be unalloyed, there may be, and probably frequently is, an intention on the part of the user of such speech of raising himself above the common level and of thereby increasing his material prospects.

The various extravagances of dress which are shown in histories of costume, indicate to what extent motives of this form of self-love may be developed. Such modes have almost invariably been originally invented by one exceptionally vain person of social standing whose vanity was sufficiently bold to defy the ridicule which such extravagances might naturally excite and the model furnished has been imitated during its period of novelty and exception by less inventive persons. Many of the actions of fashion are guided by the vain form of self-love and are frequently performed merely to sustain the reputation for fashionable habits.

Some nations are more self-loving than others and are more liable to be moved by motives of self-love in their dealings with other nations. They are chiefly those of the more southern portions of Europe where climates and racial characteristics combine to create sensibility. Such nations are usually sensible to the flattery of other nations and are more easily dealt with when their self-

love is flattered than when it is not, even in matters which affect their commercial prosperity. Some also take an especial pride in the talent of their artists, in the skill of their soldiers or in the learning of their professors and experience a gratification of self-love when such qualities are praised by foreigners and a disappointment when the praise is withheld. The national love of achievement is contented by foreign praise and there is often a resultant gratitude. It seems probable, however, that as the motive of sustenance increases in strength, throughout the world, there will be a decline of self-love motives in the dealings of states. It is not likely that nations will make war in future for motives of offended self-love only; although it is probable that they will use the pretext of offended dignity for a considerable time, or until wars are discontinued.

In general, motives of self-love as here described, must tend to disappear before sustentative and pleasurable ones. In their purest conception, they belong to an idealistic order, and if life should become more engrossed by sustenance and its end, pleasure, than it has hitherto been, then motives of self-love must be modified thereby.

The time may arrive when no man will refuse benefits which the law permits him to receive, either for the sake of the point of honour, or for moral reasons; but if such a condition of things should be witnessed, it would indicate a certain unsocial retrogression, unless there were a strengthening of sympathy to counteract it. It seems, however, that the vain form of self-love, might disappear with advantage; but of that, the prospect can hardly be considered great, although much may be expected from the effects of the general decline of artifice which cannot fail to be caused by the spread of scientific ideas.

A powerful adjunct to the maintenance of self-love motives exists in the aristocratic spirit as fostered by monarchical institutions. In countries where such institutions obtain, the love of titles is so great that even some scientific men accept such titles, discarding the name under which they had laboured and made discoveries. Their intellectual superiority would appear to be insufficient to content self-love and their desire for social superiority leads them to accept ancient forms of distinction which are no longer in harmony with modern con-

ditions of life and which, in the political field, enchain them to certain principles that are not generally expansive. The maintenance of a title, by those who have inherited one, becomes an object of endeavour and the obtainment of one by those who have not been born in titled ranks, gives rise to a number of acts which are directly attributable to self-love. It seems evident that there is in monarchical countries a constant tendency to what may be termed the higher forms of vanity. It is in obedience to motives of self-love that in such countries persons of title are appointed by preference to various posts and offices. It appears to gratify a monarchical public that a few of its men should be considered as superior human entities and it is willing to accept the guidance of such persons in administrative and other matters.

This love of superiority is manifested in all ranks in monarchical countries and it must and does lead to acts which are not always such as would be performed for the sake of their intrinsic moral or intellectual value. Up to the present time all monarchs are the official supporters of a state religion and they cannot, without inconsistency, favour any movement which aims at substituting a new ethical code for that supplied by religion or a conception of man other than the present one; yet recent researches have made it clear that the religious ethical codes and accounts of man's origin are no longer suited to modern scientific knowledge, to the knowledge of hereditary and psychological phenomena which has been obtained by long and careful investigation and unless the monarchical principles are to be greatly altered in the future, there does not seem to be much prospect that sovereigns will change their traditional attitude. But when it is considered that this form of concentrated self-love has been sufficient to create the fiction that kings can do no harm, it is impossible to foresee what fictional methods may be adopted in the future.

It is a remarkable fact that the moral faults of kings in private life and even to a considerable extent of persons who bear the titles which they confer, do not excite the blame or cause the disqualifications which similiar faults occasion on the part of the majority of men. From motives of self-love, peoples embued with

the aristocratic spirit, refrain from blaming those whom they are accustomed to exalt, even when the latter are blameworthy, and this favoured treatment is a concession which is made to the extended form of self-love contained in the aristocratic ideal. The kingly office originated in the supremacy of a skilful warrior whose will was strong enough to impose itself upon the remainder of his fellow tribesmen or countrymen. In the early middle ages it became hereditary as it has since remained and the reason of the durability of the institution is chiefly to be found in the general satisfaction of self-love which it affords. Certain nations, it seems, experience a need of a superior humanity and as such does not naturally exist, they appoint and maintain a certain family to hold and to perpetuate the kingly dignity. Women are particularly sensible to this form of self-love, and it is seen that many wealthy women of republican countries such as America, marry titled foreigners, chiefly for the sake, it would appear, of the stimulus to self-love which such unions afford.

There is little doubt, moreover, that many men yield to feminine influence in the acceptance of titles, the possession of these marks of superiority frequently develops in women an anti-social pride. When a nation adopts a republican régime, titular distinctions are no longer obtainable from the head of the state, and a number of motives tending towards the obtainment of such distinctions, are suppressed. It is seen, however, that such motives are in a certain measure replaced by those which aim at the possession of honours represented by certain badges or ribands given in reward for scientific, political, industrial or artistic merit, and it is remarkable that the recipients of these tokens of recognition generally display them upon their persons on all occasions. Such outward signs enable the wearer to be immediately recognised by all who see him, and are therefore a perpetual source of gratification of self-love. It is probably for this reason that they are so continually displayed.

In republics, ancient titles though not officially recognised, are not suppressed and are commonly used in social intercourse and by the press. This would seem

to indicate a lingering fondness for such distinctive marks even in republican countries. It may be here observed that kings when dethroned by revolutions, use every effort in their power to regain their lost position, in spite of the dangers and anxieties by which it is attended and it cannot be doubted that such efforts are caused by motives of almost pure self-love. It might certainly occur that a pretender or a dethroned king, convinced of his superior ability to increase the prosperity and happiness of his country, might be moved by motives of sympathy; but it is probable that in the majority of cases, self-love (occasionally allied to sustenance) is the prevailing motive. There is a caste or family of sovereigns and an emulation takes place between the members of that caste or family. That member who is without an empire is at a disadvantage among them and his self-love must be held to suffer. He is somewhat in the position of a rider who has lost his horse. In his case there is a diminution of personality, an absence of the satisfaction of exalted position, a want of the sense of historical importance, a desire for the sumptuous conditions of existence which a nation affords its rulers. It is for these reasons that pretenders plot and labour for many years, sometimes for a whole lifetime, to obtain the sovereignty and are willing to accept the most insecure of thrones. Those among them who are especially imbued with the religious spirit may be guided also by religious motives, deeming that they are divinely appointed; but it is not easy to form an estimate of the strength of this motive as a factor of their conduct. The strength of this participating motive would seem to depend upon the early education and natural tendencies of the individual.

Acts dictated by motives of self-love, depend for their general production or maintenance upon the prosperity of communities. When straitened means or poverty are experienced, there is a suspension of such motives which reappear as soon as prosperity is restored. For, as previously observed, in misfortune a shrinkage of self-love is produced. The thoughts being entirely engrossed with the means of procuring sustenance, most other subjects of cogitation are excluded, so that, in ordinary conditions, self-love is largely dependent upon a certain measure of

material comfort. Wounded self-love may exist in the most acute poverty and give rise to a conduct of a special kind, but the general tendency must be in the direction of indifference when the vital interest is at stake. If it were not so, self-loving nations, when defeated in war, might be expected to continue fighting to extermination rather than accept the terms of the conqueror to make peace. This however does not occur, for a time comes when the effect of the reverses sustained is to reduce self-love to the point required for the acceptance of the enemy's conditions.

Self-love motives may be considered as in a large measure due to the possession of power of every nature: but especially to that which accompanies wealth. Where great wealth is possessed, society combines to foster the self-love of its possessor who therefore finds no obstacles to its complete gratification, and the power which wealth thus confers increases in a direct ratio to the wealth possessed. The ownership of wealth, indeed, may be assimilated to the possession of royal or other distinctions as a factor of self-love motives, for it compels almost the same deference as the latter.

As wealth tends to pass from the hands of the aristocratic classes who perform no money-earning task, into those of the more plebeian earners, there is a sacrifice of self-love on the part of the former in favour of the latter and consequently a diminution of self-love motives on the one hand and an increase upon the other. A bartering of social status is said to be occasionally observable in which the introduction of wealthy men of plebeian origin into the society of men of established rank, is effected for material considerations. Such a practice if real would prove both that the self-love motive is liable to yield to the sustentative and pleasurable ones, and that the sustentative and pleasurable motives may sometimes be set aside in favour of the motive of self-love. And this is evident if we reflect that the postulant for entrance into the ranks where self-love is at its greatest height, only obtains such admission at the sacrifice of some of his material wealth. There is at work in our modern society a process of compensation which tends to make the two possessions, wealth and social status, interchangeable quantities, so that in the ratio in which a man's wealth

augments, his power of acquiring consideration increases, and there is no doubt that men of all nations, but especially those of monarchical ones, when acting under the influence of the sustentative motive, are also moved by motives of self-love.

When wealth is gained, there is, except in especially acquisitive dispositions, a natural increase of pleasure and of self-loving motives and the predominance is obtained by whichever of these is most in accordance with the heredity, education, or acquired tastes of the individual. When self-love predominates, then the acts are directed towards the obtainment of consideration and respect or adulation. The individual who is thus influenced is frequently termed ambitious before attainment and proud subsequently, or both when he exhibits the two characteristics at the same time, and such terms sufficiently well represent his attitude towards society. Although such a man undoubtedly observes many excellent rules of conduct without which his progress would be arrested, he is generally deficient in sympathy. His habit of seeking and affirming superiority tending to engender in him a contempt for all inferiority, conduces to a remorseless conception of the vital struggle, irreconcilable with any theory of conduct into which enters an element of general justice. It is true that charity is associated with the aristocratic spirit, but the manner in which charity is dispensed has hitherto shown that the pity which prompts it is not free from contempt.

Having in view all the above considerations, therefore, it may be said that the motive of self-love has a practical value, in social development, in so far as it is an extension of the fundamental love of self, inseparable from consciousness, in the direction of a stimulant to energy of a nature not prejudicial to the self-love of the neighbour or capable of lowering him in his own estimation, and this limits legitimate self-love to a far smaller field than it occupies under the existing system and excludes the titular distinctions as incompatible with the creation and maintenance of a social system in which a general standard of worth, free from envy-causing inequalities, is the object of attainment.

CHAPTER VI

SYMPATHY—JUSTICE

THE sympathetic motive proper is that under the influence of which men act in the interest of others, and seek the society of others, independently of any advantages derivable from such modes of conduct.

It produces acts of friendship, of self-sacrifice, or of social benefaction; but it has a tendency to combine with the motive of sustenance and occasionally with that of self-love which renders it more complex than the other motives.

It is necessary to discriminate between pure or disinterested sympathy and that which is not totally free from self-interest. If, for instance, to save a friend from misfortune, a man jeopardise his own interest, it is needful, in order to determine his motive, to know whether he was led to act thus, from the motive of sympathy alone, or to what extent from that of sustenance, as represented by actual advantages accruing to self from the act, or from that of self-love, as represented by increase of consideration. When a motive is supported by a profound conviction that the conditions in which human beings are placed render the granting of moral and material support an obligation which it is impossible to disregard without being anti-human, and by a sentiment of pity for the suffering experienced; then it is certain that it is one of sympathy and that (within limits) it is of a nature to increase the general happiness, and to promote the confidence of men in their own race. When, however, it is due to a desire to support a man in misfortune, because it is either considered that his misfortune may react on self, or because the individual possesses qualities which, when he is restored to his normal state, may procure to the helper either pleasure or profit; then although the help is actually afforded and the anticipations of the helper may not be

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fulfilled, yet the helping act is not to be counted as produced by human sympathy in the sense which is given to it here and it can only be the result of a form of the motive of sustenance. Pure motives of sympathy, however, must be considered as rare and are principally met with in such as the following manifestations.

When a man spontaneously performs any of those "acts of kindness" by which it is possible to lighten the tasks of others, without any thought of reciprocity, this is the effect of a motive of pure sympathy. When, again, any one of the acts of assistance is performed which the great majority of passers in the streets are ready to render to any person who meets with mishap or injury, these are, without doubt, dictated by motives of more or less pure sympathy, although when the act is a jump into a river in the presence of spectators to save a drowning man, there may sometimes be an element of vanity. Nevertheless the term "pure" must be considered as a relative one; for the motive of every act of kindness or of mutual aid, if minutely examined, may be shown to possess factors of expediency or of general interest which are foreign to sympathy strictly understood. Even in the case of assistance rendered to passers in the streets, there is an abstract interest of reciprocity, a realization that if such services were not habitually rendered, daily life would be less pleasurable. And in the case of persons of just minds, there is also an element of justice. It is considered just that a human being in distress should be succoured and this feeling appears to have its origin in the belief that men have certain rights or claims upon their fellow men which are prescriptive and inherent to the state of man.

When a man is seen to be in a specially unfortunate position, sympathy takes the form of pity; but in this form, although pure, it is not easily excited and is soon withdrawn if the misfortune is seen to be less acute than had been supposed and the acts it leads to are more exceptional. For the present purposes, however, it is not necessary to draw a distinction between sympathy and pity. The former term may be held to embrace the latter.

The motives which lead men to establish hospitals for the care and cure of the sick, are of the mixed order alluded to above. In the middle ages before public

hospitals existed, the sick, especially in times of epidemic, were frequently forced into the street to die, and the inconvenience which this practice occasioned, and the gloom which it spread among the populations; caused the authorities to establish shelters and later to provide medical assistance which was also extended to orphans.¹ The sympathy certainly, even in those non-moral times, existed among the people at large, and the rulers not only feared that it might give rise to discontent; but probably also became conscious that for want of care, many lives were being lost of which the community were in need. The origin of hospitals, therefore, was both in the fundamental sentiment of sympathy and in a social and economic necessity. To-day the same motives cause men to found and maintain hospitals and the commonness of the sense of obligation is shown in countries such as England where, although the state does not maintain hospitals, large revenues, are voluntarily furnished by the public for hospital support. As the fresh developments of medical science make greater demands, these subsidies are increased, and it is difficult to foresee a time when they will be withdrawn. There is a very distinct and universal admission of the obligation. The poor themselves who are the chief beneficiaries, are seen to be contributors, and this from motives of mixed sympathy and interest; since they are aware that the greater the funds at the disposal of the hospitals, the greater will be the comforts which they will enjoy whenever they are patients. Hospitals not only aim at restoring to health and usefulness those whom they receive, but conformably with the enhanced appreciation of human life which is a characteristic of the present century, they also seek to prolong the existence of those who can never be of any use to the community and in this respect it is difficult to deny that the motive for so doing, is one of unmixed sympathy, unless we are to attribute it to some improbable effect of fashion or of superstition. Sympathy, also, of an unmixed nature, would seem to be the motive of those who establish or contribute to the maintenance of homes for the aged poor,

¹ "On trouvait un grand nombre d'enfants orphelins de père et de mère gisant en rue sans aucune retraite." Ordonnance de 1392 quoted by E. Semichon, "*Histoire des Enfants Abandonnés*," Paris 1880.

that is to say, for persons who cannot contribute, either materially or intellectually, to the general wealth, and whose death is, in reality, a material gain to the community. Society is under no legal obligation to maintain these persons; but it maintains them out of sympathy for their helplessness and there is also here a factor of gratitude. Society recognises that it owes a certain debt of gratitude for the life spent in labour which, though it may have helped to enrich others and to increase the national prosperity, has not enriched the worker. Society is here under what is called a moral obligation and this is a development of the sense of human solidarity which has existed from the earliest times, which is still in process of evolution and which both in its interested and its disinterested forms, could not disappear without creating a profound disturbance in the course of social life. It is however certain that when the sympathetic motive is in conflict with the sustentative one, it is generally overcome, and thus when a man is forced to choose between the alternative of benefitting a friend and increasing his own prosperity, it is seldom that he chooses the former alternative.

The creation of societies of a social character and of clubs is undoubtedly due to the sympathetic motive, and although the motive is frequently frustrated by the mutual suspicion and the defamation which exist in such organisations, it is sufficiently strong, in general, to produce a spirit of confraternity which is of social value. It must be observed, however, in this connection, that in comparison with those formed for commercial or political purposes, the number of purely social associations is small, although, on the other hand, there do exist a certain number of philanthropic societies which are clearly founded by motives of sympathy. In clubs of a social character, especially on the continent of Europe, the principal pursuit is not comradeship, but gambling which is a deflected form of solicitude for pleasure, and many such clubs depend for their support upon the profits derived from games of chance in which sympathy is non-existent. So that here again it appears that motives of sympathy are liable to be crowded out by others of a less altruistic nature. In large cities, also,

clubs which were originally established for social intercourse tend, owing to the lack of social qualities amongst their members, to become little more than reading and dining rooms. This is in some part due to the larger organisation of society in great cities; but it must also be attributed to the indifference which is often shown by men for all who are without their home or professional circle.

Motives of sympathy may with some truth be said to be the cause of the hospitality which in large cities, especially, is almost the only occasion for the meeting of friends and acquaintances whose occupations do not bring them together; but we find that here there is an absolute expectation of reciprocity and so much is this the case that those persons who are not able to dispense hospitality, are largely excluded from social intercourse; although they are generally more in need of its stimulating influence than the more fortunate entertainers. It is not probably so much a return of the value of the nutriment given which is expected, but rather a return of the pleasure of meeting in social intercourse and this condition has been dealt with in the chapter on the pleasure motive.

It happens, however, in decadent societies that egoism destroys sympathetic conduct and that although it is salutary that social intercourse should be as wide as possible, some persons, from motives of sustenance or sex or vanity, place obstacles in the way of the meeting of others and sometimes seek to derive material profit from the presentations which they make. And such practises have frequently the effect of estranging observant and thoughtful people from society.

There are undoubtedly some men more naturally disposed to act from motives of sympathy than others. There are some who are so intensely so disposed, that they devote their lives to the prosecution of some philanthropic aim. It is seen, however, that such men are largely out-numbered by those who are seldom moved by sympathy, and it is necessary to use the word, seldom, in preference to never, because even amongst the criminal classes instances are recorded of mutual aid which is almost, if not entirely free from anticipation of reciprocity.

There is a class of men who are by disposition inclined

to act from motives of sympathy, but are restrained from doing so by the evil which they witness in the world and these who are generally men of nervous temperaments and fine discrimination, are undoubtedly affected by frustrated motives of sympathy,¹ somewhat in the manner in which men are affected by thwarted motives of sex, although in a lesser degree. If, for instance, a man endeavour to benefit his fellows by some labour of pure altruism; but finds that they either do not heed his efforts or that, by reason of their wrong tendencies, his efforts are without success; a shock is produced which in some cases may transform the well-doer into a person incapable of committing actions of a sympathetic nature, and the realization on the part of such persons of human inferiority, may lead to self-destruction. There is also another class of persons who, without any special perception of the evil existing in the world, are yet prevented by a natural mistrust of their neighbours from acting sympathetically. There are others, especially among the Anglo-Saxon race, who do not act from motives of sympathy, from a fear of the ridicule which the prevalence of false ideas, especially as to the moral of the Darwinian theory, tends to cast upon those who so act, and this obstacle to solidarity is more serious than it may appear to be at first sight; for it is evident that any misconception which hinders the performance of acts of sympathy, is inimical to the ulterior interests of humanity, unless we are to suppose that humanity can dispense with all sentiment of an altruistic nature and exist as an aggregate of egoisms, each striving within the limits of the laws to benefit self, and to grant no help while doing so, whenever there is no prospect of return.

When a man meets with an unmerited misfortune, his friends and sometimes, if he be a public man, the public, take certain measures either to reinstate him in his position or to materially assist him, and such conduct is undoubtedly dictated by motives of sympathy mingled perhaps with an element of justice. If the sense of the misfortune suffered, be general, the effort made will

¹ Bismarck in his letters to his wife, disillusioned and wounded in his self-love, complains of the dislike of which he is the object and remarks that sympathy must be reciprocated if it is to endure.

probably be adequate ; but if it be confined to a few, the endeavours may be insufficient to lead to any practical result, and in either case, the assistance rendered will somewhat depend upon what rival claims for assistance there may be at the particular time.

The obtainment of substantial aid is always somewhat precarious, and it is seldom that the aid received is at all commensurate with the misfortune suffered. In the case of the families of men who have died in the performance of duty, poorly remunerated, motives of sympathy, combined with justice, do not often induce the community, or individual members of it, to make much provision for such families. In the case of employers of labour whose officials or workmen lose their lives in their service, the sustentative motive may sometimes overcome the sympathetic one and cause them to seek to shirk the obligation of providing for the families of such men ; but public opinion obliges them to act sympathetically ; and although it is true that the sympathy of the public is the more easily excited when it is not connected with responsibility, yet the existence of the sentiment is a healthy sign of solidarity.

From motives of sympathy men of a village (and more especially women in whom the sense of nationality is fainter) will, during the course of a war, care for a wounded soldier of the enemy, no matter how bitter may be the hatred of that enemy, and many instances have been given where excessive kindness has been shown without any hope of reciprocity, since wars are not of frequent occurrence, and the non-combatants who give this aid to a disabled man in a foreign land, can never be placed in his position. But the aid is given from the realization of the common relationship of man which human enmity cannot destroy and this is sympathy. There is no legal reason why such villagers should not allow the wounded man to die untended on the road-side, but there is a conviction in their minds that such conduct is not of an order suited to the state of man and the fact is the more remarkable, in this connection, because his duty compels the wounded soldier, if restored to health, to return to his army and combat again the nation of his benefactors.

However much strength they may possess in the aggregate, individual motives of sympathy at a particular time and especially at the present, are certainly not strong, and this is so generally understood, that men who, in misfortune, have need of sympathy and the support which it carries with it, are generally seen to defer making a confession of their need as long as possible, from an intimate conviction, acquired in their experience of life that the majority of their friends, alarmed in their solicitude for material interests, will endeavour to withdraw from their society. So great is this fear, at times, that men whose resources are unknown, or known to be slight or uncertain, experience difficulty in making friends, however excellent their natures or their character may be. As largely as sympathy is extended to the successful, as largely is it withheld from the unsuccessful, and it is obvious that that sympathy which the successful receives, is by no means pure. Optimistic moralists are somewhat given to ignore these facts which may be observed in the ordinary intercourse of life, and although others opposed to them, are to be met with also, they may be considered as of general occurrence. Sympathy is greatly checked by the contempt for weakness which descends from the early barbarisms, and it seems destined to have formidable opponents in the motives of sustenance, adequate and superfluous, and of pleasure, until the respective shares of individuals in the sustenance and pleasure of the world, are established on less unequal principles than those which have hitherto been witnessed, or until, by its outgrowth of all other motives, it brings about a complete amelioration of human nature. It is no doubt true that there is less apparent material cruelty now, than at any previous period ; but the whole machinery of life has been improved, owing to the advance of science and to the overthrow of authority based on superstitions which favoured cruelty. And it must not be forgotten that cruelty has changed its form. If men are no longer threatened to be burnt as heretics, or, when ill, to be cast out into the street to die ; they are liable to be ruined by financial combinations, or forced to work for an insufficient wage and sympathy is generally inadequate to prevent such forms of modern cruelty which are only alleviated

when the injured are skilful enough to discover and resolute enough to use the adequate means of resistance. No doubt where sympathy fails to operate spontaneously in one quarter, and the failure produces cruelty, there are champions of oppressed persons in another who, whether purely actuated by sympathy, or partly by motives of sympathy and partly by motives of sustenance, frequently obtain, through legislative channels, the mitigation or the abolition of the cruelty. But in such cases, it is doubtful whether the results should not be considered as manifestations of improved justice, rather than of increased sympathy.

Sympathetic motives are probably aided by prosperity and checked by adversity. A man whose material wants and pleasures are assured, will generally be more in sympathy with his fellow-men, more ready to approve their manners and propensities, than one to whom both wants and pleasure have been parsimoniously allotted or denied. He will be inclined to see humanity in a more favourable light, because it has provided him with the means of enjoying life, and more disposed to act towards it from sympathetic motives, although, on the other hand, if his character be egotistical, his sympathetic motives may not extend beyond evincing to his neighbours such sympathy as he may expect to have returned, perhaps with interest. The unfortunate man, deprived of security of existence and of satisfactions, will have a strong tendency to look upon society as hard and selfish and to abstain from sympathetic acts, even when it is in his power to perform them; although he, on his part, may, if given to experience compassion, have pity for those as unfortunate as himself and strive to help them. In general, however, the effect of adversity would be opposed to sympathy.

Again, in Western Europe, meteorological conditions are not without influence as factors of motives of sympathy. In calm weather mind and body¹ are generally in a more composed state than in disturbed weather; the sympathetic nerve system is more harmonious in its working, and the man conscious of a greater sense of well-being and happi-

¹ It is well known that storms and electrical disturbances generally affect the organs of digestion, often in an acute degree.

ness, has a tendency to perform acts of sympathy. Storms and light barometric pressure, generally tend to produce irritation and a consequent lack of sympathy; while very low or very high temperatures, by the circulatory disturbance and suffering which they occasion, are equally unfavourable to sympathetic conduct. It is easy to observe in what way a heavy downpour of rain alters the conditions of life while it continues. Out-door exercise is almost entirely stopped; few visits are paid, and in the houses where there is a diminution of light and frequently an increase of humidity; there is a general tendency to depression which is not the mental state during which sympathy is generally manifested. From a pathological point of view, the influence of the weather is still more marked. Cold winds and rainfall are alike unfavourable to pulmonary, bronchial or arthritic affections and check or suppress the enthusiasm of life which is needful to produce sympathy. It is not however, necessary to enquire into the abnormal conditions under which sympathy is affected by meteorological phenomena. It may be asked whether any alliances between nations are made from motives of pure sympathy, or whether sympathetic motives ever enter into such alliances. The questions are of interest, because they widen the present enquiry, and because the answers to them enable us to measure with some approximation to accuracy, the spread of universal sympathy.

There need be little hesitation in saying that international alliances are seldom, if ever, made from motives of sympathy, between peoples, independently of material interest. In recent times, we have no instance of a strong nation having so much sympathy with a weak one, that it might offer the latter its alliance and consequently its protection. On the contrary, the small nations, unable to form alliances, have long depended for their safety upon the rivalries of their powerful neighbours. If numerical weakness does not attract sympathy, blood relationship is not more efficacious, since alliances are formed between nations of the most alien kinship for offence or defence against others of their own stock. The motives which lead to alliances of mutual help in time of danger, are mainly self protective, or sustentative, and although after they have been effected, an endeavour is made by the

allies to take an interest in each other and to sympathise with each other's misfortunes; the interest is generally seen to be of a more or less artificial nature. Intermarriages are few and there is a generally evinced disinclination to establish reciprocal free trade on the part of one or both of the allied nations, and only a limited desire to learn each other's tongue. With regard to the nations which are not allied, there is not only no sympathy, but often an openly avowed hostility and for these reasons, motives of international sympathy may be held to be non-existent, notwithstanding utterances of heads of states which often convey an opposite impression.

It has been contended, and notably by Sutherland,¹ that human sympathy is the cause of the increasing clemency of war and that it will be that of its ultimate abandonment. Undoubtedly there is some truth in the contention. While, however, Europeans give quarter to prisoners, tend the wounded among them and adopt certain rules for projectiles, they use the utmost ingenuity in constructing weapons which will kill the greatest number in the shortest time, and therefore it does not seem from present appearances, that if war is to be abolished, its abolition will be due to motives of pure sympathy. It seems far more probable that the abolition will be chiefly due to the pleasure motive, considered as a desire of self preservation for the enjoyments of existence; to a realisation of the folly of destruction as concerns Europeans, combined with a realisation of the necessity on the part of the most populous nations, of efforts towards restraint of population. It is very doubtful if the extension of sympathy would of itself be sufficient to suppress war within any approximately near future, so long as the sustentative motive demanded its continuance; but if the pleasure need grew stronger than the need for sustenance; then war would probably cease between European nations, and whether the Eastern nations would be equally inclined to lay down arms or not, would depend upon the spread of Western education among them.

Finally, the motive of sympathy, even when not unalloyed with interest, is productive of social good by the

¹ "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct."

happiness which the acts it causes brings, and by the mutual confidence which it tends to maintain among men.

Whenever it is combined with the sustentative motive; although it may not be productive of specific social harm, yet by the want of complete sincerity which it reveals in this form, it tends to be destructive of confidence and inasmuch as it does so, is productive of loss of general happiness.

JUSTICE

However it may have originated, whether from a desire to protect the rights of self by protecting those of others or from a realisation of the greater dissemination of happiness where just dealing is practised or to both these causes combined with an effect of sympathy, there exists a general desire for justice which gives rise to a motive closely allied to the motive of sympathy, if it be not an extension of it, and productive of acts designed to effect an equitable apportionment of benefits between individuals or to prevent deprivation of such apportionment. From motives of justice men frequently act in a manner somewhat opposed to their natural propensities and even to their personal interests especially after they have recognised that they have pursued personal interests to the prejudice of others and when they endeavour to make the restorations alluded to in Chapter II.

Acts performed under the influence of this desire are commonly termed acts of justice and they are generally performed, both by individuals and by groups, usually after a somewhat lengthy time has elapsed since the injustice which they are designed to compensate was committed.

Considering this tendency, it seems clear that the motive lacks spontaneity and that it is called forth after mature reflection and acknowledgment of obligation.

Like the other motives, that of justice is stronger in some individuals than in others. Owing to conditions of heredity, education, environment and physical constitution some men experience a strong, others a weak sense of justice, while others, again, appear to be destitute of such a sense.

It seems that the three classes of individuals represent

three decreasing orders of moral and social merit. The first class generally promotes the welfare of society, the second does not concern itself with that welfare, while the third is injurious to it. Men of the first class are alone habitually influenced by motives of justice and therefore it is by them that just acts are usually performed. When such acts are by nature sympathetic, they take the form of restitutions of reputation or property for injury done to either in the pursuit of motives or of measures to protect persons against fraud or deception. Those who perform them have fulfilled their end when they have restored rights withheld or made atonement for injury done, and there results a sense of social rectitude which is usually pleasurable. When injustice is witnessed, an uneasiness of mind is experienced by persons of just minds which is immediately due, in all probability, to a realisation of the social failure which would result if such injustice became general.

As regards what is known as retributive justice, it is very doubtful whether the act of punishing an offender actually convicted of an offence can be attributed to a motive of justice. It is in reality dictated by a sustentative one. The punishment is inflicted as a warning to the culprit not to repeat the deleterious action on society and is individually and socially a measure of protection.

Much of the conduct which is commonly called conscientious is dictated by a realisation of the need of justice as a factor of social life. And, generally, in the pursuit of motives, a conscientious act is not other than a just one, or in other terms, an act that is designed to be beneficial to those in respect of whom it is performed.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGION

RELIGIOUS motives, as they are here understood, are those motives which lead to acts favourable to some form of religion, and religion, for the present purpose, may be taken to mean a belief in a supernatural God which, owing to certain conditions attached to it, affects the conduct of believers in such a God.

From religious motives a class of men devote a few hours each week to attendance at religious service, or to private prayer. They give some of their substance towards the maintenance of a salaried clergy as well as to the erection of churches, and they place under the auspices of religion the events of birth, marriage and death. In other words they devote a small portion of their time and means to the obtainment of a modulating, and as they conceive, an elevating influence. And by the fact of their belief they consider themselves as something more than purely material entities and as the possessors of an interest in a spiritual world.

Now there can be no doubt that a man greatly under the influence of the religious sentiment (with the precise psychological significance of which we are not here concerned) must in certain circumstances of his life, act in ways which are different from those of men only slightly subject to this influence and still more differently from those of men not subject to it at all, and that there will not infrequently be added to the motives by which his conduct is directed, a supplementary motive—the religious one. He will endeavour to act in such a way that the interests of his religion may coincide with those of his material existence and though he will seldom succeed, the attempts which he makes produce modes of conduct different from those where no such attempts are made. If for instance a religious man covet a favoured piece of

land for the erection of a noisome factory, but if, at the same time, that piece of land be required for an extension of the church of which he is a member, it is probable that he will have more scruples in becoming the higher bidder for that land than if it was sought by a rival manufacturer and he might endeavour to make some compromise between the motive of sustenance and that of religion. In a case where he abandoned the site to the church, his act would be essentially due to a religious motive. A non-religionist would neither abandon the advantage nor seek to compromise, and therefore the conduct of a religious man is differentiated from that of the non-religious. Again, if a man be entrusted with the revenues of his church, he will feel, if there is any truth in his attachment to religion, that he must guard them with still greater care than if they belonged to the public at large and he will take special measures for their safe keeping. Such measures are prompted by religious motives, although in this as in the former case, the fear of public opinion is not a negligible quantity in the decision taken. It is a fact, however, that religious motives are not always sufficiently strong to preserve men from the temptation of appropriating such revenues to their own purposes.

From almost purely religious motives, Roman Catholics and followers of religions similar to Roman Catholicism, abstain from food, or from certain food, at fixed intervals of time; perform pilgrimages to venerated shrines and impose certain other penances upon themselves. The ulterior object of these acts is recompense in another world; but the motive which prompts them is none the less religious, although it is doubtful whether visits to sanctuaries supposed to be invested with healing powers, can be held to be due to strictly religious motives.

The same criticism may be applied to the motives of men who become ecclesiastics; because the clerical office not only affords sustenance but also, in some countries, the prospect of considerable gain. In Catholic countries there exists what is called the *vocation* which is the result of a blended suggestion and auto-suggestion, according to which a person (generally young) of either sex, after a long religious training, persuades himself or herself that he or she is called upon by the divinity to embrace

the service of religion. When this occurs the motive which leads to the assumption of clerical office must be accounted as a religious one.

While ecclesiastical bodies possessed real power, and it was obligatory on all to practise religion, it cannot have been easy to distinguish a religious motive from one prompted by the fear of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; but in the present day when there are no ecclesiastical tribunals, it is not very difficult to distinguish the pure from the impure religious motive.

It is, however, true, even in the present day, that there exists, especially among the smaller populations of Europe, and more particularly in protestant than in catholic countries, a censorship of religious opinion which holds in disesteem all abstainers from religious practice, and this censorship is frequently strong enough to force men to maintain the outward semblance of religion after they have ceased to believe the dogmas of the churches. Men who act thus are generally led to do so by the sustentative motive, because the loss of social consideration which they sustain is ultimately, either directly or indirectly the concomitant of loss of material advantages and in this sense the ancient tyranny of religion is maintained.

Those who in order to preach religion journey to uncivilised or to partly civilised countries, act theoretically under the influence of religious motives, but although the irritation which they often produce in the minds of those whom they seek to proselytise sometimes causes their destruction and they therefore risk their lives, there is nevertheless a combined motive of pleasure and of sustenance inseparable from the motive by which they are guided. The pleasure is in the form of travel, the sustenance in the form of the salaries and other advantages granted to them by societies constituted for the purpose and it is difficult to separate the sources of their conduct. When, however, a man like Damien exiles himself for life to one of the Polynesian islands exclusively occupied by lepers, or when, although subjected to torture, a man refuses to renounce his faith, preferring death itself to a renunciation, then such men must be held to be actuated by purely, or very nearly purely, religious

motives. It may be objected that the ambition of earning the name of hero may not be altogether absent; but this objection can scarcely be considered to have much weight.

In the case of the sisterhoods who devote their lives to the nursing of the infectious sick, women who have little or no chance of rising even in their own hierarchy, but who run considerable risk, especially during the period of their apprenticeship, of contracting a fatal malady; the motives by which they are actuated can hardly be called other than religious in the sense of the word here accepted. Their education has been religious in the majority of cases, and their motives are religious. It must be remarked, however, in this connection, that lay nurses whose labours are performed for sustenance are exposed to the same danger. In protestant countries such as England and the United States, men are led from religious motives to address the passers on a roadway, or to preach in public parks and as there is no remuneration attached to such proceedings, they appear to be due purely to the religious motive. On one occasion a man exhibited in a Parisian public thoroughfare a large red painted board on which religious exhortations were inscribed. Undaunted by the indifference and the quiet smiles of a population accustomed to other modes of propaganda, he walked persistently from one end to the other of an avenue, stopping at intervals to inquire of the passers-by if they were assured of a future life. Such acts may be ascribed to fanaticism, or to eccentricity; but they nevertheless indicate the force of a motive which, although diminishing in intensity, is yet sufficiently strong to produce such acts.

It is difficult to deny that the tortures of the inquisition were ordered by the Spanish priesthood, as much in the defence of the throne as of the church, yet it is conceivable that the motives of some of the men who ordered these crimes were of the religious order. In the case of Calvin criminally burning Catholics, they were certainly due to a sense of the necessity of acting in the best interest of what was considered by this reformer, to be a purified form of religion.

Undoubtedly the religious motive always tends to

become an all-pervading one, and the reason why it has not succeeded is that it conflicts with the economic. As long as men find that their religion does not make too serious demands upon their liberty or their resources, they are willing to support it; but when, especially through the conduct of its priesthood, it becomes a burden upon the civil life of the community; then there comes a reaction which stops its further progress towards dominion. A large collection of cases of religious mania has been made,¹ but as they are all abnormal ones, they do not find a place in this study of the motives of normally constituted men. They are interesting, however, as affording evidence of the dangers which attend the too constant pursuit of religious motives. Nearly all the maladies of religious mania, are contracted in the practice of religion, and it is a realisation of the danger attending this passion which has preserved men from indulging it too freely.

From motives of religion, some men in mental distress are said, and probably rightly said, to abstain from suicide which most of the churches condemn and assimilate to murder.² Those who believe that they will be made answerable for transgressions in another world, are frequently deterred from self-destruction by the thought of the fate which they consider awaits them, and their abstention is due to a religious motive of a somewhat alloyed nature. It is not one of those motives which spring from veneration or from an emotional relation towards the divinity worshiped; but it is principally produced by fear. It may be that in the anthropomorphic systems there may exist a feeling that it is an act of desecration to wilfully destroy the image of the divinity; but there would seem to be little difference in the destruction practised upon self in suicide and that practised upon others in war, and war is not considered by religion as a peccant custom.

It is, however, extremely difficult to obtain reliable information upon this point, because the fear of those who ascribe to religious feeling their abstention from suicide, is conterminous with the fear of bodily suffering

¹ James, "The Varieties of Religious Experience." Janet, "L'automatisme Psychologique."

² The words "suicide" in English and French and "Selbstmord" in German carry with them a certain blame.

and of an unknown future. Among men of weakened wills also, there is often a tendency to use the plea of religious motives to disguise their inability to commit the act of self-destruction. There seems to be no doubt, however, that the stronger the religious sense and the belief in religious dogma, the stronger will be the restraining influence due to religious motives.

If solicitude for sustenance enters into many motives reputed religious, pleasure is also to be found in such motives in no inconsiderable proportion. When once the mind has become saturated with religion, religious practises produce a species of intellectual pleasure. There is a pleasure in psalm-singing and in listening to liturgical prayers and no doubt in personal devotion and the pursuit of such pleasure may become an end in itself. There is, it is said, a sense of relief from care and materiality which follows religious exercises and which is in itself pleasurable and members of the Roman faith declare that the use of the confessional procures for them a feeling of alleviation which is beneficial both to their mental and bodily health. That there is pleasure in the music which many forms of religion use as an adjunct to devotion, is obvious. So it is also with the artistic attributes, decoration, architecture, vestments, as well as with the olfactory adjunct of perfumes or incense, all of which act as a sedative influence producing a sensation of inward calm.

When, therefore, a man decides to attend a service of his religion, his motive may be exclusively religious in the meaning adopted at the beginning of this chapter, or it may be alloyed with the sustentative and pleasure motives and belong to a mixed variety, with religion as a principal factor.

Religious pleasure is often seen in connection with religious pageants, processions and ceremonies of various kinds which appear to satisfy the desire of the religious for objective displays of their faith, and the pleasure in some cases reaches great intensity, as when in Spain, a Bishop makes his entry into a town and the whole population assemble to witness his arrival. The enthusiasm frequently reaches to such heights, that a spectator who ventured to show the smallest sign of dissension from the popular feeling would be severely treated. After religious

exercises, also, it is highly probable that there is a sense of pleasure from the satisfaction which work performed procures, although such pleasure would not appear to be sufficient to constitute a motive in itself for the performance of the work.

Whether women are more guided in their conduct by religious motives is a question which may be asked. In most countries women are in the majority at religious services and they lend help to the priesthood by collecting resources and by dispensing charity, and it is generally considered, and many women proclaim it as a fact, that religion is essential to their natures, providing them with rules of conduct having the *fiat* of spiritual authority as well as with an idealism grateful to their minds. But whether religion influences the important moral acts of their lives as deeply as it does those of religious men, is a question which is surrounded by many difficulties. We cannot discover whether there is any religious element in the more temperate and passive attitude which women adopt towards life, generally, or whether it is due to their more lymphatic constitution. Neither is it easy to judge to what extent they may be preserved from unchastity by religious, as apart from legal and social prohibitions. Data on such questions are rare, and if few women are able to analyse the motive by which they were influenced after the act has been committed, they are scarcely more able to do so in respect of the abstention from an act contrary to religious and secular morality. It seems that religion appeals more especially to the emotional side of feminine natures and that the religious motives of women are chiefly evidenced by acts of devotion.

Fear is doubtless a factor of the religious feeling among women whose natural timidity leads them to propitiate the deity in order that their future existence may be assured, and many of their religious motives are qualified by this fear which in reality is an apprehension of bodily suffering: but there is not a great probability that this fear invariably accompanies religious motives.¹ Another reason for acting in conformity with religious

¹ Fear, or reverence of the representations of the Deity is often to be found among women and the influence of priests is very great upon this sex. I have known a young girl thrown into a state of great nervous excitement each time she met an ecclesiastic of commanding presence.

precepts frequently given by widows is the hope of rejoining their husbands in a future world which they assume to be the felicitous one promised by religion to its most approved members, and doubtless a firm belief in this ultimate reunion may exercise a considerable moral influence. In the case of widows who have remarried and been widowed for a second time, the influence, for obvious reasons, is probably less strong. From religious motives, or from motives favourable to the interest of religion, women endeavour to influence men in the decision of questions where the welfare of religion is at stake. They second the priesthood in all countries and have hitherto been successful in some, in preserving religious education in schools, although in France, the country where scientific conceptions enter most quickly, into the daily life; they have failed to obtain the continued toleration of the monastic orders. It is doubtless owing to the extent to which religious motives prevail among them, that much of the slowness with which religion declines, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, is to be attributed. When it is remembered that women form the large majority of worshippers in churches, and that few women are not worshippers, it will be seen that the religious motive is an especially feminine one, as regards at least, outer religious observances.¹

Sex attraction also enters into the religious motives of women in a larger proportion than most of them are aware. Except in America, the priesthood of religious sects is almost exclusively male, and women, in taking part in religious exercises, are frequently attracted, half mystically at times, by the personal characteristics of the ecclesiastic whose ministrations they receive, and this fact is well authenticated by the example given in the chapter on Sex.

In protestant countries when the marriage of the clergy is permitted, young girls of strong religious tendencies frequently prefer clergymen as husbands to men of other professions and are sometimes unhappy when they do not marry clergymen. In catholic countries women are

¹ According to computations which have been made for me and to those which I have made myself, the average attendance at Parisian churches of the Catholic faith is ten men to one hundred women: in provincial towns twelve men to one hundred women. In London the proportion is two-thirds women, to one-half men.

attracted by the especial charm which, owing to a phenomenon that deserves more investigation than has been bestowed upon it, is attached to the celibacy of priests. It is a frequent assertion of women that their confessors are not as other men and it is this hypothetical differentiation which inspires confidence and promotes the zeal of women to confess.

From religious motives some men and women refuse to listen to arguments which tend to shake the foundations of belief in supernatural religion, although their intellectual curiosity often inclines them to listen to such arguments, and the motive is sufficiently strong, in many cases, to prevent others from abandoning their form of supernatural belief, even after they have become conscious of its error. This is one of the reasons for the persistent survival of religion, after the foundations on which it rests have been undermined. It is frequently urged by such persons, that they obtain a greater share of happiness by their refusal to acquaint themselves with the objections to religious dogma, and therefore their motives in closing their minds are, to some extent, of the pleasurable order. There seems every reason to believe that religious motives lead most of the religiously educated, when they engage in philosophical investigations, to seek conclusions in harmony with a belief in the survival of human beings after death and such investigators will accept as proofs of such survival, phenomena to which unbiased scientific searchers ascribe no similar significance.¹

As long as specific religious education is imparted, either by the parent or the schoolmaster, or by both, the motive here classed as religious must continue to influence the general conduct of communities and the influence exercised from this cause will be in direct ratio to the prevalence and strength of such education. But if owing to a decline of religious belief, religious education were to cease, then religious motives could only be produced by the remains of hereditary feeling; by the fundamental reverential sentiment of man in the presence of the

¹ Cf. the inferences drawn from Janet's "Automatisme Psychologique" by F. W. H. Myers in "Human Personality." The father of the latter was a clergyman and his training was presumably religious.

universe, or by surviving beliefs in the life of a soul after bodily death, together with its attendant expectations of ulterior paradise. As however the religious feeling produced by these causes would doubtless be of a weaker order, the motives due to it would also be less strong and no doubt less numerous. For the present, and probably for several more centuries, the religious motive will remain a reality, and it deserves to be classified among the rest. It differs from them by the fact that it shows a tendency to disappear which the others certainly do not evince as far as we can now see and are not likely to evince as long as human society develops on its present lines. But before it becomes completely abstract, there seems every reason to believe that resuscitations of ancient forms of religion, or the inventions of new, will be periodically instrumental in giving it new leases of life.

Large classes of the community, however, do not engage in the practises which keep religion alive, such are those who from conviction have abandoned religious creeds and those who in the callousness of poverty and despair have equally discarded them. It is unfortunately not possible to ascertain what proportion these non-religionists bear to the different populations of Europe, because the line which divides belief from unbelief is often extremely slight, and because by reason of the social disadvantages which result from it, unbelief is not unfrequently concealed. It can be safely held, however, that the number is sufficient to have an appreciably diminishing effect upon the religious motive considered as a factor of human conduct.

The strength of religious motives is well gauged by the architecture which they produce. In the middle ages, the churches and cathedrals were the finest buildings in the localities in which they were erected. This is far from being the case to-day. The majority of new ecclesiastical buildings compare unfavourably with public or even private edifices and it is plain that relatively smaller sums are expended upon them now, than then. It may be objected that those cathedrals which were built in the middle ages still exist and that therefore there is no need to build more of such magnitude; but if we may judge by the ecclesiastical constructions of such new countries as America, and even by those of new districts

in England, there can be little doubt that both in material and in ornateness there has been a considerable decline in the quality of church-building. It does not seem that women now devote much time gratuitously to the embroidery of vestments and church draperies and it is perhaps for this reason that, in large towns, establishments exist where all the accessories of religion are manufactured and sold for the benefit of the producer. In the case of such manufacturers and vendors, it is not easy to determine how far they are influenced by religious motives. If such motives predominated in the conduct of their enterprise, it seems that they would be satisfied with a small remuneration for their labour and the employment of their capital, but in Catholic countries, where the sale of religious wares is largest, they are usually seen to be in affluent circumstances. It is possible, however, that they may be guided by religious motives in other circumstances of their lives, although cases might also occur where notwithstanding that by conviction they had become irreligious, they continued their trade, exclusively from motives of gain.

Publishers of works of piety usually abstain from the publication of literature of any other kind; but this practise no doubt is due to reasons of trade division, and to the fact the authors whose works they publish, might object to the society of other writers.

For reasons such as these, the religious motive cannot be considered as possessing the same importance as most motives. It is more easily simulated than any other. To make a pretence of sex attraction when it is not experienced is difficult, and few pretend to desire sustenance while not desiring it. To maintain the outward semblance of religion is, however, comparatively easy and, as before said, tends to bring with it material rewards. Religious motives, therefore, are not to be considered as otherwise than secondary at the present stage of the world's development. There is no doubt, however, that should a revival of the religious belief manifest itself, either in the form of spiritism, or in some secular religion, such as that which Comte vainly attempted to establish, there might, for a time, be a strong increase of the religious motive.

CHAPTER VIII

ON CURIOSITY

ALTHOUGH curiosity prompts actions most of which, in a last analysis, may be brought within the range of the pleasure motive, it possesses, nevertheless, a sufficiently distinctive character to justify its separate consideration as a minor motive of existence.

Curiosity may be defined as a human interest under the influence of which men commonly devote a certain time to actions which do not directly form part of the main pursuits of life.

When, for instance, a crowd of passers-by gathers in the street to witness some unusual occurrence, let us say an altercation of two men, or the apprehension of a thief, or the mishap of a rider, the cause of their stopping and thereby losing time, is an impulse of an instinctive nature and since, when the sight is painful, they are not generally deterred by its painfulness from witnessing it; this impulse is not, in general, primarily a hedonistic one.

Whether there be a desire to learn a lesson of life from the sight of the unusual occurrence, or whether there be, as there is no doubt in some cases, an element of sympathy attaching to the act of giving up the attention to the event; it is certain that an impulse exists to which the name of curiosity is given and by which few men are not occasionally moved.

Clearly when we go out of our way, either to see an unusual sight or to obtain information respecting the lot of a person with whom we have no ties or dealings, we are prompted by some special interest and this interest is a curiosity of men for the actions or the conditions of men, an interest which may be extended to fictitious personages and upon which story tellers and actors rely to obtain attentive audiences.

From motives of curiosity, men read newspapers where

ON CURIOSITY

III

the interest is chiefly human, in greater numbers and with more avidity, than they read descriptions of natural phenomena. For the same reason the personal gossip of the day is a source of exceptional interest and in the case of many persons it is the chief topic of conversation. Men and women are always upon a stage before each other and are always endeavouring, by observing each other's actions to obtain information for their guidance during their career. The public which is to be found in the galleries of the law courts, watching the proceedings, is brought together by this motive of curiosity, in obedience to which visits are often made by friends to friends. In large towns where leisure is small, the motive is less yielded to than in small ones where leisure is greater, but in both, unusual events seldom fail to give rise to it. In dwellings, men generally evince curiosity as to the doings of their neighbours and often interrupt their occupations to study such movements. A desire to be informed of the actions of neighbouring countries exists in most nations and is satisfied by the costly and elaborate methods of obtaining information which are employed by the daily press.

When there is a dearth of news, the motive is somewhat thwarted and a feeling of disappointment or tedium is experienced. When there is an abundance, the motive which prompted the search for news is satisfied, and a feeling of satisfaction is experienced even when the news is harassing.

Thus, there is a general endeavour to observe mankind whenever the opportunity is afforded of doing so without any undue interference with the major motives of existence. Whence does the motive of which this endeavour is the effect, proceed? It proceeds, so far as it is possible to judge, from the need which men experience of comparing their own impulses and emotions with those of the persons around them, and especially with the impulses and emotions of those whom they perceive to be in exceptional circumstances or situations, in order that they may add to their knowledge of the art of life. This is proved by the fact that after each observation, street groups discuss the events together, and conversations thus take place between strangers for the purpose of satisfying whatever curiosity may remain as to the motives of the actors in the action or actions observed, as well as, in the case of a dispute, to judge the conduct or assertions of

the disputants. As soon as curiosity is satisfied, as far as that is possible, the street groups disperse. The knowledge has been acquired; not unfrequently a useful lesson has been learnt and it is, consciously or unconsciously, to acquire this knowledge and to learn the lesson, that the interest has been aroused.

In certain cases, no doubt, the curiosity is mingled with sympathy, or with that part of it which is called the social instinct; but whenever there is aid afforded to suffering, then the motive ceases to be one of curiosity and becomes one of sympathy. In social circles unusual events happening to acquaintances are also discussed for a certain time and then, when all the information has been obtained and curiosity is satisfied, the topic is dismissed.

In some individuals this human interest is stronger than in others, but its strength is generally proportionate to the zest of life possessed; although a man on the verge of despair, might yet exhibit it and stay to witness an unusual street sight. A man, however, in complete despair and on the point of self-destruction, would probably pass his way heedless of or indifferent to the occurrence, human events having ceased to possess meaning or interest for him. As a general rule, this motive of curiosity, instead of being an idle and blameable impulse, as it is often considered by those who are much engrossed in the main occupations of existence, is a necessary one to self-education in the practise of social life, and as such it must be held to have a certain value. The motive is not a strong one, and it is easily set aside by any of the major motives. For the rest, it often exists in combination with the motive of pleasure. The satisfaction of curiosity brings a certain pleasure; but for the reason given above, it does not seem that the pleasure end is the one primarily in view when curiosity is indulged; although, in the majority of cases, a certain pleasure is derived from its indulgence. The thoughts are thereby taken away from self. A feeling of rest from the ordinary subjects of cogitation is experienced which is pleasurable, and it is probable that if this feature were absent, curiosity might be somewhat less readily indulged than it commonly is. Finally, the motive of curiosity is a minor one, indirectly connected with the pleasure and occasionally with the sympathetic motives with which it has a tendency to merge.

CHAPTER IX

CONFLICTS OF MOTIVES—COMBINED MOTIVES

CONFLICTS

CONFLICTS of motives are those antagonisms which occur in consciousness between impulses leading, at a given moment of time, to the performance of acts of different or of opposite characters.

If a man be led by the sustentative motive to the performance of a wage-earning task, and by the sex motive, at the same moment, to the pursuit of a love enterprise; he will be drawn in the majority of cases, in opposite directions, and must either decide in favour of one or other of the motives, or abstain from action. The latter alternative being seldom adopted, the choice which is made depends mainly upon the physical and mental state of the individual at the time, upon the strength of the rival attractions and upon hereditary or acquired bias or tendency. When one impulsion is morally or socially bad, and the other morally or socially good, it is evident that, other conditions being equal, the course chosen will depend, in some measure, on the moral nature of the individual, provided that he be sufficiently able to distinguish at the time of the attraction between what is good and what is bad. There will be a general tendency to chose that course which seems to lead to the most permanent happiness; but there will be numerous cases where the choice will be dictated by immediate desire. A prudent man will, in an antagonism between Sustenance and Pleasure, act in conformity with the former motive, knowing that by doing so, he will eventually attain to pleasure; but an imprudent or impulsive man will follow the pleasure motive without regard to the ulterior consequences. The most harmonious state is that in which the motives (as shown in the diagram) all converge towards

the pursuit of one rational existence and this is the state of the majority of men at any given moment of time; for the organism is so constituted that habitual parallelism of motive is essential to its efficient working. It is when this harmony is disturbed by any dislocation of the elements which compose it, that conflict is produced.

Such conflict may assume a diversity of forms in any day of the life of an individual. There may be an opposition of one motive to the remainder, as when a man is so under the influence of the sex motive that he sacrifices to its pursuit, sympathy, pleasure of other nature, even self-esteem and material gain, after a struggle against the combined forces of the four other impulsions when these are in opposition. In such a case, there is a suspension of the normal course of conduct and a derangement of motival direction which that course maintains in normally constituted individuals. The motive of sex being that impulse which is the most irresistible in the majority, is that which is most likely to be placed in the strongest opposition to the remainder; but each of the others, according to the conditions prevailing at the time, may conflict victoriously with the rest. Sympathy, for instance, which is not a strong motive may, where a man of sympathetic nature is urged by sex attraction; by material interest; by pleasurable prospects and even by self-love; to take a step directly adverse to a friend, be the means of impeding him from taking such a step.

Barometric and thermal as well as alimentary conditions may also have a share in the determination of a conflict, just as they have been shown to have in the production of a motive and age has also naturally a determining effect, the period of the greatest conflicts being that between thirty and forty-five, when the acquired experience is already great and the vigour of mind and body is not yet impaired. When one motive is in opposition to the rest, mental pain is generally experienced which, however, ceases as soon as the decision is arrived at to pursue it. The intensity of the pain suffered, is in direct ratio to the nervous sensibility of the individual.

When the opposition is that of one motive, only, to another, it is evident that the intensity of the struggle will depend upon the nature and importance of the motives

in opposition. If sex opposes sustenance or *vice versa*, the strife will be severe; but if pleasure and self-love be the antagonists, it will generally be less so. And when only two motives are in conflict, the normal course of life will be less disturbed than when many are opposed. Suppose that sympathy be opposed to sustenance where a man wishes to help a friend in misfortune, but is held back by his desire to preserve himself from similar misfortune. Here we have a strong motive (sustenance) opposed to a less strong motive (sympathy). The chances are in favour of the stronger impulsion; but it is by no means sure that that impulsion will prevail; because some accidental circumstance, such as witnessing a sympathetic act, or hearing the praise of altruism, may turn the scale in favour of the sympathetic act, especially in cases where there is a naturally sympathetic bent. Even where there is no such accidental circumstance in the world without, the predominance of the affective state at the moment when it is needful to make a choice, may determine the adoption of the sympathetic motive, although, it must be repeated that the sustentative motive must always be the most frequently victorious in a struggle against any but those of sex and pleasure.

A man may be sometimes seen at the corner of a street apparently engaged in a deliberation with himself, commencing to move first to the right and then to the left, and we may be tolerably sure that he is drawn towards opposite directions by conflicting motives. The seriousness of his face shows that he realises strongly the importance of the decision which he is compelled to make and it will be generally seen that as soon as the decision is reached, he will go on his way with more composure. There is, however, a contingency which must not be forgotten. Instead of turning to the right or to the left, by doing which he would, as we may suppose, pursue one of two divergent motives; the waverer may take a middle course, and select the path which lies in front of him and which leads towards another act. In this case, there is an abandonment of the original conflict, and the motive followed is a third one which was not in competition, but which, however, may, in some cases, have been the hidden impediment to the adoption of either of the

opposing motives. Its intrusion may not be accidental. The motive may have existed *in posse* from the beginning of the phase and only penetrated to consciousness after a considerable delay, due to a slowness of mental activity or to the monopoly of the reflective faculty by the two original opponents. When all conditions are equal and opposing motives are of equal strength, then the influence of habit may be manifested in the choice which is effected.

Total conflict may arise from the opposition, in groups, of the six motives, as when, at a particular time, Sustenance is opposed to Sex, Sympathy to Pleasure, Self-love to Religion, and from this form of conflict we have according to the law of permutation thirty-six different oppositional phases.¹

Such conflicts, however, are practically impossible. As *conscious* conflicts at any given moment of time, such a number cannot be experienced since the mind cannot hold more than five or six ideas simultaneously. In order that they should be even partially experienced, it is necessary that the individual experiencing them should, by a preceding set of actions, extending probably over a considerable period, have so entangled the circumstances of life that the motives by which he is actuated had grown to be at total variance. For there is little doubt that the more regular and normal are the conditions of an existence, the more harmonious will be its motivation. In a group of conflicts there is another feature to be mentioned. If six motives are in play, then the three strong ones, Sustenance, Sex and Pleasure, will tend, in the majority of cases, to overcome the weaker ones; Self-love, Sympathy and Religion, and if acts result from such an opposition, they will be in accordance with that tendency. The preliminary psychological process which would lead to such an opposition is not known with any degree of certainty, but it may be elaborated in that anterior portion of the brain which according to Wundt is not accessible to consciousness, but where the most important decisions are prepared. The objectivation of the motives renders those who experience them barely conscious of their subjective side, and this is the more the case when there is antagon-

¹ $P_3 \times P_3$

ism. The attention of the man who is experiencing a conflict in this or in any other of the phases here referred to, is so monopolised by the objective facts of the particular circumstances in which he is placed; the men or the women who are actors on the stage of his existence; or the inanimate objects which may have motival significance, that he is seldom able to compare the present impulses with previous ones or to assign to them the place which they should occupy in a wisely social scheme of life. But no doubt the power of realisation and classification depends in some measure upon the degree of subjective analysis to which the individual may have been accustomed.


Another phase of conflict is that in which there is opposition between similar motives, as, for instance, when one sustentative motive is opposed to another. In this case it is evident that the results of the action taken will be of the same nature. The difference is one of degree. Thus when two sustentative motives occasion a conflict, the question to be decided by the individual is, which of the directions towards which those motives lead, is the most profitable and attended by the least risk. Similarly with the sex motive, when experienced in relation to two individuals at the same time, there is a final adoption of that course which appears to promise the greatest satisfaction of the love sentiment, and in the same way the decision of the other motives is influenced by quantitative considerations. Such struggles are seldom so severe as those which occur between different motives, and it is even doubtful if they should be included under the name of conflicts, in the meaning of this chapter; but as it is impossible to overlook the circumstance that impulses of the same species do lead to differentiated acts, it has seemed right that they should be here included. They spring from one common division of human motivation, but they lead to conflict as to the choice of action. Thus there are four phases of conflict giving rise to a large number of oppositions, but resulting in acts whenever the opposition is overcome by predominance of natural desire or by an accidental cause. The struggles, however, are not only occasioned by the necessity of determining which of two courses of conduct is the more beneficial to the interest of self, but also, in many cases,

by that of placing against the balance of inclination the knowledge of law and morality possessed and of forming a final decision in view of that knowledge, though not necessarily in accordance with the precepts it conveys. This gives rise to a second conflict, often severe, in which experience and education, inherited goodness or badness of disposition play important parts. There is a strife between the sense of what is due to self, and what society (or in some cases religion), has warned the individual is due to itself. All these factors united, constituting what for a long period has borne the name of conscience, but which is the obsession of repeated inculcations to act in certain ways devised by men in their experience and subject to errors of interpretation of the world and of its life, increasing or diminishing with the ignorance or knowledge of natural phenomena at any particular period, may give a direction to the judgment in the decision which is made and must be reckoned in the computation of conflicts. Most men know that a career may be changed by the adoption of one course of conduct rather than another, and the sense of this responsibility towards self tends to increase the gravity of certain oppositions and to assist the judgment in selecting the wisest course; although there are phases where the motives, raised to the intensity of emotions are not amenable to any of these moderating influences. Whenever there is a contention between motives, it is a proof that the individual is not under the influence of an emotion of any intensity, for intense emotions do not admit of opposition, but bear with them a predetermined conduct in accordance with the characters of individuals.

It must be observed, regarding the first category of conflicts, that the opposition may not be total in respect of the remainder. A portion may be opposed and the rest may take the harmonious direction which they have in figure 1. (page 119).

It is also necessary to point out that the conflicts considered in the diagram are supposed to occur in a certain unit of time which may be taken as one day, but which may, of course, extend over a somewhat longer space of time. The period cannot however be lengthy,

PHASES OF HARMONY AND CONFLICT OF MOTIVES



especially when many motives are in opposition ; because the existence of such conflict, causes a cessation of the normal business of life and a mental effort from which the mind tends to free itself as soon as possible. A conflict of motives is thus an abnormal state which cannot occur frequently without arresting the career of an individual and rendering him unfit for co-operation in the social field. There are natural forces constantly at work which impel to energy as a condition of existence. Unthwarted by opposing motives, a man may be guided by a dominant motive, for many years, in spite of the obstacles which he encounters in its pursuit ; but as soon as an opposition to it is formed in the motival laboratory of the ego, then a conflict must ensue and the result be dependent upon its issue. In some lives conflicts are rare while in others they are frequent. In the former case there is a steady pursuit of the fundamental motives, each being apportioned the share of activity it needs for the maintenance of social efficiency. For such harmonies to be produced, it is necessary that the intellect should be sound, the power of self-discipline good and the circumstances of life favourable and hygienic from the outset of a career.

When such is the case, the harmony of the motive scheme may cover the whole adult and mature ages, some motives becoming weaker or ceasing to be manifested as the body declines in vigour, others obtaining an increase of nervous tenacity. The harmony of the motives is a permanent state and the oppositions which occur in it are accidental. The former must be held to extend over a life-time, the latter to be of very temporary duration and of a frequency of occurrence varying with the individual.

COMBINED MOTIVES

A combination of motives occurs when two or more motives together lead to the performance of a single act. Thus in contracting a marriage, a man may be influenced partly by the sex, partly by the sustentative, partly by the self-love motives, and the union of these constituents may be intimate. In some cases the proportions may be equal ; but in others there may be a preponderance of one or more of the component parts over the remainder, and

the more nearly equal the component parts of the combined motive are, the greater will generally be the strength of the volition productive of the act. But if one motive be preponderating, and two other motives, only, bear a small proportion to it ; there is more chance that the combination will be imperfectly pursued by reason of the weakness of its minor constituents, than when all the parts are of equal force. The weakness of these minor parts tends to act as a deterrent, rather than as an incentive to the act. If, however, from a combined and equally experienced pleasurable and sympathetic motive, a man commit a certain act ; he will probably be less skilful and less firm in its execution than if he were influenced by either of the two motives separately ; because there undoubtedly must occur a division of attention which weakens the purpose, and in general it may be held, combined motives contain an element of infirmity which is absent in single motives. In the pursuit of combined motives, it is possible that in the course of development, the minor component may be absorbed by the major, before the act is reached, and in such a case the ultimate act ceases to be caused by a combined motive.

When, however, a combined motive of equal parts is pursued to the end, the resulting act will partake of the nature of the combination ; it will differ from an act resulting from a single motive in some feature. An illustration will make this clearer. If a man obeying the combined pleasure and sustentative motive, perform a journey, he will, in all probability, take a somewhat different road from that which he would take if his journey were performed in obedience to either the sustentative or the pleasure motive alone, travelling in a somewhat different manner from that which he would adopt were either of the motives in combination separately pursued. The effect of the combination is to slightly differentiate the act from the form it would assume were either of the motives in combination separately pursued.

Combined motives, as understood by the conscious pursuit of two ends simultaneously, are probably more often pursued by persons of highly organised and complex intellects, than by men of simpler mental organisation. Where the mind is highly trained, also, and

contains a multitude of images ; there is more likelihood of the production of combined motives, than where such conditions are absent.

In one sense, no doubt, all motives may be considered as operating in combination ; for all motives are pursued in view of an end which is generally the point of departure of other motives, leading to other ends ; as for instance the sustentative motive which, when successfully pursued, renders possible and leads to the pursuit of pleasure ; but this would be giving an extension of the term motive beyond the act, which is its natural boundary, and the divisions of human motivation here adopted would be impossible. The combined motive is that which consists of a plurality of motives before the act, just as a motive proper consists of a single motive before the act.

CHAPTER X

RESTRAINT

RESTRAINTS to motives are those mental inhibitions which prevent the pursuance of motives beyond certain limits, usually those beyond which they become prejudicial to individuals or to society. More generally, restraint may be defined as prudence in motival activity.

Restraint may be exercised in the pursuit of any one motive, either before a particular resulting act or after such an act in view of future acts of a similar nature, and it is entirely distinct from the arrest of motives due to opposition.

Natural impulses are first restrained in children by the admonitions of elders, and they are subsequently restrained by the experience of life which teaches that no one motive can be expediently pursued without certain modifications of its intensity. Some individuals are hereditarily inclined to exercise restraint, but the habit of restraint is generally acquired in the practice of existence and is manifested in a greater or a lesser degree according as the reasoning or perceptive powers are strong or weak, according also to physical conditions or the opportunities for over indulgence which present themselves.

After a certain period of initiation, a restrictive propensity is acquired which is the means of regulating the conduct of the individual in the best interest of both himself and of society, although the restraint exercised by the realisation of a danger to self, is generally stronger than that produced by a realisation of a danger to society, unless the danger be of a nature to bring retributive justice upon the individual.

Each motive produces its own restraint after experience has taught the need for such restraint.

If sustenance be pursued with entire disregard for considerations of health, overstrain ensues ; the striver for sustenance finds it necessary to reduce his labour,

and the conviction of this necessity, once formed, acts as a permanent restrictive influence. Again, if in pursuit of the same motive, a man, anxious to be rich, invest capital in hazardous enterprises, promising large returns if successful, he will generally be made to suffer loss and will probably, in future exercise restraint in speculation. He may also manifest restraint before either of these acts owing to his observation of the effects of such acts on others, and in such a case, the restraint is due to contracted prudence.

Occasionally, but in a lesser degree, he may be made to exercise restraint by the opinion of society as to the morality of his methods of obtaining sustenance, or from a sense of pity for the victims of his acquisitiveness, occasionally, in a greater degree, by a realisation of the legal consequences which may ensue. Thus the habit is formed by the most prudent of abstaining from all actions which have been held to be criminal, by the common verdict of society. Just as the natural propensities of the horse are corrected by the trainer to the degree required for efficient conduct in domestication, so the irresponsible pursuit of human motives is checked by the education of experience, and inhibitions are formed which become permanent restraints.

In the pursuit of the sex motive, restraint is especially produced by the mandates of experience. A man who in our civilisation gave way to all the impulses of his amatory nature, would not only injure his physical condition, but also come into conflict with a series of social and legal ordinances which would speedily effect his ruin. All except the aged are thus under the necessity of restraining impulses with which men are endowed by nature in excess of those the indulgence of which is permitted by the laws of health and the rules of social expediency in a particular time and place. In respect of the sex motive, the restraint practised is frequently productive of considerable physical and mental suffering against which the will of the individual often rebels. The results of the rebellion, however, are generally and ultimately to produce more acute suffering than the restraint itself, and this suffering helps to produce, in most men, the restrictive influence necessary for the beneficial pursuit of the motive. In a monogamous

society, a pressure is brought to bear upon the individual to force him to restrain extra-connubial pursuit of sex, and although this pressure is not always sufficient for its object, yet it does generally create a restraining influence which tends to avert acts of a libertine character. It seems scarcely doubtful that man has developed this restraint of the sex motive far beyond that which nature designed and which the animals observe. It is natural for two animals to mate on meeting, irrespectively of any considerations of expediency. But the human species in civilisation being in need of various kinds of property to mate, are generally obliged to mate in conformity with that necessity, to exercise a corresponding restraint of sex impulses until that necessity is satisfied and also to respect the rights of monopoly, created by the monogamous union of the sexes.

Whenever restraint is not imposed by man, it is imposed by nature as in the physical exhaustion or paralysis consequent upon the abuse of sex indulgence, even in legalised conditions, proves. In the latter conditions it may also become prejudicial to man by reason of the over population in which it may result. Thus the necessity for restraint in sex impulses is impressed upon the mind in all states of sex relation and becomes a permanent potentiality for restraint, which particular circumstances may cause to become actual or effective according to the physical and mental condition of the individual.

Psychologically, the sex sensation is at its origin probably excited at the periphery whence by an influx it extends to the nervous centres where it takes various ganglionic and other developments until the consciousness of desire is produced. Once desire is present in consciousness, it is evident that the tendency of the individual is to proceed to the act which is its corollary, unless the inhibition is also produced which arrests the passage to the act. This inhibition is mainly the result of collected warnings of experience, stored in the memory and available at most times as a restraining influence.

All men in civilisation who have not cast aside social obligations must often exercise this restraint, for without it life cannot be efficiently conducted, but, as said above, its exercise varies with individuals and cannot be predicted

with certainty of any one individual, although in the majority of cases where the habit of restraint has become fixed, the manifestation of restraint may be relied upon in most circumstances with an approach to certainty.

Sex restraint is also more observable in some races or nationalities than in others. In Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic countries, it is customary to allow the unmarried young to meet much more freely in society, often without witnesses, than in Latin countries where men are not credited with the restraint required to refrain from breaches of conduct in presence of excitation. Countries which practise much restraint in the pursuit of the sex motive, generally obtain certain advantages in the form of regularity in the relations of the sexes, but it is doubtful whether the severity of their sex morality is not productive of neuronic disorders or whether they are as likely as the less restrictive nations to conceive expansive and humane ideas. When natural impulses are too severely checked, physical and mental depression frequently results and the discipline of life is maintained at the expense of the enthusiasm which can never be diminished without danger to the general happiness. It is certain, however, that each people endeavours to obtain, and generally succeeds in obtaining the system most suited to its ethnical and national character, climate and alimentation and that the restraints practised by each are the result not only of experience but also of the national experience of life.

In pleasure, the knowledge that satiety is consequent upon excess, is a powerful cause of restraint. There is also a realisation bred of experience that pleasure if indulged in, except occasionally, is incompatible with the labour for sustenance. The habit is thus acquired of restraining pleasure, on this account, by all who are not independent of labour for subsistence. Self-love encounters a check from the self-love of the neighbour from comparison of values and from the ridicule which assails it when carried to obvious excess. Religious motives, if unrestrained, lead to mysticism and sometimes to madness. Sympathy itself if not restrained within the bounds of expediency and prudence leads to the sacrifice of man for man and ends in an aberration. The sense of personal rights which every man possesses by necessity, acts as a deterrent to

complete self-sacrifice and the inhibition is formed, even in the minds of the most sympathetic, tending to restrain sympathetic actions within the limits of prudence.

Thus all the motives are accompanied by restraints which although they may not always be evoked in particular circumstances, nevertheless remain in the mind as potentialities. Now it is upon the proportion which is maintained between the motive and the restraint that the efficiency of conduct largely depends. If there is too little restraint, debauch and disintegration occur. If there is too much, suffering in some form and a too rigid integration result. The success of the scheme of life is ensured by the maintenance of the just proportions between motive activity and its restraint, and the test of the justness of these proportions is their faculty for increasing social happiness. But although the pursuit of motives tends to demonstrate the need for restraint to the pursuer, the practice of restraint is ultimately dependent on the will. A vehicle in motion may be made to reduce its velocity by means of a break, if not to lose it altogether, but the break must be applied by the will of the driver. Some drivers are prudent and use the break judiciously. Others are reckless, make little use of the break and frequently meet with disaster. It is not otherwise with the curbs on human motivation which are imposed by the will, under the guidance of the reason, upon the natural impulsion. All the higher organisms are forced to observe a semblance of restraint. When the graminivorous animal ceases grazing, because the sense of repletion bids it do so, when the vulture ceases gorging for the same reason, there is a physical coercion which must often be irresistible and it is very probable that the memory of the oppressive sensation experienced after excessive consumption of food, may constitute an inhibition somewhat analogous to the human one. Restraint among animals is however mainly automatically produced, while in the human species, the higher mental organisation is the cause of its becoming reflective and volitional. When we have become convinced by experience that the reckless or irresponsible pursuit of a natural impulsion is prejudicial to ourselves and to society, we *will* restraint and thus maintain the balance between proclivity and expediency which is indispensable for the preservation of the race.

CHAPTER XI

THE RELATION OF MOTIVES TO EMOTIONS

THE relation between motives and emotions requires to be defined. An emotion is an excitation of the nervous and muscular systems accompanied by an acceleration or arrest of the blood-flow from the heart and viscerae, occasioned by a sudden and abnormal outward stimulus, lasting generally only for a brief space of time. The motive, on the contrary, as we have seen, is a fundamental normal cause of action arising out of constantly recurring needs. While the emotion tends to produce unreflected acts, the motive occasions those which form the subject of cogitation and in which the judgment is employed. While individuals may exist practically without emotional impulses, they could not live without motival impulses on the rational co-ordination of which the success of the scheme of life depends, and therefore the greater importance of motives over emotions as factors of acts is manifest.

Emotions are often opposed, in their consequences, to motives. Grief on account of loss of fortune may frustrate the pursuit of sustenance; joy resulting from a sudden accession of fortune may, by leading to some act of folly, have the same effect.

A sudden emotion may be produced by some outward circumstance which may suppress, for the moment, whatever other motive or motives are being pursued and substitute that to which it is by nature attached. If two lovers, for instance, meet an infuriated bull, at the turning of a lane, the motive under the influence of which they were taking a country walk, immediately disappears and is changed into one of self-protection as soon as the nervous and circulatory phenomena have taken place in the interior of their organisms. The original motive will reappear, however, as soon as the danger has passed. Jealousy frequently produces strong emotions leading to

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sudden acts, whether excited either by love or interest. In the former case it is an effect of the sex motive, in the second of the sustentative.

Sudden emotions produce shocks, whereas the generation of motives is accompanied by no such sensory effects. A sudden fright causes first a rapid flow of blood to the brain which is recognised by a distinct thud, followed immediately by another thud, as the heart and viscerae receive the returning down-flow, there is a sensation in the throat which is known as the emotional ball. A motive brought into play by some exterior circumstance produces few, or none, of these sensations. It is a calling into use of fundamental motor functions, inseparable from the constitution of the organism, its needs and its desires. The first five motives are common to the whole race; but there are many of the chief emotions which many individuals seldom experience and which certainly do not form part of the process of daily life, although they may, *at times*, have a determining influence upon it.

The list of Emotions given by Romanes¹ as complete although the sex emotion is omitted is composed of "fear, surprise, affection, pugnacity, curiosity, jealousy, anger, play, sympathy, emulation, pride, resentment, emotion of the beautiful, grief, hate, cruelty, benevolence, revenge, shame, rage, regret, deceitfulness and emotion of the ludicrous." Of this number, sympathy, benevolence and affection come within the province of sympathy of which they may be considered as emotional forms, and pride, shame and emotion of the ludicrous are also embraced in self-love of which they are likewise emotional forms. Of the remainder, fear and pugnacity, which are the forms of vital solicitude and the instinct of perservation, are included in the general idea of sustenance; while surprise and curiosity, play, jealousy, anger, resentment, grief, hate, cruelty, revenge, rage, regret are only related to the several motives in so far as they occur in their pursuit. Thus, while some of the emotions may be classed as forms of motives, or as forming part of the basic conduct of men; others, the result of accidental conditions, both as concerns the inner self and the outer world; are incidental to motival activity.

¹ "Mental Evoluton in Man," p. 6.

It is often stated that a man has committed an act from "motives of jealousy," or from "motives of revenge," but if the circumstances leading to the act be examined, it will be discovered that behind what is thus described, is to be found one of the fundamental motives of existence, the satisfaction of which is sought. If emotions, especially the sudden ones, were the only causes of acts, it is evident that our conduct would be so little under the control of reflected thought, that it would become incoherent and the realization of this circumstance is shown by the generally received opinion that it is imprudent to give way to an emotion. Emotions, however, carry their own principle of destruction with them. The excessive nerve tension which the most intense produce when prolonged for any length of time, exhausts the organism and causes either their disappearance or the physical exhaustion of the person who experiences them; so that the normal conduct of existence must be resumed unless existence be abandoned.

The grief experienced at the death of a beloved relative cannot be long continued without interfering with the normal course of life and coming into conflict with its essential motives, and therefore we see that the violent acts of despair to which it tends, are not resorted to as long as the mind has not completely lost its rationality.

Emotions, also, may be consciously artificially produced, while motives cannot be so produced. A motive is a project to do something, supported by the will in obedience to a necessity the source of which lies in the first causes of human conduct. Tears of grief, joy or enthusiasm may be brought to the eyes of the spectator of a theatrical performance and such emotions will be directly proportional to the strength of the illusion produced and to the emotional capacity of the spectator. Here the emotions are experienced, notwithstanding the knowledge possessed by those experiencing, that there is no reason in fact for such experiences and such emotions scarcely lead to acts. It is impossible, however, that a man should be made to seriously pursue a motive having its corresponding act in view, when aware that the object of attainment does not in reality exist. Again, an emotion causes a disturbance of the process of the thoughts

and frequently engrosses the mind to the exclusion of all other themes.¹ A motive, on the contrary, when not in conflict with another, is pursued as a habit and does not generally so completely engross the mind. The relations between emotions and motives as here understood, vary with the significance which is attached to the term emotion. We have hitherto considered the word as expressing a more or less sudden excitation, caused by accidental circumstances, and producing abnormal acts; but where an emotion is a pleasurable sensation which is the object of desire and attainment; then it becomes the end of the motive reached by an antecedent act or acts, and in this sense all the motives which in one or another form aim at gratification culminate, after the production of action, in emotion in which case emotion becomes the effect instead of the cause of acts. It must be here observed, however, that the painful emotions are not susceptible of becoming the ends of conscious motives, although they may become the effects of voluntary acts. I cannot willingly endeavour to burn my finger, but in the performance of a voluntary act, I may meet with an accident which may be the means of my doing so.

Finally, the motive tends to pursue an even course, which an emotion may disturb or thwart. The motive is essential to existence, the emotion is accessory. The motive when normally pursued is rational, the emotion has a constant tendency to be irrational. An emotional state (happiness) is the end of motives, and this state is rational in the same ratio as man is a rational being

¹ Spinoza writes: "Humanam impotentiam in moderandis et coercendis affectibus, servitutem voco." *Ethics* iv.

CHAPTER XII

THE INFLUENCE OF SEX ON MOTIVES

THE term conduct is generally applied to the acts of both men and women indiscriminately; but owing to the physical and mental differences which exist between the sexes, the general conduct of women is not identical with the general conduct of men and masculine and feminine characteristics may be observed in the working of the motives whence that conduct proceeds. It is not possible to enter here into an elaborate description of these differences; but some of the most important facts in this connection may be considered.

The difference between man and woman consists not only in the genital systems; in the shorter stature and weight before and after birth of woman; in her smaller weight of cranium, in the lesser sensibility of her sensory nerves; in the lesser number of red globules in her blood; but also in the process by which aliments are assimilated in her body and serve to repair the losses in substance and in strength which the tissues continually sustain. While the characteristic of the male mode of nutrition is one in which the destructive process is the most active, that of the female is one in which the constructive method is predominant, and thus the equilibrium of the metabolism is not maintained in the same way in the male as in the female. Man is constructed in view of reproduction, woman in view of maternity. The man's province is to transmit life, the woman's to produce life and to preserve it. The energies of the man are centrifugal, those of the woman centripetal. Men are free from the physical and mental disability to which women are subjected during half their lives and for an aggregate period of about two months of the entire year. Women are distinguished from men by a higher pitch of voice, and by the general superior fineness of limb and feature; by greater natural

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gentleness of movement. So many points of differentiation cannot exist without producing a corresponding differentiation in character of mind. The female mind as we know it, although capable in certain cases of competing successfully with the male mind in the acquisition of knowledge, and of pursuing the same process of acquisition, exhibits differentiation whenever the creative faculty is used. Thus, there is generally acknowledged to be a considerable difference, plainly apparent to the initiated, in the artistic productions of women, and it is well known that among domestic servants, work performed by men is different in character from that performed by women. The epistolary and literary styles of women differ somewhat from those of men and there is exhibited by the woman of untrained or of half trained mind, defects of reasoning powers which are generally much less apparent in men of the same degree of mental development. It has generally been agreed that there is a masculine and a feminine mind. Women know in advance how their sex will think on any particular issue with a considerable degree of certainty, and generally, although the field of thought is wider, men know how men will think on the same issue. Only a few men, however, can accurately estimate the feminine attitude of mind towards a particular subject of thought and only a few women are able to accurately gauge the male attitude. The reason is that in order to be able to thus estimate, it is necessary that the man should possess the faculty of completely realising the female mind, without the omission of any of the factors which compose it, and also that the woman should realise the whole of the male psychological conditions. As this is not easy, the difficulty is the cause of many misunderstandings between the sexes.

There is no doubt that the character of the feminine mind is largely determined by the character of sex; by the solicitation of the maternal instinct, and by the desire of being chosen by the other sex for the purpose of giving effect to that instinct, and although the male mentality is also influenced by sex, by the desire of perpetuation; it is generally less monopolised by such desire, and is more able to devote itself to extraneous pursuits. It is not a question of quantity of brain or of

material quality ; but rather of character of quality. As we at present know woman, there is a sufficient warrant for saying that there is a parental semi-conscious influence at work in her mind more continuously present than in the case of man, and one against which she may only react by abandoning the ordinary attributes and functions of her sex, and living the life of man, as some women do who cultivate their minds in the male manner. This influence is perceptible even in advanced spinsterhood. Men become resigned to celibacy after a certain period is passed ; but women rarely, and although it is possible that this differentiation may be reduced, as the difference in mode of life is reduced by reason of the adoption by women of the same professions and occupations as men ; yet it is not probable that the two attitudes of mind will ever be identical.

Now in what way are the fundamental motives affected by this factor of differentiation according to sex ? It must be said at once, that the motives as hitherto considered, have been considered from the common point of view of the two sexes, as included under the term mankind ; but that that point of view is, to a large extent the male one, is easily deducible from the fact that men have hitherto been the principal actors in the world and the chief authors of its schemes of conduct. It will be sufficient, therefore, for the present purpose, to dwell upon those features of difference only, wherein the female motives tend to diverge from the male. Firstly the motive of sustenance among women is much less prominent than among men. It is the cause of a lesser number of acts and it gives rise to less anxiety of mind. Among the poorer classes, it takes the form of life-preservation, of household management and economy of the male earner's wage ; among the richer it gives rise to fewer acts of household management although frequently to many of economy and of life-preservation. These motives, however, are, in general, pursued without much method and with inequalities of economic zeal, particularly in the richer classes where the thoughts are seldom very closely concentrated on them. These remarks, however, apply principally to where the actual money-earning is done by the husband or the father ; for it is seen that women who

engage in trade enterprise, independently, frequently show considerable method and skill in calculation. As they are in the minority in the present social system, they cannot afford subject for generalisation. It needs, however, no demonstration to show that, primarily, the sustentative motive which demands the greatest display of continuous energy of which human beings are capable is beyond the physical strength and incompatible with the functions of the majority of women, and that if the majority were to engage in it, working through the periods of indisposition, pregnancy and child-rearing, the race must inevitably suffer. Medical science is agreed on this point, and as it is proved that intermittent labour is alone compatible with the female state, and as intermittent labour is of small value in competition with the continuous labour of men ; it is evident that the sustentative motive must give rise to less activity in women than in men. It is true that among the agricultural populations, in most countries of the European continent, women are seen to work in the fields, much in the same way as men. But this is generally at certain times of the year only, when the crops require attention, and the harder kinds of labour are not generally performed by young girls, or by young women during the periods preceding and following maternity. From the remotest times, as with most savages to-day, women being recognised as physically less apt than men in the chase, have been assigned the more sedentary occupations of housewifery, and by a general consensus of opinion, based upon practical experience, it has been determined that even when equally capable intellectually, woman is physically incapable of performing the same sustentative acts as man. For these reasons, women are not either for so long a time or so strongly influenced by this motive as men ; in its direct manifestation, it holds a secondary place in their scheme of motives.

The life of women differs from that of men most distinctively in the predominance of the motives of sex and parentage, pleasure and self-love in the order here named. The whole of the early life of woman is occupied with the endeavour to obtain the greatest measure of matrimonial felicity, and in enhancing her attractions by dress and ornament, so that the admiration of the male may be

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The life of women differs from that of men most distinctively in the predominance of the motives of sex and parentage, pleasure and self-love in the order here named. The whole of the early life of woman is occupied with the endeavour to obtain the greatest measure of matrimonial felicity, and in enhancing her attractions by dress and ornament, so that the admiration of the male may be

maintained as long as possible and that her own comforts and pleasures may be increased as an effect of that admiration. These three motives are so closely allied in the majority of women, that it is often difficult to separate them; but whenever this is possible, it will be seen that the motives which are pursued in obedience to any one of them, are pursued by less direct ways than is generally the case with men, and with more elaborate preparation as regards the act. There is a persistent tendency among women to judge the majority of questions, not upon their own merits, but from the point of view of their own tastes or interests and thus the judgment possesses a special characteristic which must be termed the feminine characteristic. It is a fact of common observation, that women are made happy by any eulogy of their personal appearance and unhappy or angered by any disparagement, and thus it is natural that their motives should be those which procure the obtainment of the desired approbation. This aim is evidently the racial aim, that of nature working for the conservation of the race. Women feel instinctively that the life zest of the male must be maintained at its fullest point, and it is customary with them to stimulate men to action whenever they perceive in them a diminution of energy. And in this indirect way women pursue the sustentative motive under the existing social system. In pursuit of this treble motive, women of the middle and higher classes who best represent woman as she appears when possessing some freedom of action, that is to say when not driven by the necessity of manual or household labour; spend a large portion of their time in cities in the minute study of millinery and modes, as well as in that of facial preservation. In the large draper's shops, women may be seen at certain periods of the year, when prices are reduced, engaged in a kind of contest for the possession of the most advantageous articles, and in another order of ideas—that of obtaining the most artistic or uncommon headpiece—they are frequently seen to spend sums which are out of just proportion to intrinsic value. Apparently the motives of this labour are not only those of sex and pleasure, but also that of self-love in the endeavour to excite admiration or envy in their own sex and to enjoy the satisfaction which such an effect is liable to produce.

Milliners are well aware of the strength of this motive and in some capitals, notably in Paris, they exhibit consummate skill in stimulating it to the utmost by the continual invention of novelties. The endeavours of women to obtain jewellery, although sometimes due to sustentative motives, are mainly to be attributed to the motive of self-love which is supremely gratified by the display, on the person, of rare and costly gems. Women of the poorer class by whom these ornaments are unobtainable, are frequently seen, in obedience to the same motive, to substitute imitations for them. Again, from motives of frustrated self-love, women are apt to retaliate by coldness, disdain or even calumny when criticised by men. Partly because the attitude towards women originated during the age of chivalry has survived and has come to be considered by women as the only right one, partly because women conceive themselves, as the mothers of the race, to hold a position which places them above criticism, they resent, as an affront, even the expression of truth concerning them, if the truth be not of a congenial character. On the other hand women display a readiness to criticise the other sex, whenever they have experienced from it, contradiction, disappointment or indifference, and this, irrespective of their own conviction of the true merit of the person criticised. And in general, their motives of sex and self-love impart to women a tendency to declare as good, those acts of others which directly or indirectly advance their sexual, matrimonial or family interests, or increase their power of display, and as bad, those which directly or indirectly oppose those interests. Thus, whenever these two motives are called forth, women do not seek truth for its own sake, but rather a harmonisation of facts with their personal feelings. How far these feminine tendencies may be modified by efficient education, it is not easy to say; but it seems probable that they may be considerably modified, if we may judge by the increasing numbers of women who by intellectual culture succeed in divesting, or in almost divesting themselves, of them. The only objection to such a modification, from the point of view of racial preservation is that it might have the effect of reducing the coercion to mating which exists under the present conditions, but this evil does not

appear to be a very serious one, while the benefit which would arise from a less egocentric conception of existence, would probably be great.

In women, there is undoubtedly a greater fund of jealousy excited in pursuit of the sex motives, than in men and in some cases it assumes the character of a veritable malady, especially among those women who have been trained in the principles of monogamy. Sex, pleasure and self-love motives are all thwarted by the success of a rival, and women are frequently led to commit acts of violence or desperation, in consequence. As women have not the same privilege as men of selecting mates, their eagerness to secure those who court them, is often excessive, and there is added to the sex motive, on this account, a sustentative one, in so far as the interest of material support is concerned. Feminine jealousy which is mainly aroused by the sex interest, is moreover closely dissimulated, and it is possible for women to make demonstrations of affection towards those of their own sex of whom they are jealous to the point of hatred, and on whom they await an opportunity of being revenged without danger to themselves.

Thwarted motives of sex, and self-love principally produce the manifestation of spite which is much more common among women than among men, and this is chiefly due to the fact that many women do not realise as distinctly as men, the deleterious action upon society of retribution, their minds being more exclusively absorbed then men's by purely personal themes.

When women read, sex motives incline them to turn by preference to story books in which the relations of the sexes are imaginatively described and in such books they not only seek recreation, but also information as to the conduct of the sexes towards each other.

We have already seen that from the motive which has been here termed the religious one, women devote more time to devotional exercises than men, and although they are not, unless exceptionally, official teachers of religion; they are the most constant supporters of organised religious forms. It is probable, however, that considering the natural timidity of women, religious fear, that is to say, fear of future punishment which removes the motive

of religious acts from religion to posthumous sustenance, is the cause of much feminine religious zeal. The long recognised tendency of women to rely upon men for protection has its equivalent in a tendency to rely upon a God for consolation for the ills of life, and it is possible that the latter is only an extension of the former. As all gods are represented as being of the male sex, women of extremely mystical natures may be to some extent under the influence of the sex motive, idealised, when they engage in rapturous adoration of a young and martyred god. It is noticeable, in this connection, that women are in the habit of leaving legacies to religious, more frequently than to any other institutions, and this is due apparently to motives of posthumous pleasure. Women are, for the rest, generally incapable of conceiving philanthropy independently of religion.

In crime, women act in a manner somewhat different from the manner of men. According to the researches which have been made,¹ women when under the influence of revenge caused by the frustration of one of the motives, generally that of sex, pursue their intentions for a longer period, brood over a crime much longer than men and seldom evince remorse after its perpetration in which they frequently exhibit refinement of cruelty. According to Lombroso, criminal tendencies are physiologically latent in women, and if this be true, feminine crimes would be produced in the pursuit of motives or deflections from motives, as the result of an hereditary tendency of the sex. If the same author be correct, there exists in women a latent fund of wickedness which would generally tend to deflect the normal course of motival activity. Of course the number of female criminals is much smaller than the number of male criminals, but, as already stated, this is due to the fact that women do not take an active part in the struggle for existence. Should women assume a less passive part in life, it is probable that the proportion of female crime would be increased.

There can be no doubt that feminine motives themselves vary with the position of women in respect of the male sex. According as women are maidens, wives, mothers, widows or spinsters their conduct is

¹ Those of Lombroso, Davis, Key-Akers.

affected. The greatest change takes place probably when maternity is reached. Until then, the love emotions or the desire of love emotions, occupy a considerable place in the thoughts and the predominating motive is that of sex. But as soon as offspring appear, the sex motive proper is supplemented and often partially replaced by its parental form. During the period following childbirth and when the consequent suffering is over, there takes place in the minds of normally constituted women, a realisation of the true end of the love instinct. There is a certain physical deterioration, beauty is somewhat impaired and a greater seriousness is induced. A sense of responsibility is manifested, and, in many women, a consciousness of matronly importance is produced. There are more duties to perform, a second life to protect, and there is a general harmonisation with nature which frequently softens asperity of character. All these circumstances have an influence on the course of feminine motives, bringing them into their normal channel and preserving them in it, for a considerable time. When wives are childless, these effects are often wanting. Maternity modifies the motive of self-love, since some of the love of self which had its full expression before maternity, is transferred to offspring. Fewer acts of women are produced by self-love after maternity, than before. Often, after maternity, less care is bestowed upon dress and ornament than previously; but this depends upon the social station. Where wealth exists, this decline of coquetry is much less apparent, if not wholly absent.

When women are childless, these modifications do not occur; but there is often produced in such a state, an asperity or lack of sympathy with the world which may be reflected in conduct. The normal functions of maternity not having been exercised, there is a sense of such loss of function and the motives are thereby affected.

The motives of sex and self-love both cause women to endeavour to exercise a continual coercion upon the other sex which directly or indirectly furthers the ends of sex. For this object threats of personal withdrawal; the exaction of the tribute of homage in the form of com-

pliments and attentions; the arrangement of recreations suited to the display of personal attractions or of games in which declarations of inclination or sympathy are not easily avoidable by men, the dispensation of social recognition according to homage received; all these means are used, and a considerable portion of women's time is employed in the exercise of this coercion which, although no doubt necessary to the maintenance of the racial incentive, may lead to breaches of sex morality. This is conduct of a kind which men, engaged in the sustentative labour of life, do not habitually practise, and it is essentially an effect of the female state. As it is throughout nature, the males, although the actual captors of the females, are encouraged to capture by the females whenever the former might be inclined to flag in the pursuit. The continuation of species would appear to be ensured by devices which women, in their present general stage of mental development, practise instinctively.

It is evident that in the pursuit of purely pleasureable motives, the methods of women must differ somewhat from those of men. Women do not habitually seek pleasure in sport or in dangerous exercises, although exceptions to the general rule may. Neither have they generally derived much gratification from politics and none from philosophical speculations which often seem to them trivial or useless, and their field of intellectual pleasure being chiefly limited to artistic enjoyment is restricted. They are not naturally fond of gambling on account of the conservative instinct with which the passion of gambling is with difficulty reconcilable. The pleasure motive of the majority, is generally pursued in those conditions which afford the maximum of comfort and amusement, together with the minimum of physical or mental exertion and thus carriage-driving, play-going, sight-seeing and generally any employment which pleasurable changes the current of the thoughts, are favourite pursuits. It is plain that those women who endeavour to imitate men do not exhibit this feminisation of the motives so distinctly; but it is doubtful if they ever succeed in producing any but an imperfect imitation of masculine conduct, owing to the organic and functional

differences which separate them from the other sex and which have their influence upon conduct.

But considering the important part which women perform as the rearers of offspring and the confidants and frequent inspirers of men, considering also that the mental characteristics of the mother are transmissible to children; that mental capacity on the part of the female parent is almost as important a factor of hereditary genius as mental capacity on the part of the male ancestor; it would seem to follow that the more the standard of education and general enlightenment among women approaches that of the best standards among men, the more probable it will be that feminine conduct will be brought into greater correspondence with a rational conception of existence. There will always be a masculine characteristic and a feminine characteristic of conduct; but there may occur such modifications of the latter as may render it less liable than it is at present to disturb the harmony of domestic and social life.

As long, however, as educated women continue to seek excessive luxury; to practise the constant display of advantages; to select friends according to wealth or celebrity independently of moral qualities; to maintain superstition in ancient or in novel forms; to live in an unreal atmosphere of adulation and false representation; to indulge in the corrosive vice of spite; there will be done to social progress an injury proportionate in magnitude to the extent of these proclivities and to the influence of female conduct on the general conduct of society.

CHAPTER XIII

GOOD AND BAD MOTIVES

IN ordinary speech, it is customary to call certain manifestations of the fundamental motives good, and certain others bad.

A man's motives are said to be generally good when his intentions are such as do not, if carried out, contradict any of the received principles of conduct, and evil when they do contradict them, and in the majority of cases the term motive is taken as being synonymous with intention.

Evil motives, in this acceptance, then, are those which if pursued to the act, inflict injustice or suffering upon others, as all that result in crime or in social delinquency. In reality, it is not the motive in its true significance under which the man acts, but the deviation from the normal course of that motive which is implied. The term, however, has become applied to any tendency of an anti-moral character. Thus we hear of deceitful motives, of avaricious motives, of predatory or mercenary, or criminal motives, all of which are held to be evil in varying degrees. Now from what has preceded, it will be seen that all these may be classed in one of the divisions here adopted. The deceit, mercenariness, pilfering and crime are occasioned by sustenance, pleasure or sex, and we have seen that the inclination to resort to them originates when the boundary has been crossed which separates the normal from the abnormal in motival activity.

According to the legal point of view, the culpability begins as soon as the evil project has been formed; that is, as soon as a man decides to steal or to commit a crime of any nature. At that moment, it is held, there takes place in his mind a passage from one mode of thought to another, and a guilty course of conduct generally ensues. What takes place, as previously

observed, is rather a transition from the socially legitimate to the socially illegitimate pursuit of one of the motives of existence; but this latter pursuit has come to be regarded as in itself a motive and to be given opprobrious names. It matters little, however, how it is designated. A process does occur in the working of the organ of thought which has a decisive influence for evil. Can we obtain any knowledge of that process? Can we ascertain by what causes and in what manner the mental state is produced which constitutes the bad intention? If we cannot as yet attain to a perfect acquaintance with this phenomenon, we can at least arrive at some approximations to the truth if we are careful to seek them in the region of observable fact.

When a motive deflects, the deflection appears to be due to a hereditary, physical and pathological, mental and neuronie or imitative cause and from these causes, in the relation above stated, evil proceeds.

In the initial chapter, heredity was referred to as a first cause of motives; but it may here be considered as a cause of motival deflection. For just as the tendency to the normal act which is equivalent to the moral act, may be transmitted, so the tendency to the abnormal act which is equivalent to the immoral act in the pursuit of motives, may also be transmitted and exist *in posse* in the thought-field of an individual. Almost every adult is aware of the probable consequences of a criminal departure from the normal course of action and yet, owing to what must be described as hereditary promptings or to a sudden impulse coming from an ancestral or other source; he is seen to risk these consequences. It is doubtful whether the exact psychological conditions under which this change occurs, will ever be known with certainty, although, as previously observed, the keeping of minute family records of acts and tendencies might throw some light upon the probabilities of their manifestation in a particular generation, either as a separate effect or in conjunction with other effects.

Some men are said to experience at times the realisation of the presence in their consciousness of an anterior consciousness which possesses attributes dissimilar to their own and surprises them by its dissimilarity, and it

may be that this anterior self, under stimulation from the outer world, becomes, for a moment, the author of the deflection. All we know is what criminologists have revealed concerning the heredity of crime, and that is sufficient to support a belief in the hereditary origin of some criminal decisions. Evil motives or intentions thus derived, would thus be a bad inheritance for which the heir must, in the interest of society, be made responsible. And this is one of the cruelties of the human state which can only be removed by a perfecting of social and hygienic conditions. The method of society towards hereditary evil, however, is as regards the bestowal of blame, indiscriminating. Evil motives excite the same resentment whether they originate in the individual or whether they are derived from his ancestors. In the former case alone, they may be truly called intentional. In the latter they are psychologically automatic and as such they should be commonly considered.

The physical and pathological cause of deflection is that which is produced by any organic defect which by its influence upon the mind may, at a certain moment, determine an impulse contrary to the conservation of social justice or to the preservation of human life. Impaired cerebral, digestive, circulatory or respiratory organs, are productive of special mental states and it is highly probable that the experiencing of an irrational impulse may sometimes be aided by the derangement of organs.

Hypochondriacs may experience groundless fears either of being dispossessed of property or robbed of life and may become avaricious in the pursuit of gain or murderous in the pursuit of sex. They are moved by motives which under normal conditions are legitimate, but which under abnormal conditions are illegitimate and noxious. Each time that deflection occurs from a pathological cause, there is again a diminution in the culpability of the intention, and when we consider that the derangement may be due to atmospheric, thermal or hygrometric conditions, or to the injustice of individuals or of society; it will be seen that the point of blame recedes still farther, supposing blameworthiness to consist in a personal, independent evolution of the evil intention. Persons at fault are very prone to cast the blame for their faults on others

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who are not individually responsible, and such persons are often censured for so doing. There is little doubt, however, that they have some realisation of the interdependence of human acts, and possess a feeling that they should not be held to be *unique* causes of the wrong act. But as the natural tendency of men is towards the concrete rather than towards the abstract, they fix the blame on those, or on one of those, with whom they are in contact in their daily lives rather than on society in general or on natural causes, self-love forbidding any man to condemn himself uncompromisingly.

It must be admitted, however, that the deflections due to the derangements of the organs of the body as a primary cause of mental derangement do not probably originate much conduct morally bad, the effect of bodily derangement being rather towards neutral acts from the lassitude or loss of vital energy produced, although it is a fact that when the derangement takes the form of deformity, the physical deformity is often accompanied by a certain moral deformity owing to the intimate correspondence between body and mind.

But when there is a purely mental affection, however slight it may be and however it may be produced, the case is different and deflections may be directly caused by such affection and be again independent of, though capable of combination with the previous causes of deflection. In insanity, it is evident, the conduct manifested being insane conduct, does not come within the present field, but there is a large amount of conduct, which is performed under the influences either of slight cerebral lesions or of slight general derangement of the brain-organ, conduct for which those who manifest it are held to be responsible by society, although they act under impulses not strictly rational. From special mental states induced by anxiety, misfortune, nervous or material degeneration, sun-stroke; a man's brain, ceasing to act normally, may be the cause of divergences from the line of conduct which experience has shown to be necessary to the social life. Under the influence of the above conditions the reasoning powers are impaired, passions which are themselves of the nature of mental aberrations, take the ascendancy and the decision is arrived at to

pursue the evil course. Here again the motive being pathologically produced does not fulfil the required conditions of the purely personally produced intention, as hitherto understood; for even if the mental infirmity be not due to accidental circumstances it may be produced by the injustice or the friction of society or by the inability of the individual to fulfil the requirements of society and consequently to retain a respected place in it. And in either case it cannot be truly called a product of his personal will. If it be said that society has no means of ascertaining whether the wrong-doer is mentally affected or not in the slight degree here alluded to, then it should be more openly acknowledged than it is, that displays of indignation are not warranted by facts. Only those who have not acquired the habit or the faculty of tracing effects to their true causes should be indignant at moral laxity. Acquaintance with such causes reveals wrong acts as moral misfortunes which should excite, not general anger, but general regret and stimulate to the discovery of the means whereby such causes may be removed. The real sentiment excited in most cases of moral failing, should be social self-reproach.

The imitative cause of the deflection of conduct is equally difficult to attribute exclusively to the culprit himself. The strength or force as it is called of example is proverbial. Men are naturally inclined to imitate not only good conduct but bad, especially when the latter is seen to lead to success in the aims of life and the more prevalent bad conduct is, the more it is imitated by those who are wanting in the power of independent thought. A man may have pursued the motive of sustenance normally for a considerable portion of his life, but having observed another who has pursued it more profitably than himself by means of subterfuge and deception, he may suddenly decide to adopt the equivocal methods which he has seen succeed and at the moment when this decision is arrived at, the evil intention has its origin. Nothing tends more to increase crime than reports of undetected crime. Men whose moral education has been unsound are dazzled by the prospect of obtaining a permanent advantage by a speedily executed act. The chances of detection appear small until the act has been committed

when the point of view changes and they frequently appear great. The poor often endeavour to imitate the defective conduct of the rich with disastrous results. Imitation is constantly taking place from class to class from the higher to the lower and wherever individual instances of imitation of wrong conduct are seen, they are evidences of the prevalence of wrong conduct in the community and of the lessened responsibility of individual culprits. There is doubtless no positive necessity for any man to follow the bad example, but there is a magnetism at work which, in respect of some men, is irresistible. Wrong conduct is certainly contagious and epidemics of such conduct occur.

If, then, there are so many forces at work to determine at a particular moment of time the impulse of wrong conduct, forces which act upon the will and cause it to deviate from its normal plane of volition, the question naturally arises, how is responsibility for misconduct to be fixed according to the bad intention, if the bad intention be considered as a determination to act wrongly due to the individual himself considered as a free agent? Or to state the question in other terms: is it possible to discover any human personality that is formed entirely by the reason of a man during his lifetime and is independent of extraneous influences, on which to fasten the responsibility for the wrong act? The answer is an emphatic negative. There is no such personality. If to obtain one, we fall back upon the reason and hold a man responsible for the moral quality of his reasoning faculty and blameable whenever such quality is bad and conducive to acts contrary to fundamental morality or contrary to *the morality of a man's times and nation*, we see at once that the moral quality of the reason is dependent upon a series of anterior causes physiological, educational, nutritional and hereditary and that it cannot be taken as self-made.

Are we then to seek the responsible personality in the individual will? Not with more success, for the same or nearly the same anterior causes are at work which invalidated the reason for the representation of the personality. The will is the product of the same factors with an increase of magnitude for heredity and physical con-

ditions. The will to commit evil acts, follows, moreover, upon the subjugation of the reason by the enticement or impulse to commit them, and there is a close dependence of the one upon the other in this sense. The will is not more a personal evolution than the whole organism. The truth is that the whole foundation of the theory of individual culpability rests, and has always rested, on the assumption of free will which, in its turn, rests upon that of a God who for purposes of his own has placed man in the midst of temptations which, however irresistible they may be, he has yet the power to resist, whatever his physical or mental conditions are. But all human beings have not this power and its advantages can only be acquired by the labour of men themselves resulting in the perfectionation of their physical and mental states and in the removal of temptations to mutually prejudicial conduct. The individual in whose mind had suddenly germinated the evil motive or intention was not free to prevent germination, and once this has taken place, the growth of such intention depends upon the mental soil encountered, while the soil itself depends upon a long series of causes and effects over which the individual has no control.

For these reasons, responsibility for the evil act cannot in pure justice be attributed to the evil-doer, and although they do not make it less necessary that society should protect itself against him, they render it needful, that society should freely acknowledge its own share of responsibility in his misfortune. The habit of dividing men into two classes: good and bad, is in itself unsound. It would be better to conceive of them as normal and abnormal, the term normal being taken as synonymous with moral, and the term abnormal as synonymous with immoral, all neutral conduct being included in the former class. This classification might tend to remove the ancient superstition of the two principles of good and evil as it has been handed down through most of the religions. When it became ascertained that what has been called the principle of good was none other than knowledge of and conformity to the normal and necessary (by which the majority tend to be guided) and that the principle of evil was ignorance of and deflection from the

normal, then the true bases of conduct would come to be generally perceived.

Good motives or intentions are all those motives which form part of the rational and normal pursuit of the fundamental motives and more particularly of the motive of sympathy. All the intentions of a man's daily life are good which tend towards the pursuit of the motives without trespass upon the rights of others and towards the preservation of health and energy under the same conditions. The good intention, as commonly understood, does not generally denote the intention of performing the common tasks of life, but is generally held to mean that which has a sympathetic or altruistic end in view, as for instance the exercise of charity or philanthropy, the increase of the neighbour's happiness, and such intentions have their origin in hereditary or acquired habit, in physical and mental efficiency, and in imitation. A good ancestry generally produces, in the mental composition of the offspring, a tendency to good intentions, although it is probable that the tendency is less strong than in the case of evil. Data, however, are wanting for any dogmatic assertion on this point, and it is evident that if neutral conduct be included as good, and heredity be credited with a share of its production, then the prevalence of good over bad intentions is undoubted. If, however, good be held to mean only the altruistic impulses, then it is probable that it is a less powerful effect of heredity than evil. The difficulty in judging good intentions lies in the fact that such intentions are frequently less purely good than evil intentions are purely evil. Very often intentions which are credited as highly altruistic may in reality be of an egoistic character, such as charities supported for the sake of the social recognition which their support procures, while it is not often that the evil intention is mistaken for what it is not. There are undoubted impulses or promptings coming from heredity of an unalloyed sympathetic or altruistic nature and they may be produced at any moment of a man's life.

Physical and mental efficiency are undoubtedly important factors of good intentions. Where there is a sound mind and body unimpaired by insobriety of any kind, conduct generally tends to be either not harmful

or good and as such advantages are chiefly acquired through heredity, education and environment, it is evident they are not self evolved and are phenomena for which there is no need for more praise than is contained in ordinary social approbation and admiration. Such men are the fortunate among the world's inhabitants and it remains with society at large to increase or to diminish their numbers. The sensation of health which is derived from sound inheritance and from hygienic living, is one of exhilaration and contentment which tends to dispose men well towards their neighbours and to cause them to act sympathetically towards them. For this reason athletic exercises, when moderately indulged in, are productive of the tendency to good. Evidently mental training when not pursued beyond the powers of the individual, is productive of the good intention and the study of science, as being the study of truth, is especially beneficial in this respect. The more wisely the body and the mind are developed, the greater should be the sum of good intentions whenever there is sound heredity and efficient moral education. Imitation is also productive of the good intention. Given a subject of neutral tendencies, the probabilities are extremely great that in a good environment, he will develop the good intention as a mental prompting and at times perform acts of altruism which may bear the test of scrutiny.

It is, however, a fact that purely good actions do not offer themselves abundantly for imitation in daily life, the tendency of which is towards an increase of the neutral class of conduct which in turn frequently borders upon the evil. Society seems in danger of making up its mind that it has no time for altruism and that if it obeys the laws and the social rules, it is doing all that is needful to general progress and civilization. And thus the genesis of the purely good intention tends, by reason of this erroneous opinion, to be checked and the intention to become neutral. Good intentions undoubtedly cause satisfaction to those who conceive them and ease of mind, while evil ones are productive of the uneasiness of risk. But when remorseless competition engrosses a nation's energies, the former are not easily produced.

CHAPTER XIV

THE MOTIVES IN RELATION TO SOME MORAL SYSTEMS

WE may now consider broadly in what relation the Motives, as here defined, stand towards the principal moral systems which have been offered by philosophers.

It does not seem necessary to dwell at any length upon those systems propounded in ancient Greece, since they were not based upon an accurate conception either of the physical and mental constitution of man or of the composition of the planet or its place in space.

Aristotle found the end of all actions in some good towards which all efforts and desires tend, and he identified this end with happiness. At times, however, his reasoning leaves some doubt in the mind as to his conception of happiness and at others makes happiness synonymous with virtue or right action. It fails to show, in any case, the social necessity for right acting, or to credit happiness to the wrong doer at the time of action. Happiness, in the Aristotelian sense, is not a pleasurable nerve stimulation, but an idealism and of its nature imprecise. The forces which impel men to seek this sensation, are not named and we are only supplied with the terms good, virtue and happiness which are taken as more or less synonymous, but of which no satisfactory definition is given. Man himself is little alluded to, but the virtues and vices of men are treated almost as though they had an existence independent of the race. Finally, the prime sources whence spring all human acts, are not sought and although the observation of life and the depth of thought are generally remarkable, yet the Nicomachean Morals offer no true explanation of the moral problem and are of little more than historical interest. It was their want of precision that enabled them to be adopted by the schoolmen of the middle ages, as a basis for their ethical dialectics.

Much clearer and more in accordance with experience was the view of Epicurus. Although this philosopher did not know the true relations between man and environment or the method of working of emotions and impulses, he perceived that the constant aim of men is pleasure, and perceiving, also, that this tendency was self-contradictory when pursued excessively; he advocated prudence as the antidote to the effects of excess, and his philosophy might have prevailed had not the Christian religion subsequently opposed it. As soon, however, as the belief in religion, began to weaken, the epicurean philosophy reappeared in the form of utilitarianism which as long as the nature of man remains as it is, must, in its main features, be the prevailing form. Since, as we have seen, all actions converge towards the satisfaction of the pleasure motive, it is not doubtful that moral conduct will always be bound up with it, and that the study of the manner in which that satisfaction is obtained, will always be the task of moral science. The end is known, but efficient means still remain to be discovered.

Hobbes who considered that the desire of the individual was the test of good, propounded a doctrine which if carried to its logical conclusion would cause so great a deflection of the motives that it is doubtful whether any degree of civilization could be maintained under it. If there were no restraint in the pursuit of the motives; no discrimination in the face of desire between what is physically and socially harmful and what is gratifying to the senses; it is evident that men in the pursuit of this form of "good," would retrogress to a state approaching that of the savage. It does not matter whether there be three or thirty kinds of "good," so long as they only concern individual desire and do not consider consequences, either to the individual or to society. Bentham states his principle in these memorable terms. "By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question or what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose their happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and, therefore, not only of every

action of a private individual, but of every measure of government."

Now in the pursuit of the fundamental motives, happiness or pleasure is not only apparently, but actually experienced, during the performance of acts which, however much they may be to the interests of the individual, are contrary to those of society. Most individuals are happy when they have succeeded by means of unjust monopoly in gaining a large amount of wealth; but it would be difficult to contend that the practice of monopoly and the appropriation of such wealth by one individual, conduce to the general interests of society or is an action of which it can rationally approve. Similarly a man may be momentarily happy in the appropriation of another man's wife, but the scheme of matrimony and of family cohesion and authenticity is impaired by that action, and the order of society is disturbed. And again, the principle of judging actions by their effect in promoting the happiness of the performer may be extended until a crime which, if successfully performed, undoubtedly does increase the happiness of the habitual criminal hardened to fear or to remorse, appears in the light of a commendable action. There are also some acts which are not productive of any discernible happiness, but of which society would hesitate to disapprove. Such are the acts of labour performed by the very poor to sustain a wretched existence. They are performed in obedience to the motive of sustenance, and if they are not performed, death results from lack of nutrition. And unless we suppose that the almost infinitesimal pleasures which are contained in that life of wretchedness are sufficient to excuse them; such acts are, according to the Benthamian principle, to be held as wrong. Thus it is implied that the wretched have no claim to live. The motive of sympathy exists, however, in human nature, and many who are guided by it assert that the wretched have a prescriptive right to live, and that their acts to enable them to do so are not exposed to blame. Society, however, has not been able to accept that opinion without reserves and it has prescribed a certain conduct as alone granting the right to live in wretchedness. But as that conduct is frequently impossible to follow, except to persons gifted with almost superhuman powers of endur-

ance, the demand of society is illogical. Again, if in pursuit of the fundamental motives, a man is only desirous of securing the greatest possible happiness for himself, it is evident that he will act in such a way as to realise that wish. It is equally evident that he will sometimes perform acts which will tend to frustrate the happiness of others, and such conduct cannot be adopted as a universal law without the infliction of suffering. Even if a man act in view of securing the greatest happiness for the greatest number, according to the principle of Mill; he will, in the pursuit of the fundamental motives, be thwarted of happiness himself, and the checks inflicted on his impulses may have prejudicial effects, not only on himself, but also on society. If the greatest happiness of the greatest number, be a universal principle, then many motives which would be good, as augmenting the happiness of any one European nation, might be bad considered from the point of view of Europe generally. It might, for instance, increase the happiness of one country to deprive the remaining European countries of their liberty, if powerful enough to do so; but it would certainly decrease the happiness of those remaining countries to be subjected to the domination. Again the happiness of the whole of Europe might be increased by the division of all the territories of the Eastern peoples; but it cannot be said that the happiness of those peoples would be increased by such a division, except by supposing that the introduction of Western civilization would be generally productive of more happiness, which is doubtful, and, considering the danger of the mental shock produced, improbable for an excessively long period of time. And yet the Eastern peoples are the most numerous section of humanity and their pleasure, if there be any truth in the principle above enunciated, should be an object of general endeavour.

There is not any accurate means of judging the moral value of the pleasure motive. Pleasure must be considered as necessary, in the main, to mental and physical health, and beneficial or harmful to the ultimate interests of individuals or society, according to the intensity with which it is manifested and according to the acts to which it leads. The social and moral quality of these acts depends upon the heredity, education, physical and

mental condition and environment of the actor, and they must be judged, if judged at all, in full knowledge of such conditions and with due allowance for them. If a man in pursuit of pleasure intoxicate himself until he brings on *delirium tremens*, or gamble until he is completely ruined, his action, in either case, is harmful to himself and indirectly to society; but it is due to a deflection of the pleasure motive from the rational to the irrational, as before dwelt upon, consequent upon a series of anterior causes independent of his will. It is not the pleasure motive itself that is the cause of harm, but the deviation of it from the plane on which it is stimulus, to that where it becomes disintegration. In practice a compromise usually takes place between the pleasure interest of the individual and that of the greatest number and by this means a certain measure of general happiness is maintained. Although physical happiness may not be made the universal test of actions, it is certain that the actions of men and of groups of men tend towards the obtainment of happiness. Terrestrial conditions, however, make it necessary that men should not endeavour exclusively to obtain that end in the present, but that they should also endeavour to promote it for the future, not merely by acts that are habitually called moral, but by every action of their lives; because by so doing they are obeying the developmental principle which is discernible, as well in conduct as in knowledge. But if a developmental principle is at work; men have only to live the life of the world and allow the principle to reach its ultimate expression in the course of time unaided. That is what the majority of men who lead neutral lives habitually do; but by such conduct, the attainment of the end must be considered as far remote. It is in the power of men to hasten the progress of moral evolution, and this they will do, or not do, according as the motive of sympathy, as here defined, acquires strength or loses it, and this, whether or not it has egoistic roots.

What is especially remarkable in the Ethics of Kant in this connection, is the declaration which they contain of inability to "get completely behind the secret springs of action" which he considers are anterior to experience. In the initial chapter it was endeavoured to be shown

that while a general conduct of a kind favourable to the preservation of the race is prescribed by necessity and is the condition upon which men exist on the planet; the rules of that conduct, far from being intuitional except in the sense of heredity; were acquired gradually both by the race and by the individual in the practice of existence and that certain motives, due to that necessity, were fundamental and contributed to the preservation and happiness of the race when normally pursued, but were prejudicial to it when abnormally pursued; finally that if there was any influence of an *a priori* nature, it was hopelessly hidden in the secret of the material universe from which human, as all other life, has sprung. If we take the famous categorical imperative: *Handle so dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetz gelten könne*, and apply it to the daily experience of life, the many contradictions which have been observed by numerous critics, become apparent. By this law, as has been pointed out,¹ we cannot be celibates, as the majority of philosophers have been, without willing the extinction of the race; neither can we, if married, have large families without desiring that every man should have the same and that the congestion which must result be produced. Neither can we drink wine (even when wine is necessary to restore circulation) without desiring that all the world should be wine drinkers although we now know wine-drinking to be a dangerous practice, in all climates, and a fatal one in some—and so on *ad absurdum*. But the maxim of Kant was evidently meant to be a general one and not applicable without exception. As a general principle and as embodying the ancient ethical maxim of "do unto others as you would have them do unto you;" it harmonises in many respects with the mental prohibitions to restraint, in the pursuit of motives, which may be produced by education and by experience. Education, may certainly say "If you have any realisation of sympathy and the other impulses of existence you should pursue them in such a way that your pursuit of them may not cause suffering to others, in so far as that may be possible." But there is no possibility of formulating

¹ Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics."

a categorical imperative which may apply to all circumstances and to all stages of development, and the attempt to formulate one or to establish rigid sanctions, has been one of the chief reasons of the discredit into which the science of conduct has shown a tendency to fall. It is not expedient to use imperatives in moral education. It is far more profitable to point out the expediency of right conduct towards self and the neighbour as a condition of human development, allowing the reason to find a reason for such conduct, by deduction from the causal relations of men and things, aiding it, when needful, by exhaustive elucidation. It is useless to tell men, "do not act thus, because such action is contrary to social evolution." It is better to say, "If you wish for a healthy and pleasurable life, for yourself and for your children, you may contribute towards the attainment of such life by observing and improving the rules which society has discovered for its preservation and enjoyment, just as by a wise economy you may constitute a fortune which will bring ease to yourself and to your children." It is of small avail, also, to require the observance of duty as Kant has done, unless duty be shown to mean the continuation of the work of perfection, in accordance with expediency. There are no super-terrestrial notions of duty in the human mind; but merely convictions of the terrestrial necessities, forced upon the mind by heredity, education, environment and experience. The failure of the metaphysicians to recognise these facts; can only be accounted for by the imperfect state of scientific thought in the era when metaphysics flourished. A constant need for a certain level of morality, has been experienced in human society. As Berthelot has said, "Man finds morality in himself and gives it objectiveness in attributing it to the divinity."¹ We cannot escape the moral necessity. It is recognised by the rudest savages, and life itself is conditional upon its recognition. We may give it the name of virtue, duty, intuitive morality, but we make it for ourselves, so that we may live, just as the birds build nests in order that they may breed. We make it for ourselves in the pursuit of the

¹ *L'homme trouve la morale en lui-même et il l'objective en l'attribuant à la divinité.* Berthelot, "Science et Morale."

motives which are the combined result of our somatic state and of the state of the world in which we live.

Darwin, in the moral portions of his "Descent of Man," traces clearly the effect of the sex and sustentative motives both in relation to the human and to the animal species and offers a description of the nature of conscience which is in complete accordance with the working of human motives, as they are observable by experience. These moral portions supported by the wealth of biological facts which gave its great value to the work, are far more convincing than volumes of dialectics. They are permeated by the scientific spirit in which alone the problem of right and wrong should be approached. In attributing to the measure of man's sympathy, however, the measure of his remorse for an evil action, bringing reprobation upon him; Darwin appears to be only partially correct. For a man whose sympathy is not strong, may yet feel remorse for having forfeited the esteem of his neighbours, by reason of wounded self-love, due to the disesteem which is manifested towards him, and this remorse must generally be added to that due to the sympathy, although cases might occur where either sensation might be a sufficient cause of remorse. The poet-philosopher Nietzsche finds the cause of remorse of conscience in the *interiorisation*,¹ which takes place in each man, after he has infringed one of the primary rules of society and resolved to abstain in future from such infringement from fear of social consequences. Undoubtedly when, let us say, the sex impulse, is repressed by the disabilities which have resulted from its irregular indulgence, a certain malady of timidity is produced, and this, according to this writer, is remorse of conscience. The punishment, he says, dominates the man; but does not make him better. The value of this last remark depends upon the sense in which the term better is taken. If the man who has been dominated, that is to say, who has been forced by society to restrain his instincts, regrets having been obliged to do so; he certainly is not better, supposing good to mean voluntary right action for its own sake; but if while not regretting his former conduct, he yet acts in future in a manner that is innocuous or

¹ "Zur Genealogie der Moral."

even beneficial to his fellow-men; then he is certainly better, supposing good to mean any conduct, which is not harmful or is beneficial to society and considering that the trend of this writer's works is to advocate the attainment of general preeminence or chieftainship as the highest aim of individuals, independently of the means employed; it would appear that in Nietzschean Ethics, the experiencing of remorse must be a proof of moral weakness and that each man possessing the strength to do so, must, to be moral, pursue a remorseless course. But the substitution of might for right which is the result of such a system, is subversive of the moral edifice slowly erected in the course of centuries and implies the institution of a régime of tyranny and of oppression, culminating in the ascendancy of a few victorious men, inebriated with superiority. The fallacy of such a view, is self-evident. It is opposed to the evolutionary increase of social good, and to general principles of justice. In order that the few may triumph, the motives of the many must be restrained beyond the normal limit of restraint. Such a conception is only a revival of ancient Greek hero worship, and has no place in any developing system of social conduct. It has been rightly termed "immoralism," and as such must be recorded as a passing aberration in the annals of philosophy.

When we reach Spencer, we at once emerge from utilitarianism based on dialectics to utilitarianism founded on facts. In the *Data of Ethics* this greatest English philosopher states his position in these words: "Morality, properly so called—the science of right conduct—has for its object to determine *how* and *why* certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things and I conceive it to be the business of Moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, what kinds to produce unhappiness." With utilitarianism, thus conceived, the scientific mind must needs agree. Observation, comparison, classification and induction are the methods by which the laws of science have been evolved and by these methods, all conduct and the motives which produce it,

may be scientifically studied. By careful observation of the effects produced by the working of the motives, it is possible to determine which of such effects are beneficial and which are prejudicial, both to individuals and to society considered as a whole; how far a motive may be beneficially pursued and how far detrimentally. Furnished with the facts which such observation elicits, it is possible at each period of time, to know what are the laws which a man may not transgress without danger both to his own well-being and to that of society. Given this perfect knowledge and a will-power trained to the necessary restraint, a science of morals may be constructed which will be positive so far as the knowledge on which it is based is positive and which, like all other sciences, will expand as knowledge expands. Throughout the ethical writings of Spencer this, the natural course, is consistently pursued and human acts are considered as phenomena observable by the inductive and deductive processes which have been successfully applied to other phenomena.

It is evident that the practice of the altruistic mode of conduct, that according to which the aim of individuals is to increase the happiness of others, rests upon a predominance, actual or desired, of the sympathetic over all other motives. But this predominance does not exist in fact. Sympathy, in the order of motives, occupies the fifth place, if the classification here adopted be correct, and in any case a place several steps removed from the first; so that if actions be measured by their derivation from a motive comparatively low in the scale, it is plain that under present conditions society must be regarded as, for the most part, corrupt and the only hope of its betterment would lie in the increase in strength of the sympathetic motive. Now it is scarcely open to doubt, that this motive does tend to increase in strength, but that it can ever do so, to the extent of becoming the first motive of existence, does not seem in consonance with the nature of human beings and the necessity which each is under to care for his own primary wants before caring for those of his neighbour. And it is plain, moreover, that if the first concern of every man was to work for the benefit of others, the conditions would be little changed, since, in this way, there would be a mere exchange of services. Each man

would work with the consciousness that another was working for him and justice would require that an equation should be established of the benefits bestowed and the benefits received. Thus the moral teaching of Comte, although of a high character, did not possess the adaptability to practice which was necessary to secure success, and his idealism, the service of humanity, being inconsistent with the natural impulses of men in their present stage of development; did not meet with the success which its founder anticipated. It only erred, however, in requiring too much from humanity. Happiness may be obtained by a conduct more in harmony with man's fundamental nature, a conduct in which the indispensable egoism of men will be restrained within such limits as permit of the development of the equally indispensable altruism, aided by the development of scientific knowledge. This was clearly recognised by Spencer when he wrote that egoism comes before altruism and that self-abnegation in excess, results not only in an inability to help others, but in the infliction of positive burdens upon them. He also recognises the connection above referred to between the altruistic impulse and the hedonistic feeling, showing that in the pursuit of the one, the other is experienced. An act of altruism, therefore, may be performed under the influence of the sympathetic, combined with the pleasure motive, and it is even doubtful whether it is ever possible to pursue a motive of sympathy without pursuing one of pleasure at the same time. This parallelism of altruism and pleasure is a factor of importance in the progress of society towards the goal of harmony which it seems destined to attain if it is to justify its existence more adequately than it has hitherto done.

The relation of the motives to that theory of conduct according to which right action is symbolised by duty, is not as vague as it might, at first sight, appear. The mechanical process by which the motives are worked, contains an element of realisation of the need for certain conduct, either beneficial or unarmful to the race, and whether that realisation be called duty or by any other name, it exists as a moderator to the play of the desires and performs the work of the governor in a steam engine,

controlling the action of the parts. If we give to this realisation the name of duty, we merely idealise a tendency which is the natural outcome of our material and terrestrial state, a tendency which experience of life proves to be necessary to the maintenance of social order and stability. Each man, arrived at maturity, becomes aware of this necessity which, during the ages of faith, was naturally attributed to a divine inspiration towards right conduct; but which may now be attributed to its true cause, the social activity of human life in its abode in the heliocentric system. Kant himself used the term necessity, as applied to duty, when he wrote that "duty is the necessity of an act, out of reverence felt for law;" but in giving as the reason for the necessity, reverence felt for law, he reverted to the ancient order of metaphysical conceptions which for a century delayed the introduction of scientific philosophic thought. But when we consider that Kant was struck with awe both by the starry heaven above him and by the moral law which he considered was in him; it is scarcely surprising that he should have written in this sense concerning duty.

Schopenhauer who founded morals on the sentiment of pity and called that man the most moral who showed pity for any victim of cruelty, sought a supreme test of moral feeling in a sentiment which might not connote perfect goodness in all the circumstances of life. Although the test was probant, it erred in its sentimental derivation. Persons of high nervous organisation are more apt to experience pity than others, but are not necessarily prevented by this sentiment from wrong-doing.¹ Many might also *feel* pity and yet not act in any sympathetic way in consequence and there are some who endeavour to avoid being made to experience pity owing to the pain or discomfort which it occasions. In the struggle of existence, how many men are turned away from acquisi-

¹ . . . penchants à l'avarice, à la charité, à la sociabilité, à la féroce, à la pitié, etc. Ces tendances si diverses peuvent exister dans un même caractère. Guyau, "Esquisse d'une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction," p. 181.

De même que la vie se fait son obligation d'agir par sa puissance même d'agir, elle se fait aussi sa sanction par son action même, car en agissant elle jouit de soi; en agissant moins elle jouit moins, en agissant davantage, elle jouit davantage. Guyau, "Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction," p. 250.

tiveness by pity for those on whom their acquisitiveness, if successful, will effect deprivation? Pity in the daily life of the world is not frequently excited, because the objects of pity are habitually kept out of view and it is probable that were this not the case, mental depression might result which would lead to pessimism. It is easy to understand how a man like Schopenhauer, of the utmost penetration, having become convinced of the injustice and general inferiority of society, should seek a proof of moral feeling in this extreme test, but it is more difficult to comprehend how it could ever be made of universal application. But, in reality, the difficulty is one of terms. Pity is only an occasional form of sympathy and as the sympathetic motive increases, this form of sympathy must tend to disappear. We have already seen that the sympathetic motive continues to acquire strength. As it strengthens, the need for pity which requires brutality or inhumanity for its production, will tend to decline. It is not possible to found morality upon a term representing more or less exactly a single sentiment. Morality is evolved from human activity and does not rest on any one expression of it. There is no act which, if minutely analysed, may not have a moral significance according to the way in which it is performed.

Guyau's position towards the motives is of some importance. Although he does not hold that pleasure is of necessity the end of conduct and does not admit the wisdom of the search for ends, yet in his sketch of a moral system without obligation or sanction, he very clearly states that in the exercise of vital activity (which is not other than the pursuit of the motives) "just as life creates for itself its obligation to act by its power to act, so it also makes for itself its sanction by its own action." He proceeds to say that "in acting, life enjoys itself; in acting less it enjoys less; in acting more, it enjoys more," and this seems equivalent to saying that the motives lead to an end more or less pleasurable according as they are actively or sluggishly pursued. In another and preceding passage, he admits that in our activity our intelligence and sensibility, there is a pressure which exerts itself in the altruistic sense; an expansive force which he identifies with duty. The altruistic pressure, to which he alludes,

is not other than the working of that motive which is here termed the sympathetic and which operates in favour of a distribution of pleasurable means.

The merit of Guyau is his abstention from dogmatism and his endeavour to show how moral conduct is an attribute of social life which is not amenable to inextensive rules. Nothing more than this is claimed in the present enquiry; only pleasure is openly recognised as the aim of men, for the cogent reason that experience of men's acts supports no other view.

It is not because pleasure is and must be recognised as the ultimate end of men's individual and collective action, that a rigid sanction of the Benthamian type can be established which may not be proved fallacious in the practice of existence. Experience has shown that the quality of pleasure sought, is the real criterion of all acts and that the test of quality is the benefit in healthy, innocuous, pleasurable life, accruing to individuals and conjointly to society. No system founded upon a single term possesses working potentiality. Morals must develop on the results of experience. If there is general progress in conduct, it is plainly perceptible in an increase of general well-being, and it is always possible at a particular time and in a particular place, to ascertain what actions are good or what are bad, from the point of view of this general progress. The force which constantly tends to make men conform their lives to the general interest is that of moral custom. Whatever standard of conduct is prescribed by custom, it cannot be fallen away from by individuals without the incurrance of blame and this risk of blame is a strong restraining influence. The custom itself is established by those who have the most intelligence, knowledge and influence in the community, and they are led to establish it, notwithstanding the fact that it may sometimes thwart their own desires or inclinations, by the conviction of its necessity which they have derived from their observation of their fellow-men. Occasionally, however, an anti-moral custom is established by the less intelligent, thoughtful or scrupulous; but such customs have a circumscribed life. They sink as soon as their danger becomes universally recognised, and thus society preserves itself from serious relapse. At no time has

moral custom, however, been sufficiently good to satisfy moralists who generally possess a strong sense of the moral inferiority of their times. Such men have always existed and will doubtless continue to exist, until the end of moral effort is reached. Their existence is the more remarkable from the fact that the study of the human condition with its constant alternation of good and evil, pleasure and pain, is a task generally more painful than pleasurable.

Again, if men are found to devote their lives to the work of moral reform, do they do so from motives of sustenance or self-love only, or are they not rather primarily impelled to do so by the abnormal strength of the sympathetic motive in them? Undoubtedly in the majority of cases, they act under the influence of this latter motive almost exclusively. Moral reformers including those who were religious reformers at the same time, and moral philosophers, have always been primarily moved, it seems, by this sympathetic motive, on the development of which, as we have seen, the progress, of the race, towards harmony, depends. Experience of happiness for any length of time, is sufficient to create the conviction in the mind of the man who experiences it, that there is a possibility of the diffusion of such happiness and when it occurs that such a man is sympathetic, he is naturally inclined to undertake the task. The presence of such men in a community tends to give greater general confidence in the perfectibility of human nature.

It is, however, a fact that such men are regarded by the greater number as mistaken idealists, devoting their lives to impossible and unprofitable tasks and the reason why they are so regarded is that the habit of individual labour for individual good, is so inveterate and customary, that individual effort for the collective good cannot be readily conceived. There is undoubtedly a great bridge to cross before the individualist habit of mind can yield any place to the collectivist; but that it must eventually be crossed, seems certain. If mutual help is destined to be a condition of existence, the time must come when labour for the common good will cease to excite surprise. Hedonism, altruism, or duty are in reality but different standards of action for arriving at an expression of existence in which

there is no suffering, in which all the motives converge towards social concord, and considering this similarity of end, it is remarkable that so great an expenditure of argument should have been made by the rival schools of ethics, when the divergence rested mainly on the interpretation of words. The error proceeded initially from the desire of the early moralists to construct logical frames for their systematisations and from the fact that these frames were of their nature inexpansive.

The science of pure logic, however useful it may be to accuracy in argument, cannot alone help us to the solution of a problem which is continually changing and in which the truth of premiss requires to be continually tested. Each revelation from nature alters the moral values previously established and the moral parallax can never be definitely obtained. Moral science is governed by the same necessary rule that governs other sciences: that truths are truth as long as, and in so far as they are not supplemented or superseded by greater truths.

CHAPTER XV

THE MOTIVES IN RELATION TO EDUCATION

WHETHER or not all or any of the motives may be acted upon or modified by education, is the enquiry which presents itself at this stage. In an efficient moral education, it is clear that instruction would be given in the conduct most conducive to the general good in the chief concerns of life. As regards sustenance, it would conceivably be shown that since labour for food and property is needful to support existence, since in order to live it is necessary, either to cultivate the earth, to furnish, or to be the means of furnishing pleasure, instruction, and commodities or service to the possessors of wealth; the manner in which such occupations are performed is of the greatest importance to the general well-being. It would be demonstrated, for instance, that if agriculture were inefficiently performed, either through ignorance, neglect or design, its products would be defective; that if such products were sold to consumers as the normal yield of the soil, a prejudice would be caused to such consumers and to society generally; that if such prejudice were caused in obedience to the necessity of gain, then that the person causing it failed to exercise the restraint over his natural instinct of gain which the interests of society demand and that therefore his conduct was socially deficient. Similarly it would be shown that defective manufacture, any false representation of quality or quantity in any dealings for the object of gain, should, owing to its general injustice, be inexcusable on the plea of the necessity of gain in the majority of cases and wherever the pressure of destitution and want does not impair the judgment. It might be explained to the young that while men are hourly influenced by the need of sustenance in the course of their careers, they are, while seeking it, hourly in danger of causing prejudice to the society in the midst of which

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they live and upon whose good-will they are in a large degree dependent. It might be said to the student of this department of moral education: "There are two methods of earning: by injustice towards society through equivocation in your dealings with it, or by conformity with the rules of dealing which society has established. The former course is beset with dangers, both to you and to society, and is fundamentally wrong, according to the consensus of human opinion from the remotest times; the latter course you are alone at liberty to take without imperilling yourself. If you pursue it in such a way, however, that the result is the ruin of competitors and the concentration in your own hands of a great amount of property then, by exercising no restraint upon your desire for gain, you are acting in a way which is not the best for the general welfare of your race." The tenacity with which dogmatic religion is retained once it has been taught in early youth, goes to prove that such principles, once instilled, would exercise a salutary influence upon the pursuit of sustenance. For in general the moral side of education is so neglected that manhood is attained without any more efficient moral knowledge being acquired than that which is afforded by the family and religious moral codes or the works of the moralists of Ancient Greece, together with those of some metaphysical writers containing maxims of a transcendental character. The strenuous work of life is engaged in by many in ignorance of the true nature of the impulses which they must obey or how far it may be possible, by the exercise of will, to resist the force of such impulses. The will to resist will seldom be present unless the knowledge is also present of the need for resistance. For whatever general maxims the ordinary moral education may contain, the youth who enters a career discovers that they are either inapplicable to the struggle for sustenance or only imperfectly applied. It is commonly said that men may not be made honest by a legislative act, and this is partially true; but they may, without doubt, be raised to a higher standard of social conduct than has hitherto been known, by efficient moral and social education. Men have always been told that it is wrong to steal, but they have not yet been made sufficiently acquainted with the fact that it is wrong to

practise excessive greed. Such an enlightenment if introduced into ethico-social education, would doubtless produce the best results, notwithstanding the strength of the motive which has to be inhibited. It is plain, however, that if we would have restraint of greed, we must have a concomitant restraint of luxury among the richer classes of society; for the desire for luxury is the chief cause of the over-strife for wealth and thus frugality may be also taught as a branch of conduct. It may be inculcated that although luxury does require for its practice some of the highest mechanical and artistic efforts of which men are capable, and although its indulgence increases the prosperity of those whose business in life it is to minister to luxury, yet the envy and unscrupulous action for possession which it excites, is generally harmful and opposed, in our present stage, to the promotion of general happiness.

If, however, it be objected to this instruction, that it would pave the way for miserly habits, the reply is that if the moral education, which cannot here be fully described, were adequate, then altruistic principles would be instilled which would remove any danger of this nature; and if it be further objected that any check to the motive of sustenance would diminish the energy of life, and that children should not be taught any principles which tended to produce this effect, it might be opposed to this objection that it would be better for the attainment of the human end that energy should be checked, than that it should be misdirected. For the rest, the field of pleasure, is so vast, that, as previously observed, a portion of it only, is sufficient to maintain the energy of life.

With the sex motive it is not different. Moral education, by demonstrating the need for restraint in the pursuit of the motive, might do much to reduce the number of its victims and might also restrain the reckless and harmful gratification of the impulse in matrimony which is the chief cause of over-population. Not a word of instruction in this most vital subject is ordinarily given in colleges and little by parents in the home. In countries like England, men are theoretically held to be unacquainted with the other sex before matrimony and to be under no special, or at any rate no social obligation to self-control after matrimony. But natural impulses

render compliance with the former requirement sufficiently rare in practice and that the latter view is erroneous physically and socially needs no demonstration. The consequences are plainly apparent in our civilization and need not be enlarged upon here. Intercourse of sex depends upon temperament and age and not upon customs or conventions. It is when passion is allowed to become unbridled that it becomes self-destructive and socially dangerous, and it is for this reason that a preparation for restraint should be made through education. It is true that nature, herself, furnishes physical warnings when the limits of sense indulgence are being overstepped; but these warnings when unsupported by a mental interdiction, are in danger of being disregarded, and such interdiction can only be supplied by moral education supported by special physiological and even by pathological instruction. It is as necessary that some restraint should be practised in respect of the sex motive, as it is essential that excess of such restraint should be avoided if the race is to be preserved at its full degree of individual efficiency and if neuronc and mental diseases, from restrictive causes, are to be avoided. In the present state of European conditions which render early marriage difficult and extra-matrimonial relations dangerous, it is evident that no dogmatism on this subject is possible. What education may achieve is the presentment of all the facts relating to the union of the sexes together with an exhaustive examination of their causes and effects, so that, at least, all errors due to ignorance may be avoided and men and women may start upon an adult career with a full knowledge of the natural laws governing the relations of the sexes and of the relative degrees of suffering which result from the neglect or the defiance of these laws. Whether or not such instruction would properly belong to morals or to physiology matters little. In whichever department of knowledge it were taught, it is essential to rational social morals that it should be taught. Although the sex impulse is inborn, there is no natural intuition of the great series of phenomena which accompany its satisfaction and little or none of the anti-social consequences which are inseparable from its irresponsible pursuit. After a breach of the rules prescribed by society for the regulation of sexual relations, there

comes, frequently it is true, a feeling of regret for the breach committed; a realisation of social transgression which varies in direct ratio to the sense of social justice of the individual; but this regret and realisation are the effects of the traditional blame which being known to the transgressor from his childhood, assume a certain force when the subsidence of passion has restored the reflective faculty to its normal condition.

If it be objected that if such instruction as is here outlined were afforded to girls, the charm of maidenly innocence would be lost, the answer is that we must choose between the æsthetic pleasure which this charm affords and the deeper and more real pleasure which would result to society from a removal of the errors to which that ignorance gives rise. For the rest, it is evident, that the instruction in self-restraint would be suited to the feminine condition and might possibly be of a less radical nature than that afforded to men, the more so as the sex impulsions among unmarried women are generally excessively weak compared with those experienced by men.

It is evident that the inculcation of restraint cannot be supported by any parallels drawn from animal life. Among animals there is only such restraint as is imposed by natural exhaustion, there is no other limit to productivity. Although offspring are continually produced for whom there are little or no means of sustenance in the place of their production, parents exhibit no prudential instinct in this respect and the only principle which nature manifests in the animal world in this connection is that of irresponsibility.

If the human race was governed by such a principle as we know it in Europe, is it not plain that the suffering resulting from human congestion must be experienced, or that an exodus to the still uncongested localities on the globe must be made? Considering however that there are limits to the earth's capacity for affording sustenance under such conditions as those with which we are now acquainted, it is evident that the latter alternative must eventually fail, and therefore what may be termed the natural principle, is not that which should be taught by educators as most conducive to the attainment of the human aim, unless they are prepared to also teach the

necessary destruction of a proportion of the human species at birth.

This, doubtless, no educator would ever be inclined to do, and therefore the danger to society by reason of the too thoughtless indulgence of the sex motive, must be shown to be avertible by other means. Such means are principally the exertion of will power, the adaptation of diet and physical exercise. Frugality, scientifically practised and exercise proportioned to strength, are the best antidotes to the evil of irresponsibility in the pursuit of the sex motive and they should be advocated by educators as possessing such qualities. When the food partaken of, while as little animal as possible, yet possesses the due proportions of albumen necessary to repair the waste of tissues which is always at work in the organism, and when alcohol, the source of much sexual irresponsibility, is shown to be harmful to the race and is abandoned, then restraint of sexual impulsions may be sufficiently produced to enhance social happiness in this direction.

For moral education, if such may be said to exist outside the incomplete and often inapplicable codes of religion, is largely concerned with the search for or proof of sanctions and makes little or no attempt to connect human acts with their true causes in the physical and psychological nature of man, notwithstanding the fact that many authoritative works appear in which the moral bearing of physical and psychological phenomena is examined.

The sex motive, finally, as the impulse upon which the maintenance of human life depends, demands the most careful treatment at the hands of those whose calling it is to prepare the future citizen for the life of the family and of the world. Upon its right direction depends a large share of the health and vigour of the race. As the factor of life, it is urgent that it should be pursued with an adequate knowledge of its most recondite consequences, and that those consequences should be treated without false shame and in a scientific, as well as in a philosophic manner. Much of the education given in schools, much of the learning derived from colleges, is held up in the memory for a few years after the examination in view of which it was committed to it, and then all that which

does not come into use in the daily occupations, is either forgotten or but dimly remembered.

It is not so, however, with moral instruction based upon the practical issues of life; for this being retained in the memory by the daily practice of existence in society, is in no danger of being forgotten. It is possible to impress moral principles and warnings upon the minds of learners which stand the test of time and in no case is this more possible than in that of sex morality.

And if education may be beneficial in preparing the way for the pursuit of the motives of sustenance and sex, it may be scarcely less so in laying down the principles for the guidance of pleasure.

Education is imparted with a view to fitting its recipients for a useful or an ornamental position in society, but it is incomplete in a particular of vital importance if, in the departments of morals and sociology, it does not aim at presenting to the young a picture of human society as it is at a given time, in special relation to its pleasurable ends. Even at the risk of somewhat dismaying the beginner, it should not shrink from enumerating the many errors into which pleasure leads, not representing these as in theological times as temptations expressly laid by an evil spirit, but as one of the results of an imperfect human condition which men, by study and industry may hope to improve. It should draw the finest distinctions between the violent, temporary and noxious pleasures which are traps for the non-self-controlled, and those pleasures which lead to a permanent and healthful state of enjoyment. It should distinguish, also, between those snares which men lay for themselves in the pursuit of pleasure and those which are laid for them by society and which are the more easy to avoid when the proper warning has been given. If this were done, it is probable that errors due to cunningly devised temptation placed in the path of the inexperienced, or the weak-willed by the unscrupulous, would be diminished in number and extent, and much cruelty and injustice would be removed.

If, for instance, it were taught, in the primary schools, that the brilliant drink-shops so conspicuously placed at the corner of thoroughfares in English towns were devices for the encouragement of various degrees of alcoholisation

and that the liquor traffic, although supported by a special press and an influential body of men, was one from which an ascertainable quantity of human misery proceeded which might be avoided or minimised; an inhibition might be early formed which would conduce to the gradual extinction of the alcoholic habit. Similarly, if all the other sources of moral aberration, gambling, extravagance, warfare, were exhibited in the world's schools in their true light, with all their attendant evils, a race of men might eventually be formed with clear perceptions of the possibilities for happiness inherent in the human state and imbued with a true desire to reach that happiness by an abandonment of ancient misconceptions. Many persons hold that the vigour of existence can only be maintained by indulgence in the pleasures and the lacerating activity above alluded to which they moreover urge are the means of providing sustenance for large numbers of men. They also consider with regard to the pleasure allurements, that as it is every man's duty to protect himself, it is natural that he should be victimised if he fail to do so. This principle was symbolised in the tale of Cebes in which the wayfarer was confronted by doors leading to a number of attractive deceptions which he must either enter or avoid, according as his will prompted him; but it is not that which can ever ensure the confidence of man in his race or by which social happiness can be attained.

The passion of gambling, so far from stimulating, has a tendency to close the mind of those who give themselves up to it to all other passions or sentiments, and the elation which gain brings, is overbalanced by the depression which loss occasions. No one can consistently maintain that so brutalising an occupation is necessary to the hedonistic welfare of the race, or that its abolition would leave a blank in human life which it would be impossible to fill with less mentally injurious recreative modes. It is true that the practice is often held to be excusable by reason of the charities which it supports and the superior horse-breeding which it encourages; but if charity were dependent for support upon customs which are manifestly productive of misery, then there is established a principle which may be stated thus: it is

right to produce misery in order to alleviate misery, or it is right to benefit the equine at the expense of the human race: two propositions which are obviously untenable.

Again if extravagance be urged as necessary to pleasure, it is easy to show that the penury to which it often leads, is productive of pain and that therefore it is unjustifiable, except in the case of the most ample and renewable resources, unless it is held that the pleasure of the moment is better than the happiness of a lifetime. Undoubtedly those who spend freely give employment to many who might otherwise lack it, and benefit those who serve the extravagance for a certain time, but seeing that when ruin supervenes which, in most cases, it eventually does, either the latter, or others, must sustain loss and suffer injustice and that these others may be many, the original benefits bestowed are generally neutralised by the final prejudice caused, and there is a loss to society of social rectitude as well as the destruction of the career, and frequently of the health, of the ruined man. Law wisely imputes culpability, in such cases, according to the recklessness exhibited and takes no heed of the benefits dispensed during the period of extravagance, and for these reasons extravagance beyond means, or the reasonable prospect of means, is a social fault which may be practically demonstrated in moral education with the greatest advantage. By means of an early acquaintance with the dangers which they conceal, much might be done to check these tendencies of gambling and of undue extravagance which are mainly deflections of the pleasure motive.

It may cause some surprise that war should be included here as one of the human aberrations which education may modify or remove, seeing that in the colleges of Europe, a not inconsiderable proportion of youths are educated in view of the military profession, and that in many European countries several years of the lives of youths are devoted to the acquirement of the art of war. "War has always existed," it is said, "and it always will. It is the natural escape-valve for the redundant energies of nations." Now in the Greek and Roman worlds, slavery was considered essentially a part

of the social system, and even moralists saw nothing to reprove in it. Yet the middle ages were able to dispense with slavery in Europe where it has come to be condemned and where it could never be revived. Men have found that they can live without the enforced servitude of a portion of the population and that freedom of contract might be substituted between master and servant for coercion.

Again it was once thought that disputes between individuals as to what are termed affairs of honour, could only be decided by single combat, yet the jousts of the middle ages have disappeared, and although they have survived, in some countries, in the form of the declining duel, there is at least one country in which they have been prohibited by law without any apparent ill effects. Again torture, in the middle ages, was held by the governing classes as the most efficient means of extorting confession, but that custom has for ever disappeared. It would occupy too much space to enumerate all the pernicious practises once considered necessary which have been abolished. War is one of those which has survived, but which has now entered the stage in which human customs are subjected to human criticism.

It is beginning to be perceived that war which has ceased to be waged for motives of kingly or national self-love and which is the most aggravated form of the motive of sustenance, is neither a necessity of social progress, nor a practise which is consistent with the human pretention to pre-eminence over the brute creation. War is the armed struggle of one nation against another for possession of a portion or portions of the earth's surface which each nation proclaims itself eminently fitted to possess by reason of its superior civilization, or of its superior power, or of both; although there is no standard of civilization, and power can only be tested in the field. Thus it happens that war is declared and the patriotic spirit is aroused to such an extent that all humaner feelings are extinguished and army is led against army. One side, after great loss of life (insufficient however to affect population to any appreciable degree) is dispossessed of some of its land, if not deprived of all of it, and thrown into subjection; condemned in any case to rancour and a

deep sense of injustice. In both countries taxes are raised and suffering experienced. In neither country has any advance in happiness been made, but on the contrary, a loss has been sustained and the barriers of other countries have been strengthened against the victor. The régime of distrust has been strengthened and the advent of international fraternity postponed. Is there more vigour, more pleasurable life in the country of the victor? This is doubtful. The revenue of the state may have been increased by the accession of new provinces, but so also has the expenditure. A few additional careers may have been opened to the governing classes, but the general prosperity of the kingdom remains the same, while the number of widows and orphans in it, has been increased. Little real gain has been obtained, but a retrogression in humanity has been made which it requires many decades of peace to repair. At the stage which we have reached, the geographical boundaries of race have been defined by antiquity of occupation and by physical features. It is the duty of nations to keep within those boundaries and to employ their redundant energies within them, not in internal strife, but in the numberless roads of human industry and enterprise. But it is probable that if we were to closely analyse the sentiments of the defenders of war, it would be found that they consist of a desire to vent upon the alien race, the resentments which they are unable to vent upon their own, and if this hypothesis be true, then another argument is furnished in support of the contention that war rests upon a social inferiority or defect. The resentments being due to injustice suffered, or to rancour experienced for disappointed ambition, and the injustice and rancour being caused by defective social and moral states; if the resentment ceased to be experienced, war might cease to be regarded by a large section of the community as a safety valve and it is certain that the resentments are modifiable or removable by the progress of man as a social being.

For the rest, athletic exercises (as before observed), when not of a brutal nature, may be relied upon to effect much in the reduction of the superfluous energies above alluded to.

It is plain that a volume might be devoted to the

moral aspect of war, and it is only possible here, to incidentally mention some of the main objections to the theory that war is a necessity. It is hoped however that sufficient has been said to render the contention not preposterous that some pronouncements may, and should be made, against war by moral educators, in order that the inhibitory seed which we have seen to be beneficial in respect of other common practices of life, may be also sown in respect of this. For in education lies the source of possible amelioration. When ministers of public education, in the several countries of Europe, combine to order the demonstration of the anti-social character of war, war among Western States may be within a measurable distance of its extinction. Arms will only need to be protectively retained until the East has been brought completely under the influence of western thought, in this respect, and it is not impossible that that result may be reached sooner than might seem probable owing to the greater and increased intercourse between East and West which the development of locomotion has effected.

With the deviations of self-love, moral education might fitly deal, always supposing that its elucidations and exhortations were based objectively upon the observable actions of men in society and were fearlessly made. It might be shown that the result of pride is to produce a species of mental torpor unfavourable to the inception of new ideas. It might be shown also that whether in a scientist, a philosopher, a politician, a professional or commercial man, an artist, pride of attainment was a sentiment which was not of a nature to produce that calm but dignified humility before the effects of nature which, when exhibited by the gifted or the successful, goes far to reconcile to their lot in life the less gifted and the unfortunate. If humility were inculcated as a moral duty, and men grew up in its practise, much of the asperity of life which the large majority experience would be removed and the confidence of humanity in itself increased.

It might be objected that the lessons of this education would touch on contingencies too remote from school or college life to be useful, but many such lessons may be

rendered applicable to the life of the school where all evils of adult life may be found in embryo—greed of advantage and pride of birth being especially conspicuous, as well as cruelty and tyranny.

As general education is conceived, the end in view is chiefly the supremacy of individual over individual and of nation over nation, an end which is not favourable to the spread of happiness. Students are allowed to believe that when they enter the life occupation, their chief solicitude must be to raise themselves by any means allowable by law to a position of superiority. This is called making their way to the front and to a certain extent the spirit conduces to the energy necessary to the earning task; but when it exists as a spirit of ruthless competition for the enrichment and elevation of self and family, without any consideration of social expediency; then it is a spirit which moral education is qualified to treat.

It will be always necessary that the nature of the struggle between individual and collective motives of sustenance, should be elucidated with the utmost care and an appeal made to the reason of the learners to decide between the continuance of the theory of life according to which each individual struggles for himself alone, and that according to which he labours partly for the common good. When a boy has culled some fruit, or become possessed of some other advantage, he is sometimes asked, in order to test his disposition, whether he will keep it all for himself or whether he will give a portion to his friends, and according as the boy has inherited or contracted an egoistic or an altruistic disposition, so is his decision. When he decides to retain the whole himself, he is called selfish and is blamed. When he elects to distribute a portion, he is styled generous and praised. In the former case, he follows a course which bears a close analogy with that pursued by the majority of men in the struggle for sustenance and pleasure. In the latter, he pursues a line of conduct which although admired in childhood, is considered injudicious, if not foolish, when continued as a principle in after life, a course which in the present state of thought, most parents and educators would refrain from counseling. But if conduct such as that of the altruistic boy is commendable, there is no reason why it

should only be considered so when manifested by extreme youth. If we limit pure altruism to youth, why should we praise a tendency which we do not think expedient in adult life, and which the boy must discard when he reaches the adult age? And if we do not think it expedient in adult life, or if we act as if we did not think so, do we not tacitly admit that our mode of living is not in harmony with certain tendencies of our nature, with a certain working of our minds which we dare not express in our dealings with our fellow-men? Some answer that human nature is not perfect, and that we must be resigned to accept it as it is. And yet ought not the sense of admiration for generosity in children and sometimes in adults, to suggest that there is in human nature a faculty of perfection, and to encourage efforts towards its attainment? Whence does the unselfish boy derive his unselfishness? Chiefly, probably, from a habit of his ancestors. And if so, or where so; how came his ancestors to form that habit? Undoubtedly from the realisation of a human need, from a desire to promote the happiness of successors in the world, as a recognition for the benefits received from predecessors. For few men can contemplate the world which we at present know with its wealth of knowledge and of comforts, without realising that the advantages possessed are due to the mental labours of those ancestors who sought truth, not only for their own sakes and their son's sakes, but also for *its* sake, impelled by that curiosity of mind which is the source of all discovery and progress. The scheme of existence is one of constant reception and transmission from ancestry to posterity. What we have received we must pass on, increased in value. Knowledge and happiness, the objects of transmission, must continue to advance on the path assigned to them by evolution. Happiness must not lag behind, or the advance is incomplete. Fortunately the one is in a large degree dependent on the other. Out of knowledge may eventually spring the distributive desire which will give general contentment, but its advent may be hastened by the aid of moral education, without which all other education fails to maintain the simultaneous parallel advance which is the main factor of perfectibility.

But any moral education of the kind here indicated, would, if it is to bear fruit, deal with facts observable in contemporaneous life from which its teachers must draw ethical conclusions. It must avoid mere admonitions unsupported by evidence of necessity; but it must give reasons for its admonitions drawn from the relations between cause and effect in the whole range of natural phenomena. Even in the absence of any direct principle inducible from those facts, their mere presentment, scientifically made, will conduce towards efficient moral and social conduct.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSIONS I

I. THE NATURAL TENDENCY OF CONDUCT

MEN act, as we have seen, under the influence of a series of impulsions which have their first causes in the cosmography, composition and atmospheric conditions of the world, in the composition and construction of the human body and in heredity.

They also act with two main conscious purposes, to sustain life and to enjoy.

Whether it be in the forms of amorous, intellectual or æsthetic emotions, pleasure is always sought as soon as sustenance is gained and the highest possible degree of sense-gratification as soon as sustenance is superfluously acquired.

However they should act, the majority of men do act as though individual pleasure were the real end of life. Mankind develops according to a method by which the most mentally and physically endowed or the most favoured by circumstance, obtain the largest share of pleasure and the race must therefore be regarded as existing for the visible and conscious purpose of procuring pleasurable sensation.

Most workers would cease to exert energy were they assured that the result of their energy would be pain and even if there existed a superior reason for existence, it seems inevitable that the pleasure incentive must continue to be that by which the zest of life, the will to continue living, must be maintained. Pleasure is sought in the relations of the sexes and upon its prospect in such relations, the continuation of the race mainly depends, since it is not probable that in the absence of such gratification, the desire for offspring would be sufficiently strong to ensure that continuation, except to a limited extent. It is sought

in palatable nourishment, even in the mere satisfaction of appetite. It is sought in exercise which stimulates the circulation of the blood, strengthens the muscles, and intensifies the vital enthusiasm. It is sought in the practise of any art, especially when mastery has been acquired. It is sought by devotees who have accustomed themselves to believe in the felicitous life of another world, by those who lead lives of strict sobriety and hygienic discipline in order that they may attain the comfort of health as well as by inebriates who seek the more temporary but intenser satisfactions of insobriety. It is sought in social intercourse, in philanthropy and charity. Even among the very poor it is seldom, as we have seen, that some modicum of pleasure or of prospect of pleasure does not subsist to maintain the desire of life. In pursuit of pleasurable sensations, inhabitants of cold climates seek warmer ones and sometimes the inhabitants of warm climates resort to colder. Games of chance, the ultimate result of which is almost certain loss, are played for the pleasurable excitement which they afford, while dangerous enterprises are undertaken with the same object. In the somewhat arduous task of the upbringing of children, there are from the beginning, certain pleasurable prospects which greatly tend to lighten that task such as the increasing beauty of the child as it grows, the satisfactions to self-love resulting from the abilities it displays and later the parental pride in the attainments of offspring. Everywhere and always men have striven to obtain the fullest share of individual pleasure with but a secondary regard for the happiness of society as a whole. If the obtainment of pleasure is the principal occupation of life, the obtainment of pleasure is its principal end. Men labour to possess the one in order that they may acquire the other. Every action of a man's life that is not self-destructive, is caused by the quest for pleasure. Given the nervous organisation of the human body, its affinity for pleasure and its aversion to pain, no other conditions are possible and although supernatural religion has been instrumental in the past in inducing men to postpone the indulgence of pleasure until a future state is reached, acts of men so influenced have shown that they were only slightly deterred from present pleasure by the prospect which was held out

to them. The reason for self-destruction frequently given by persons who commit suicide is, in substance, that they are no longer able to procure the satisfactions of existence. The prospect of a life of suffering causes them to wish for removal from a world in which suffering is destined to be their lot. In every community there is a class of persons who are exclusively occupied in pleasurable pursuits and who are generally envied.

The epicureans of antiquity, recognising the fact that all human conduct was based upon pleasure, avowedly instituted the cult of pleasure and in spite of the errors into which they fell, they were consistent in the sense that they founded a system of philosophy upon the tendency which was observed to be most constant in human nature.

We do not know with any accuracy how far the prospect of pleasure beyond that of the satisfaction of appetite, stimulates animals, but it is well known that dogs who are the most intelligent among the mammals, are generally stimulated by the prospect of a walk with their master or by the perspective of a hunting day. Many of the higher animals appear happier when the weather is fine and they are able to bask in the sun and it is scarcely doubtful that among the lower forms of life a sense of pleasure must be derived from the absorption of food. The whole of living nature appears to be conscious of the pleasure-sense which man, the highest product of nature experiences in a direct ratio to the complexity of his nervous organisation. The vibrations of the sensory nerves are, it may be, but the human expression of the rhythm which pervades the vibratory æther of the universe. The tendency of action towards pleasure would be as necessary to life as the principle of rotation to the matter of the universe. Cessation of pleasure would bring about cessation of life. But the universality of the pleasure aim is not always recognised because life is full of minor aims which have the appearance of separability and because the occupations of daily life often appear to be ends in themselves.

In general the reasons for which men continue to exist are: (1) to postpone as long as possible the pain of death and the passage to an unknown state; (2) to prolong as long as possible their participation in the life of the planet

and in the pleasures which that life affords; (3) to complete some labour, the completion of which is itself productive of satisfactions of a pleasurable kind. If we imagine a life totally destitute of pleasure, we see at once that the only inducement its possessor has to continue living is the desire to postpone the first contingency, but we may conclude that, under such conditions the desire of the postponement must somewhat rapidly cease. Therefore, in order that life be lived, it is imperative that it be pleasurable.

Again the eagerness of children for pleasurable sensations and the convulsions into which they are thrown by pain, show very clearly the tendency of the race. All children love pleasure but while some exhibit intense egoism in its indulgence, others exhibit a tendency towards altruism and the two attitudes, manifested in adult life, constitute a large share of human injustice and of human justice. It is natural to some men possessing the power of affording pleasure, to do so only in respect of those from whom they anticipate an adequate return. It is also natural to others, in the same position, to dispense pleasure without any definite anticipation of a like benefit being conferred upon them. The former class tend to make of society a ledger in which accurate accounts are kept of benefits given and received, accounts which are closed to those who from any cause are incapacitated from rendering as much service as they receive. This class promotes activity, eliminates non-values, increases the pace of a form of progress, but fails to establish any ethics among men superior to those of ordinary barter. As society is constituted, pleasure is to a large extent denied to those who do not or who cannot provide it for others. If, however, pleasure be necessary to maintain that taste for life which is indispensable to the welfare of the race, its denial tends to dismiss from existence those who have no pleasure to offer in exchange for that which they receive. This applies to the pleasures which men themselves create, for it is evident that there exist certain pleasurable sensations which are afforded by the exterior world such as those derivable from the beauties of nature, from pure air and space, although it happens that even these consolations are frequently denied to the poor,

especially in cities where a sufficiency of light and air and space is the privilege of the rich alone. The natural tendency of men, individually, is to make participation in the pleasure which the world affords conditional upon certain qualifications or aptitudes which, although not necessarily inborn, must nevertheless be acquired if the reward of pleasure is to be obtained. The capacity for pleasure varies as the sensitiveness of the nervous system, but it is seen that men of highly developed nervous organisations, are not generally the most fitted for the labour of the acquirement of sustenance upon the possession of which the gratifications of the pleasure sense is in a considerable degree dependent, and hence there results a contradiction which is frequently the cause of pain. Within certain limits, the least apt to enjoy are the most able to procure the means of enjoyment.

As observed in the chapter on sustenance, wealth is often amassed by those who procure from its accumulation the active stimulation of only a limited number of the pleasure senses, but as we have seen, the character of pleasure is such that one pleasure is sufficient to maintain the desire of existence. Men are also seen to be moved by the prospect of pleasure.

Wealth which is equivalent to potentiality for pleasure, is itself conceived of by many as the symbol of pleasure and hence the quest of wealth is that which calls forth the highest efforts, physical and intellectual, of which human beings are capable. Wealth is guarded carefully by those who have experienced hardships or non-pleasurable sensations in its acquisition. In their case wealth is the fruit of labour and labour is the cause of discomfort to both mind and body. The remembrance of such discomfort causes them to preserve the means of their emancipation lest they should be forced to return to labour. Those, on the contrary, who inherit wealth or who obtain it with little effort, often risk it imprudently or squander it because they have no knowledge of the difficulty with which it is generally earned. Since pleasure depends for its adequate production upon wealth, it follows that the flow of wealth from one channel to another must have a very important bearing upon human actions. As we have already seen, wherever wealth is

abundant, men act in a different way from that in which they act when it is scarce. In poverty acts are seen to be performed under the pressure of circumstances independent of the will and under non-pleasurable conditions. There is a lowering of vascular tone; often cutaneous, renal, cardiac and mental diseases are superinduced by the anxieties experienced; the vitalising influence of hygienic pleasure is absent and the poor man leads the existence of an animal in a barren country whose life is a constant search for food. It is true that by privation, many of the benefits considered necessary during prosperity, almost cease to be desired owing to their remoteness from attainment and the acts are directed only towards aims which, to prosperous men, appear beneath consideration. There is a diminution in the variety of action caused by the limitation of the scope of life where the gold-flow is deficient and a corresponding increase where it is abundant.

Again, as the advantages obtainable by wealth increase in number, there is a tendency to sacrifice the most fundamental principles of morality to the attainment of the medium to which the progress of the arts and sciences has given so wide a range of potentiality and hence there are not wanting instances of traffic and compromise, especially among those who are considered to lead society, which, extending to the lower ranks according to the law of imitation, must be the cause of social disorganisation. It has become difficult to measure the range of pleasurable attainment, commencing with the few and inferior enjoyments within the reach of the poor and culminating in the multitudinously varied pleasures obtainable by the rich, and it is still more difficult to foresee the limit to that range.

Conduct is greatly affected by the possession or non-possession of property and as we have seen that the primary distinction between the rich and the poor from a moral point of view lies in the fact that the former, by reason of the conditions of their existence and of their superior education are much less in danger of committing criminal acts than the poor and that the rich possess a potentiality for good which the poor do not possess, it appears that property must be regarded as an important

factor of right action. And if this be the case, then the manner in which property is manipulated, distributed or preserved must be of the greatest moment to society and a large share of social responsibility must be incurred by those who manipulate, distribute or preserve it. In each community there are certain persons to whom the management of the property of others is entrusted by reason of their office or profession and as such persons have in their hands, in a considerable measure, the happiness or misery of others, it is evident that their actions are of especial significance morally and socially. Thus statesmen who expend the public money in imprudent enterprises to gratify undue pride of nationality and who increase taxation in consequence; as well as municipalities who in their rivalry with other municipalities cast undue burdens upon the tax-payers, incur an equal if not a greater responsibility. Similarly persons entrusted with the property of others have it in their power to ensure or to destroy the happiness of those whose property they guard and are therefore in positions where great moral or immoral conduct may be displayed.

The many and increasing achievements of the arts and industries which have as their object the production of appliances of whatsoever nature for the comfort and well-being of the public, augment the quality of human pleasure and tend to increase the competition for it which is so general that idealisms or altruistic occupations that are not the immediate and visible means of promoting pleasure, are much disparaged, except by the more thoughtful few for whom, however, they may themselves constitute pleasure. For in whatever light human actions are viewed, sense or intellectual gratification, in one form or another, is always seen to be the ultimate end towards which all conduct converges.

It is certain that no other reason can validly be maintained for introducing children into the world than the chance of pleasurable life. The pains of disease and death are positive and the only compensation possible is happiness. When the advances of science together with the enactments of legislators have made the life of this planet free from the dangers to health which are still encountered, when every member of the community possesses

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an adequate knowledge of the construction and functions of the human body and of hygienic laws and not only possesses the knowledge of such laws, but is willing to observe them, then it may be possible to reach a state in which the non-pleasure caused by disease will be eliminated, provided that a parallel improvement in the distribution of wealth occur. For it is evident that hygienic perfection would be impossible of general realisation without economic perfection. The combination of perfect general health and perfect general sustenance must, if accompanied by a perfection in the ethics of sexual and social relations bring about a happier and a longer period of individual existence and human motives must and do tend towards that end. The obstacles to its attainments are, the ignorance of natural and social laws and the maintenance of superstitions which tend to contradict those laws. If men act with the object of procuring happiness and yet maintain a mass of traditions and misconceptions, such for instance, as an irresponsible production of offspring sanctioned by an injunction to Jewish tribes 2000 years ago, or if, in spite of the pronouncements of medical science, they persist in habitually absorbing the poison of alcohol, then it is clear that they will not attain to an efficient state of permanent happiness. Signs are not wanting, even in the countries most oppressed by tradition that a realisation of these facts has begun, but unfortunately many retrogressions are to be anticipated on the road which must be taken. From time to time men will revert to the ancient ignorance, the more so as those whose occupation it is to maintain that ignorance, make the most strenuous efforts to resist the introduction of the new order of things. There is pleasure doubtless to be derived from these ancient conceptions themselves, but it is not capable of developing beyond the limits of its circumscription. The higher animal, man, exists upon a planet of the solar system for the visible objects of sustaining an organism in need of recuperating the energy which it is constantly losing through the combustion of the nutriment it absorbs and for that of procuring to its nervous structures certain vibratory movements that carry to consciousness, sensations which when not too frequently or too violently produced are of a stimulating and generally healthy

nature. Whenever men are pursuing the normal course of life and are not strongly under the influence of those emotions which impair the reasoning faculty, they are engaged in the pursuit of one or other of these aims and even the improbable discovery of an ultimate purpose for which men should strive, could not appreciably alter the primary objects of their conduct. Men cannot move outside the sphere of their physical condition and although they may hope to improve it, to render it in more complete harmony with nature through the knowledge of natural phenomena which they acquire by their industry, there must always be a subservience of men to their necessities and propensities. It must here be admitted, however, that in addition to all pleasurable incentives to existence which influence conduct, including that of the possession and contemplation of offspring, it is highly probable that there is a desire or instinct of racial continuation inherent in the human species and independent of sexual considerations, and that this desire or instinct is in itself an end with a distinct bearing on conduct. It is not alone the attraction of the sexes which causes the complex behaviour of lovers. There is, in the majority of men and women, from adolescence to maturity, a half realised but persistent genetic impulse which although running generally parallel with the sex impulse may, under certain conditions, dictate conduct of a special nature, as when a man for the purpose of continuing his family line, threatened with extinction, allies himself to a woman for whom he has no affinity. It is known that celibates experience a sense of limitation, that they are conscious of regret for wasted function and for these reasons it seems that this genetic duty must be considered as a separate purpose of existence, apart from the hedonistic aims of life. The desire to fulfil this duty, however, appears to depend upon the maintenance of the pleasure of living, for in suffering or in mental depression, it is almost completely absent. We are therefore brought to the conclusion that if pleasure be not the sole end of life, it is at least the end upon the attainment of which any other possible ends depend. It is probable that if all men were asked whether or no they desired the continuation of the race, those would reply in the affirm-

mative who led pleasurable lives while those who led non-pleasurable existences would either answer in the negative or assert indifference; although most men, except under great distress would be unwilling to advocate the self-suppression of the species and there is no reason to suppose that there will ever be any general desire for annihilation so long as the earth maintains the position which it now occupies in space and residence upon this planet is rendered physically tolerable by reason of the suitability of atmospheric conditions to the human organism. The human mind is disturbed by the thought of a world in which human life had ceased to exist, a world which, as it is at present constituted, does not appear capable of evolving the race of man and unless by some inconceivable arrest of progress due to a general corruption of conduct, and a downfall of all principles of social relationship, it cannot be held that there is any danger of the rise of an anti-racial feeling. Hitherto amongst the nations of Europe, perpetuation has been considered as a national duty, especially after disasters in war and undoubtedly, at such times, there has been a definite and conscious purpose added to the conscious purposes of life which we have just examined. In order to be successful in war and to be in a position of superior strength in respect of neighbours, national fecundity is essential. Without it, the pleasure of national self-love is liable to be destroyed and the pain of subjection endured. The conditions would be changed, however, if peace were assured, as it must eventually be, amongst the nations of Europe. Then, the purpose of excessive procreation would cease and there might result a smaller disproportion between birth-rate and national resources which must have the effect of increasing the happiness of society generally, in spite of certain neuronc disorders which, in some cases, might be produced. Conduct must always depend upon the choice of the pleasures chosen as inducements to exist. It may seem to one generation that certain gratifications are superior to others, and errors may be made that may have the effect of retarding the formation of a perfect social system which can only be attained by the selection of pleasures, the pursuit and enjoyment of which are opposed to no law of physical or

mental development. The results of the choice made cannot, it is true, always be foreseen; but as knowledge advances and the relations between cause and effect in social and hygienic science are better known, greater accuracy in the process of selection will be obtained.

It is plain that universality of pleasurable life cannot be reached without a disappearance of crime or more correctly of that crime which is committed under the influence of criminal heredity or under pressure of want. We have seen that the latter cause of crime is predominant and therefore the attainment of the pleasurable life which, if none of the obstacles below enumerated intervene, humanity appears destined to develop, depends more upon the adjustment of economic conditions than upon other considerations. Men do not take pleasure in committing crime. There is an enormous balance of preference in favour of a social mode of life. Those who act criminally share that preference in the majority of cases, only a combination of circumstances of birth, education, environment and opportunity, in which accident plays an important part, has directed them towards conduct, the effect of which is to render repetition apparently unavoidable, if life is to be sustained.

But as a man with no criminal heredity may become criminal through lack of food and may originate a criminal heredity, it is clear that one of the first means of destroying crime is the more equal distribution of wealth and although, in such a case there might still be criminals from greed or the desire of additional pleasure, yet their number would be greatly diminished. They would probably disappear as the methods of detecting and preventing crime became more scientific. Under the present conditions, however, we have the evidence of statistics to show that crimes due to cupidity tend to increase and to become more skilful and so long as envy is excited by the display of unbounded luxury, there seems no prospect of their diminution. Crimes due to impediments to the gratification of sex instincts must become rarer as pleasurable emotions multiply and compete with those of sex. With the increase of cupidity such crimes tend to merge into crimes of property. With a more rational conception of existence than that which has

hitherto been manifested by poets and other idealists, they will also tend to decline, but considering the influence upon the reason of the psychological phenomena which accompany the relations of the sexes, it is not to be foreseen that they will ever be non-existent.

The tendency of conduct is not towards crime which being anti-social renders those who resort to it liable to the penalty of exclusion from all except the criminal classes. As the quest for pleasure increases, however, there is a tendency to substitute for crimes of violence, devices and stratagems which although incompatible with rectitude or justice, are nevertheless not classed as crimes and do not carry with them social degradation, although they are frequently the means of inflicting extreme suffering upon great numbers. In all societies which place luxury as the highest standard of attainment there must, it seems, be equivocal dealing on the part of some, but there must also be an effort of the majority towards a suppression of such dealing, the extension of which would evidently be destructive of the trust without which a pleasurable organisation of society cannot be maintained. Under abnormal circumstances, all the motives with the exception of sympathy lead to crime which is a deviation of conduct from its normal course. In pursuit of sustenance, under the influence of sex, in obedience to a form of self-love, violence is manifested which frequently results in the negation of human purpose, and as long as the character of human motives remains such as it has hitherto been, that is to say as long as men are not prevented from committing premeditated criminal acts by a sense of social obligation, until men who when afforded an opportunity by circumstances of committing a crime, the effect of which would procure them a great increase of pleasure, abstain from such a crime in obedience to such an inhibition, no abatement of these deviated actions can be produced. There are signs, however, that society in its own interest is gradually evolving the will to abstain, but this will can only be formed by a co-operation of many forces and its formation will probably be slow. In order that men should find a reason for abstention from crime, it is necessary that social and moral science, free from all connection with religion, should have a far greater place

in education than it has at present, that primary education should include an efficient instruction in the philosophy of history, in physiology and in natural science, so that men should cease to conceive the possibility of altering, by their own acts, the order prescribed by nature. When men have understood that the process of their minds is reflected in the living matter of the germ-plasm and that thereby the mental conditions of their offspring are affected, it is possible that they may eventually reach a stage in which they will abstain from evil acts the tendency to which is transmissible to offspring. But it cannot be too often said that the ground to be traversed before this will of abstention is produced is of vast extent. How long it may be possible for the neighbour to conceive crime and to carry his conception into execution, in the absence of the enlightenment above alluded to, the future alone can tell. The criminal reports of most nations do not suggest that crime tends sensibly to diminish, although the fact that the majority of crimes are committed by the most ignorant, shows that the argument in favour of higher general enlightenment, as a deterrent to crime, is valid. Wealth as a means of procuring education and the alleviation of most physical and mental distress or comfort, does raise its possessor above the level of criminal propensity and therefore unless the State provides *efficient* education gratuitously, the possession of a certain amount of wealth or what is the same thing, of property, would appear to be the most effectual safeguard against criminal tendencies. It seems probable, however, that wealth will never be sufficiently equally distributed to place more than a minority in the category of those who do not experience such tendencies owing to want. Abstention from intoxicants and from the immoderate consumption of animal food which may be expected to result from such education must have a great anti-criminal effect. The mental being largely dependent on the bodily state, violent impulsions are less easily produced where a calm temperament is maintained by alimentary sobriety, than where excitants are immoderately absorbed.

It may now be enquired whether conduct tends to become more sympathetic or whether it inclines towards that indifference of which signs are often apparent. Now

men do commonly perform acts which may be termed sympathetic, so long as that term excludes the idea of sacrifice, but it is certain that the instances in which they undergo privation or suffering for others must be described as rare. It was observed in the chapter on sympathy, that sympathetic motives are seldom free from an admixture of self-love or interest and there does not seem much reason to suppose that they will ever be entirely unalloyed. Although it is evident that a great many men who are daily assisted, might be left to perish in want or in disease without any appreciable loss to the community, and in some cases to its distinctive gain, yet the practise of suppressing, or of allowing to be suppressed, all the weak or the unfit, according to the example which is set to some extent by nature, is a practise from which the majority of men prefer to abstain, realising that the human condition being one of constant change, no man is totally immune from disease or from misfortune. It is this realisation, helped especially at its origin by the charitable injunctions of the religions, which has been mainly instrumental in building up the spirit of human preservation that has been variously designated as altruism, neighbourly love and charity. If any such sentiments existed in a pure condition, we should see them manifested in the practical form of regard for the *needs* of the neighbour in the obtainment of benefits of whatsoever nature. Instead of this, we perceive that in the relentless competition for advantage or pre-eminence in which men are constantly engaged, each individual or group endeavours to wrest from competitors the utmost share of such advantage without considering the effect that his or their acquisitiveness may have by reason of the deprivation or injury sustained by the less able or less fortunate competitors. It is true that the very successful sometimes restore to the community a portion of the possessions acquired, in obedience to the complex impulse previously discussed, but it is probably seldom that the benefits bestowed are equivalent to the deprivation caused, and in any case the sufferers from the one are seldom the recipients of the other. Hitherto legislation has been directed entirely in favour of the successful competitor and even of depriving the

unsuccessful of the common needs of life, on the principle that the benefits which the world offers, although limited in extent, are prizes which may be cumulatively won. And while various attempts have been made from time to time, formerly by revolutionary means, now by electoral methods, to cause legislation to take more equalising measures, and while the knowledge of the interdependence of men in society has continued to grow and philanthropic institutions have increased, there yet remains so great a desire for monopoly that neither legislation nor philanthropy has been able to effect any important change in the distribution of advantages. Nevertheless the realisation has begun that there are reasons of sufficient practical weight for an extension of sympathy or consideration for the needs of others in the work, both political and philanthropic, which has been commenced and which must, unless an improbable interruption intervene, follow a normal course of development. Already those who are born in poverty are supplied by society with gratuitous primary education and with free scientific treatment in disease and under the present system, they tend, when particularly gifted, to rise and to become themselves the exponents of ideas which are contrary to the interests of their original class. For the desire of pleasure is so intense in the majority of men that those who accede to wealth act, with few exceptions, in the manner of those who have been always rich.

The increase of regard for the condition of the neighbour and the decline of the indifference which, in spite of the altruistic tendencies above alluded to, is still prevalent, is chiefly a question of time, but the duration of such time must depend upon the rate of the progress made in the realisation of the necessity of a more equal distribution of benefit. Until individuals have become convinced that instead of making of their existence a state in which humanly inflicted suffering is imminent, they would derive more pleasure from it by converting it into a condition of mutual confidence in which the intensity of the labour for sustenance was diminished and the cause of disease, anxiety of mind, against which medical science is powerless, was removed, there is little reason to believe

that the rate of progress will be other than extremely slow. Automatically, no doubt, benevolent institutions tend to develop and to attain the proportions needed for the production of a certain degree of happiness, but the period required before general happiness could be secured by such means would seem to be incommensurable.

Neither can personal example be relied upon to accomplish much. There have appeared and do still appear, a limited number of men who have laboured and do labour to increase the happiness of the world from purely unselfish motives, for the sake of an ideal conception of good, but the self-denial which they have been generally seen to practise, has not found many imitators and the religions, notwithstanding their altruistic precepts, have only succeeded in slightly assisting the cause of social amelioration. Individualism, the principle by which each man labours for himself alone, is still the chief rule of existence and it does not seem that the rule is likely to be abrogated until men have become convinced that in working for others, they are working for themselves. However desirable it might be to take a higher view of life, the aspect of life as it is lived naturally leads to the conclusion that men do not really desire the welfare of their neighbours if that welfare in any way deprives them of accustomed pleasure. The attitude of the majority is indifference tempered by a small quantum of sympathy, due to a more or less dim realisation of its necessity as a factor of existence.

It is possible that human development consists of three phases: the antagonistic, the neutral and the sympathetic. The first would have already passed or nearly passed, the second would be that of the present time and the third would be the future in which the discords of social life would cease to exist and the greatest sum of happiness obtainable would be acquired. But this, especially as regards the last phase, is hypothesis; for as before observed, evils might result from the abuse of the pleasure sense and the deviation of the pleasure quest from the rational to the irrational which might result in social decrepitude and death.

It seems more probable, however, that society is moving towards a state in which the progress of all the arts must

lead to perfection in the art of life. All the sciences tend to improve the adaptation of the human organism to the conditions of the world's life. Not only is disease cured more successfully each decade, but its outbreak is more skilfully averted. Much of the wearisome labour of previous periods is rendered unnecessary by mechanical appliances. The duties of the household are made lighter by similar means. Thought can be transmitted in a few minutes from one hemisphere to another and in the chief centres it is possible to learn much concerning the simultaneous actions of men throughout the world. Journeys are made more easily, rapidly and cheaply. The dress of both men and women tends to become more rational. The salubrity of cities continues to increase. Holidays are more frequent. Generally men are placed by circumstance in the position favourable to healthy and pleasurable life. All these factors are as spokes in a wheel, the axis of which is the perfect social life and the faulty spoke of which is sympathy. Unfortunately it is this member of the wheel of life which is the most difficult to perfect and hence we see society still engaged in the work of forging its own miseries; each individual forcing his own claims by means of threats and retaliation, and seeking to monopolise the benefits provided by the earth and human labour.

The most favoured by birth and fortune, those whose example is followed and who have consequently the greatest influence for good are not generally seen to set any example beyond that afforded by the outward observance of the conventional rules of right and as society is constituted, there is little doubt that the advance towards social perfection would be more quickly made were it headed by these favoured classes. Signs, however, appear to indicate that if the example does not come from above, it will ultimately proceed from below. When the education of the poorer classes equals that of the richer, or as nearly as possible equals it, the power of precept may belong to whichever class has become the most sympathetic.

Before any important progress can be made however, it must cease to be thought that much of the moral obliquity which is considered characteristic of what is termed

human nature, is essentially inherent in it and ineradicable. It must cease to be held as a dogma that men must of their very nature, continually evince cruelty, hatred, malice, malignant joy and the other defects by which the harmony of social life is disturbed. These moral maladies are not more ineradicable than the organic diseases of the race, only the progress made in the cure of the one, is not commensurate with that made in the cure of the other and the old theological notion of the principle of evil at the side of the principle of good, derived from the early fabulous religions of the East, has had the effect of supporting the view that men as a race cannot hope to attain to moral perfection. Hence much conduct of an anti-social character is considered natural which is the cause of considerable suffering.

But we have seen that most of moral maladies are due either to deviations from fundamental motives or to obstacles to their pursuit and that such obstacles and such deviations have produced defects in the relations of men to their surroundings. If this be so, these defects are susceptible of amelioration as the laws of just apportionment and prudential living are discovered and observed. Men will always be moved by the five principal motives here discussed, but it is highly probable that the manner in which these motives are pursued, will increase in social efficiency in direct proportion to the general progress of the race. For it is evident that when sound hygienic principles both of mind and body have been taught and learned and hygienic living has become the common aim, when the claims of the various human families to the possession of the earth's surface have been founded on principles of general justice; when a real desire and endeavour for mutual aid have become prevalent; the deviations from the normal course of motives will tend to diminish and to disappear and human conduct will make directly for the pleasurable end which it is probably destined to attain.

2. THE LIMITATION OF PLEASURE

Pleasure being physiologically a series of nerve vibrations, and nerve vibrations being only producible to a limited extent without injury to the organism, it follows that an

excess of pleasure defeats the pleasure aim and results in disintegration. Thus it is necessary to enquire what are the boundaries beyond which pleasure becomes physically and socially harmful to the race.

Harmful or illegitimate pleasure may broadly be defined as that which impedes the progress of moral and social development and the general welfare of the race. It may be of two kinds, that is: prejudicial to the mind or body of the individual who experiences it, and prejudicial to the welfare and progress of the race. The former class includes all those pleasurable stimulations of the senses by over indulgence of appetites which impair any one of the normal functions of the body and tend to shorten life; the latter are those pleasurable experiences which although not prejudicial to the health or longevity of individuals, yet by reason of their too constant indulgence, occupy the time of life to the exclusion of the vital interests and the necessary labour of existence, or which by reason of their exclusive or luxurious character, excite envy or lead to emulative conduct morally or socially unsound, for the obtainment of similar enjoyment.

Insomuch as it is generally agreed that human life is to be preserved by all human means, each individual is held to be of value to society, and if this be the case, then it is plain that all men who, by pleasurable excesses injure their own bodies, are injuring the general interests of society and that the pleasure they derive from doing so is illegitimate. Consequently that man who indulges in alcoholic, gastronomic or sexual excesses does that which is socially illegitimate. This is the conclusion which must be reached if the argument of intrinsic worth, supported by the incessant efforts which are made to secure the lives of the greatest possible number of the community, be sustained. This conclusion, however, fails to provide a sufficient reason for restraint from excess of pleasure, because it is seen that together with the solicitude for life there is also evinced an indifference to life, as well as a belief that every individual has an undeniable right to treat his body as he wills. Thus only the more thoughtful persons are influenced by the conception of restraint as a duty to society and the limits of

social expediency in pleasure are frequently overreached—in the poorer classes by destructive insobriety, in the richer by over stimulation of the senses.

In order that the necessity for limiting pleasure be recognised, educators, as we have seen, must not only teach as subjects of primary instruction the physiology of the body, the functions of its nerve systems, the effect upon the organism of poisons and the fundamental laws of hygiene, but they must also demonstrate all the consequences physical and social resulting from infringement of any of the laws of nature. Until the desire of prudential conduct in the interests of the race be experienced, such methods are alone capable of confining pleasure within those limits which favour the health of communities and the progress of the race towards a degree of perfection which it can never reach so long as large numbers of men remain ignorant of or imperfectly acquainted with the laws of somatic government and of natural phenomena or so long as, when versed in them, they are ignorant of or indifferent to their social significance. When the acknowledgment is made that pleasure and the refinement of pleasure are the ostensible end of life, then the methods by which pleasure may be made as perfect, as innocuous and as universal as possible will be adequately studied. It will be discovered that because pleasure to be experienced generally requires that some should toil in order that others should enjoy, is of the nature of an injustice, it is necessary that that conduct should be considered moral and social which tends to distribute pleasure, and anti-moral or anti-social that which is designed to monopolise it. But how is the distribution to be effected? Must those who possess the means of procuring the most exquisite enjoyment, seldom indulge in such enjoyment so that those who are less fortunate should obtain a share, or are such pleasures to be prohibited by opinion until by the progress of society in that direction, they have become the privilege of all? It is evident that unless refined pleasure be pronounced to be immoral which would be a condemnation of the human aim, the indulgence of the most refined pleasure when innocuous cannot be prohibited by opinion, for it is only a foretaste of that to which the race wishes to attain

generally and permanently, and it therefore seems that the possessors of the means of such pleasure are required to perform the task of dissemination which the dissemination of wealth enables them to attempt. The man who, possessing a beautiful park, instead of reserving it for his exclusive enjoyment, allows the public access to it, distributes refined pleasure and sets an example which if generally followed would greatly aid in hastening the attainment of the human end. Whoever helps to extend the limits of hygienic pleasure, not only performs a service to the race, but also inculcates the principle of self-limitation which is essential to human perfection. Such men appear to perceive the interdependence of society and to be aware that the unhappiness of one section of the community must tend to impair the felicity of the other and that in acting as they do, they are contributing to an increase of pleasurable conditions the effect of which they not only experience in their own lifetimes, but which they may hope will be experienced, in a still greater degree, by their descendants. Therefore although their motives are dictated by interest, the interest is of so high a quality that it may be considered as equivalent to sympathy even in the ancient sense of the word. The superiority of this form of beneficial conduct is that it is a product of the reasoning faculty free from transcendental factors. As we have seen, pleasure is as invigorating in moderation as it is destructive in excess. The true skill of life consists in discovering the boundary at which, ceasing to be healthful, it becomes noxious, and in maintaining pleasurable aims below that limit.

If the world's inhabitants, by the invention of mechanical appliances and the discovery of other and more concentrated forms of food than those now used, so greatly removed the necessity of labour for the maintenance of life that only a few need work so that many might enjoy, and if we also suppose that the many, the non-workers thus freed from toil by the ingenuity and wisdom of their forefathers, gave themselves up exclusively to pleasure, it is probable that after a space of time the only men remaining who would be capable of experiencing pleasure would be those who had laboured for the pleasure of their fellow-men. The former category having ceased to labour,

would be dependent for the invention of new pleasures upon the workers who might prove unequal to the task and then there might result a temporary cessation of sense-gratification and a general return to labour for the production of fresh sources of enjoyment.

It does not seem that pleasure will ever be totally free from effort. Sports, pastimes, ceremonies, exercise, all require a certain energy both physical and mental and those who do not display that energy are forced to be content with a restricted number of pleasures which may eventually become distasteful through too frequent repetition. Lethargy in pleasure induces injury to health. A man whose favourite pleasure and constant practise was lying in bed would lose the use of his limbs and unless great precautions were taken, his body would become sore. His pleasure would be converted into pain. The energy of pleasure when maintained within the bounds of health and social expediency is essential to the well-being of the race and to the attainment of its pleasurable goal, for when this moderated energy is absent, there is a relapse to non-pleasurable conditions.

Thus while pleasure is both the result of labour and the cause of labour, its maintenance is conditional upon its restriction within limits the dimensions of which society is capable of ascertaining. A healthy society will remain within those limits, an unhealthy one will pass outside of them, and wherever the infringement takes place, there will be an arrest of social progress and a danger of dissolution. Finally, society must continue to strive to enjoy and must endeavour to enjoy while striving.

3. OBSTACLES TO PLEASURE

Obstacles to pleasure are created by individuals in the pursuit of the motives of existence and whatever actions result or tend to result in the unjust infliction of suffering, constitute such obstacles. We have seen that immoral and anti-social acts are committed in the quest of sustenance and pleasure in one or another of their forms and that these acts constitute that source of non-pleasurable sensation, due to human agency, which is equivalent to moral or social evil or to the principle of such evil as

experience has shown such a principle to exist in the relations between man and man, and they include the whole range of human delinquency. It has been already shown that decrease of crime depends largely upon the equitable distribution of sustenance and upon abstention from excitants and there can be little doubt that if education increase in scope and value, crimes of violence will tend to diminish and to disappear. Even under the present conditions the pain which they inflict, in consequence of their comparative rarity, is only experienced by an exceedingly small minority, and it has, therefore, only a limited effect upon general happiness. The punishment, moreover, which it brings upon perpetrators is so severe, that in the absence of a more efficient deterrent, fear may be relied upon to restrain crime.

The case is very different as regards the suffering imposed by individuals upon individuals owing to which, conduct which though not against the laws and not always contrary to expressed opinion, is yet destructive of general happiness. The gravity of the danger which threatens the course of social perfection from this source is the greater because it is not commonly recognised. It is not held to be particularly blameable to inflict acute mental suffering by evincing unwarranted contempt or scorn, any more than it is deemed reprehensible to endeavour, in the struggle for sustenance, to impoverish the competitor by the use of stratagem. Those who commit either of these social faults do not stop to consider that by either course they are acting in a manner which is apt to convert well-disposed members of society into ill-disposed and that the ill-disposed are the most ready to become rebels, both against the laws and against the rules which society maintains, and as rebels, to disturb social order or to inflict pain. If any man wilfully suppresses a competitor under pretext of eliminating the "unfit" individual, he is proclaiming a principle which is destructive of general happiness. If he argue that happiness cannot be obtained as long as the unfit exist, he is tacitly admitting or recognising a standard of fitness, the requirements of which he may, at some period of his career, be unable to fulfil and which may also be superseded by a superior standard. If he cite

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instances of such action in the animal world and draw inferences therefrom as to the design of nature, he will not be in accordance with reality if he neglect to cite those almost equally numerous phases of animal life where such suppressions are absent.

But in any case, what proof is there that man, even if issued from an animal ancestry is destined by the nature of his condition to continue to act after the manner of such ancestry? Is not the fact that he possesses reasoning faculties vastly superior to those of the higher animals sufficient to make it clear that he may lay claim to a different social conduct? Civilisation, although it has at times used this process of elimination, has by no means made it a constant rule; otherwise, instead of adopting measures to preserve *all* life as it does at present, it would have applied the method of Plato and suppressed all weakness at its origin or birth. This it has not done, partly perhaps because it has begun to realise that just as the long discarded residue of pitch-blend contained the unsuspected radium bromide, so the apparently worthless member of society may have an unascertained social value, partly because there is a sentiment of charity due to a recognition of its necessity as a kind of prospective pity for self under similar conditions and also to the religious charitable inculcations of ages. For these reasons, the suppression of the unsuccessful by the successful which in most, though by no means in all cases, means the suppression of the least skilful by the most skilful, is not carried out to its logical conclusion and a measure of mercy, too frequently accompanied by a measure of contempt, is extended to those who fail in the life struggle.

If universal pleasure be the end for which men should strive, and the tendency of achievement is to inflict suffering upon great numbers who have no means of raising themselves to the level of pleasurable life, then it is contrary to such an end, understood in a general sense, the more so as animosity and the disorders which result from it, are undoubtedly produced. If it were sustained that the efforts necessary to progress are stimulated or maintained by this attitude of the more favoured, then would this not be equivalent to saying that pleasure must

remain the privilege of the few; that it cannot become universal? Such a doctrine is defended by many, but it cannot be harmonised with any system of general justice. It is true that the inferiors sometimes rise to be superiors, but the number of the former is small compared with that of those who remain in the hinterland of life.

Pride of achievement will continue to breed contempt for failure until the necessity for the generalisation of pleasure is recognised, if it is ever destined to be recognised and until the means are discovered of affecting this generalisation without arresting that portion of progress which is conducive to human happiness. It may be asked whether there really exists a depreciation of the non-eminent or not rich and the answer in the affirmative must, of course, rest upon personal experience, but it does not seem possible to study the behaviour of the classes without becoming convinced that a continual sorting is taking place which has for its object the exclusion of individuals from all social intercourse with those whom they do not equal either in wealth, celebrity or intellect. Many persons, indeed, are so accustomed to form estimates, that on the slightest indications they judge with a great degree of accuracy, the social value of those they meet. The standard which they apply, however, is a purely conventional one and they are in danger of overlooking exceptions to the convention as well as of overrating its value which is what usually occurs.

It is true that many offices can only, with safety to society, be entrusted to those who prove their ability to fill them, and that such persons must tend to develop a certain pride of attainment, but it is also true that in the society of such persons are to be found many who have no such proved abilities, who frequently have little moral worth, but who are possessed of ample material means. And yet both form the upper social strata in which the pride of achievement and possession is maintained as well as the distrust of the less favoured. Finally, it may be said that whatever practise tends to make one section of the community view the other as an assemblage of human beings with whom it can have nothing in common, from whom it is separated by the most formidable barriers, is

prejudicial to the spread of pleasurable conditions. It is asserted by many that human circumstance is such that there must always exist a class condemned to experience a minimum of pleasurable sensations in order that others may enjoy a maximum, but few proofs are advanced of such a contention beyond those which are afforded by history. Proofs derived from history, however, in the obtainment of which history is not carefully divided into the pre-scientific and the scientific periods, are of their nature imperfect. What men did or could do in the art of living, let us say before the eighteenth century, bears a very small proportion to what they can achieve since that period. The poorer classes, better educated and more highly remunerated for labour, more habituated to commodious conditions of existence by the benefits of industrial progress, are gradually becoming less separated from the richer in the manner of existence, and it is probable that if the birth-rate among them descends to the level of the richer classes, the services which they render will tend to be more highly remunerated by reason of their greater scarcity.

There are forces at work, political and social, the resultant of which must be an amelioration of the condition of these poorer classes and a greater share of happiness consequent on a greater share of possessions. The state most favourable to social harmony is probably one in which all the community perform a share of labour, but a share in strict proportion to real needs.

The suspicion and distrust which are still apparent in our civilization and which are survivals of the primitive fear of the neighbour, are not less important obstacles to harmony. It appears undeniable that men do commonly lack confidence in each other and that they only acquire confidence when proofs of trustworthiness, the most convincing of which are possessions, are abundantly produced. There is mistrust between the parties in matrimony, between the sexes in courtship, between master and servant, between fellow travellers and between the majority of those who have monetary transactions together. Notwithstanding this, the need for confidence as a factor of civilized life is so strongly felt, that we see it frequently extended to persons who are unworthy of it,

but who maintain the outward appearance of excessive wealth or exceptional ability. Society seems to recognise that it would work much more efficiently if trust could be generally reposed, but owing to an imperfect power of discrimination, there has been developed a nervous apprehension of deception which greatly retards the attainment of a pleasurable state. The assumption is that no man who is not known to be in the habit of acting fairly, is to be trusted and it is also frequently assumed that many men known to so act, are only reliable because there exist laws of which they are in fear. There is thus a general admission that evil is in existence largely in the life of the community as well as a general tendency to suspect its presence in all exceptional conduct.

It may undoubtedly be urged that if men were not suspicious, the worthy would be continually deceived by the unworthy, and to a considerable extent such is the case. A certain measure of caution is needful to protect the just from the unjust, but that measure is continually exceeded and replaced by an unwholesome suspiciousness which complicates or impedes social relations.

It should be realised that the machinery of life is made for the use of the honest, that it can only be misused by the dishonest at the greatest risk and that as right conduct, under these conditions, must tend to be the rule of the majority, the chances of the manifestation of wrong conduct are not great enough to warrant a constant apprehension of it. But society has developed, or it would be more correct to say preserved, an aversion to the modern prototype of the man who, in the tribal system, offended against the tribal rules and incurred the punishment of expulsion from the tribe. Certain nervous effects are produced by this aversion and an instinctive shrinking from the real or supposed wrong-doer, however much he may prove his intention to reform, or however good his conduct. It must also be remembered that trust engenders trust, just as suspicion engenders suspicion and that while the former promotes harmony, the latter impedes it. Is it not worth risking the chance of an occasional abuse of confidence to aid the establishment of a more perfect system of living than that which is practised under the régime of mistrust? It seems so.

In commercial transactions trust is found to be a practical necessity. If none were extended, a vast amount of time and labour would be lost in precautionary measures and the flow of trade would be considerably checked. Measures of surveillance are also found to be costly in trade and are not generally used even in banking transactions when the temptations to which employers are subjected, are extremely great. For the rest, there can be little doubt that extreme suspicion is indicative, to a certain extent, of a tendency to wrong conduct on the part of the suspicious. It is observed that persons of great moral rectitude are much less suspicious than those who possess propensities to moral laxity. As the latter are inclined to act, or as they sometimes act, they conclude others are equally if not more ready to act and hence they conceive a greater suspicion of their neighbour. Exceptions to this class are to be found in persons of wide experience and knowledge who, although incapable of wrong-doing, have nevertheless observed sufficient wrong conduct in the world to be somewhat apprehensive of its appearance in their midst. Such persons, however, generally possess sufficient acumen to enable them to detect truth from falsehood and sufficient magnanimity to cause them to abstain from the condemnations which those pronounce who are insufficiently acquainted with the origin and course of human conduct. In countries which maintain a high standard of integrity, suspicion, leading to aspersion is of greater gravity than in those where the standard is lower and it is therefore essential that in the former countries, the degree of trust should be greater than in the latter. This is what generally occurs, but there is nevertheless in the countries of high moral pretensions a certain tendency to gratify revenge by inflicting the social degradation to which suspected persons are liable. Finally, as an obstacle to social progress, suspicion is an evil of great magnitude. Wherever it exists, the perfection of the pleasurable conditions of life cannot be successfully pursued.

An obstacle to pleasure is observable in the faulty relations of the sexes in the married state. As the great majority of men and women live together in matrimony it follows that any defect in the practise of so general a

system must cause a diminution of general happiness proportionate to that defect. That the defect exists is proved by the separations of married persons which are witnessed, but the extent to which it exists is not determinable with any degree of certainty owing to the reticence in this respect which is evinced. It is certain, however that much unhappiness is caused by the deficient conduct of married persons which might be avoided if the sexes possessed a better, a more perfect knowledge of each other's physical and mental needs than is generally the case and if self-love, stimulated by ancient conceptions, were kept within narrower limits.

Much conduct is dictated by instinct which though in the main conducive to the preservation of the genetic will, is in many respects too roughly and blindly conducive to that end and capable, like all instincts, of being corrected or subdued. It is instinctive to women, even in matrimony to make themselves attractive not only in the eyes of their husbands, but also in those of other men and this instinct, if much yielded to, may have the effect of arousing the passions of such men and leading them to attempt the destruction of the wife's fidelity. It is not unusual, also, that husbands endeavour to find favour with or to excite the love of women other than their wives. Both manifestations are due to the incompatibility of sexual desire with the conditions of monogamy, but both may be and in a great many instances are repressed, though seldom sufficiently to avoid the arousal of jealousy and the infliction of its attendant pain. The difficulty, in respect of such manifestations, is that they are the source of pleasure while their repression is the cause of suffering. Those who conquer these tendencies in order that conjugal felicity may be maintained, are generally rewarded by the comfort which stability of domestic relations affords, but those who give way to them come into conflict with received opinion by acting contrary to established rules and consequently generally suffer. Evidently if monogamy be wrong, their course of action which may be urged to be in accordance with natural impulse may be claimed to be right; but if monogamy be right, and this system has alone appeared adapted to the conditions of Western society, most suited to the

rearing of offspring and to the maintenance of family cohesion; then their action must be regarded as socially wrong. Considering, however, that neither the injustice done to offspring by conjugal infidelity, nor the loss of reputation which is risked, deter men and women from such infidelity, it seems right to conclude that the reform of this source of unhappiness will be slow, especially as it is seen that not even marriages of affinity are always immune from the danger of disruption or disturbance by reason of infidelity. Actual separations, however, may in most cases be averted wherever concessions are made on either side to human impulsions. Ancient prejudices frequently prevent such concessions being made and discord is produced.

The religions, in their classifications of peccancy, have made little or no allowance for physical causes, yet as these causes are productive of certain definable effects in the lives of married persons they cannot be left out of consideration in any system of social ethics. Deviations from the regular course of matrimony are not, however, always due to strong physical impulsions, but are often the effects of a capriciousness which may be corrected as moral and social education advance.

But in order that married persons under the influence of a strong extra-conjugal attraction should submit themselves to such treatment, it is necessary that they should have a sufficient realisation of the social necessity of strictly observed monogamy. This, however, is not often the case and frequent failure of the marriage system results. In this instance again the will to restrain propensities must precede the commencement of reform. The gratification of pleasure without any regard for social expediency is the defect which society must remove before it can obtain even an approximation to its end. But the state of marriage, being the intimate association of two human beings, either member of the union possesses, by reason of its closeness, a considerable power of inflicting mental distress upon the other, owing to unwise or ill-natured speech and by minor acts of tyranny. By such conduct, positive injury to the nervous system is caused, not unfrequently mental malady is produced and not only is great and continued unhappiness

occasioned, but life is undoubtedly shortened. Such practises, although not habitually censured by opinion, are essentially anti-moral and constitute yet another obstacle to pleasurable life. Better moral and social education is the probable remedy for this defect. It must be taught that unless each member of the union consider the peace of mind of the other as placed under his or her especial care, the system of monogamous existence cannot provide the happiness which it is designed to secure.

An impediment to happiness is to be found in the pre-matrimonial unions of the sexes which occur as effects of the sex motive, and although the unhappiness caused by such unions in a monogamous society affects principally and initially only one sex, yet they are often the means of inflicting suffering upon that sex and loss of benefit to offspring whenever they bear fruit. The question was dealt with in the chapter on the sex motive, but it may now be considered in relation to general moral and social considerations. In the early Western civilisations pre-nuptial chastity was required of girls, and bridegrooms were entitled to expect it. Probably because they found that the system conducted to the recognition of paternity and to social stability, the early Jews prescribed it. It was practised in Greece and Rome. It entered into the moral code of the European peoples and it has become one of the canons of their conscience. As it has apparently aided social progress and in general increased the happiness of the nations which have maintained it, it does not seem that it could be replaced without causing injustice towards the young of the female sex and for these reasons it must be considered as generally conducive to the human aim. When, however, the system is infringed, the moral and social fault varies in degree according to circumstances. It is evident that it is great whenever the effect of infringement is to cast upon society either a young mother or a child without means of support, because it tends to force the mother to penury or to promiscuity and to consign the child to a social state often inferior to that of the father. In cases where the father not being a celibate, marriage is impossible, the social fault is greater; but it is still greater when deception of any kind

is practised and the culminating point is reached when violence is used. It should not be forgotten, however, that both men and women when strongly under the influence of the sex motive, are not in possession of their full reasoning faculties and are not able to foresee the consequences of their acts and that when nourished on the stimulating food of European peoples, they are especially liable to experience uncontrollable impulses. Religion has ignored the palliatory character of these psycho-physical effects consistently with its theory of free will, but they undoubtedly go to mitigate, if not to condone, many cases of pre-matrimonial satisfaction of desire. There are cases where an excessive disposition for a conjugal existence on the part of women may occur, yet owing to social prejudice, to material causes or to lack of opportunity, such women do not marry and mental or nervous diseases are brought on which might be cured by union with the other sex. Such women, when they abstain from such unions are undoubtedly victims of the virginal system as well as of certain deficiencies of the social system of their times. It is true, however, that enforced celibacy does not always end in nervous disease. Many celibate women, especially those of calm temperaments, devote their lives to the alleviation of suffering and promote general happiness not altogether without pleasure to themselves.

Again, if society opposes barriers to early marriage while science proves, as it does prove, that such marriage is necessary both to the health and vigour of parents and offspring, society must expect that breaches of chastity will be frequent and endemic and that considerable numbers of the community will be excluded from the pleasure of social approbation. General happiness, however, requires that there should be no such outcast class whose existence is largely the result of conditions for which society is itself responsible and thus there is an opposition between the acts and the interests of society in this respect. In a great many instances the hindrance to early marriage proceeds from prejudices of social status which require the maintenance of a certain traditional scale of comfort or luxury; but it may also proceed from parental interdictions based upon sustentative

motives. Unless such marriages do occur, however, or unless breaches of pre-matrimonial chastity occur, there must continue to be suffering from the repression of natural instincts which is not compatible with a felicitous scheme of life.

Considering all the facts of the case, it seems that there is little prospect that the relations of the sexes can ever be amenable, in their entirety, to rules or laws. The happiness of society must continue to be impaired from the cause above stated, until either science discover some innocuous means whereby natural impulses may be checked, or until early marriage is surrounded by less difficulties than it encounters in the majority of European countries. It seems that society has recognised that the ancient blame attached to prematrimonial intercourse was too severe for such intercourse has ceased to become punishable by law as it was up to the sixteenth century in respect of woman. Opinion has undergone some change in the direction of clemency.

If, as it is logical to conclude, longevity is comprised in the aim of happiness, then it follows that all those effects of the sustentative motive, which tend to impair the health of the community for the benefit of individuals, are obstacles to that aim. Such effects are: (1) the pollution of air and water; (2) the adulteration of food and drink; (3) the overcrowding of dwellings and the creation of noise. Here the sustentative motive takes the form of the private interest to which the lives of individuals and communities are often sacrificed. Any enterprise of a commercial nature which tends to pollute rivers or springs, to sell as potable water that which is not pure, to diffuse into the air of cities smoke charged with carbonic acid or other gas or vapours harmful to the human organism, to sell as food that which is not fresh or pure, that which contains poisons or irritants of any description, to tempt to the consumption of intoxicants, to let as dwellings, houses or portions of houses of insufficient size for human habitation or into which daylight does not sufficiently penetrate and to create noises injurious to the nervous system in any place where men live or assemble, is both immoral and anti-social.

At first sight it would seem that legislation from the

earliest period of legislative history should have taken effective steps to render these pollutions and adulterations impossible, but parliamentary and municipal governments were formed before science had enabled society to adequately distinguish between the pure and the impure. Many things moreover were pure which the growth of population and consequently of cities have rendered impure. Works which were once without the cities, are now within, owing to the extension of the cities. Rivers which were once adequate to sustain the drainage of towns, become inadequate. Food was generally pure before skilful methods of adulteration had been discovered. Respect for property, also has grown into a superstition and legislation is generally unwilling to take the measures of injustice towards individuals which are necessary to secure justice for communities. Abuses tend to be protected which must be removed before a true civilisation can be established. It is the duty of governments to exercise a watchful care over the health of towns and, if necessary, by compulsorily indemnifying the owners of noxious manufactures, to cause the removal of such manufactures to districts set apart for the purpose, as well as to make themselves responsible for the water of the urban populations and the purity of the food-stuffs supplied to the people. Some of these duties are discharged by certain governments, but owing to inherent defects in the system of electoral franchise by which those whose interest it is to maintain the abuses are either legislators or electors, they are generally inadequately performed. Some governments, also, derive a large share of their revenues from the duties which they levy upon alcohol and consequently are not inclined to take active measures for the limitation or suppression of the liquor traffic. This fault was sufficiently great when the properties of alcohol were imperfectly known, but it is much greater now that its general poisonous effects are scientifically established. Apparently if greater economy were practised in the administration of nations, and the exchequers were relieved of the burden of war and preparation for war, such unworthy sources of revenue might be dispensed with, without difficulty. It is almost unnecessary to add that the maintenance of armies, by

reason of the burden which such maintenance places upon the resources of nations, is one of the greatest of all obstacles to happiness. War itself, being the negation of all principle of social harmony must cease to be offensively waged before any claim to civilization, in the true sense of the word, can be established.

CONCLUSIONS II

It is clear that the possibility of pleasure is contingent. In order that pleasure should be experienced, it is necessary that a series of circumstances exist, favourable to its development, the failure of any one of which may invalidate the whole. Over-population might render life too great a burden. Under-population might render it too great a difficulty. Any change of thermal or atmospheric conditions might reduce existence to a state of continual suffering. The attainment of the human end is conditional upon the maintenance of certain relations between man and environment which may or may not be maintained. It is, moreover, conditional upon the soundness of the racial intellect which excessive striving after the perfection of existence might conceivably impair.

Can we assign a term to this attainment? If we consider that in suppressing tyranny, serfdom, wars for royal quarrels, pestilence and general famines: that in caring efficiently for the sick poor and in establishing equality of justice, and security of property, parliamentary régime, urban sanitation, rapid locomotion and general education, all within a period of fifteen centuries, Western society has achieved much for happiness, we may with some reason anticipate that in a similar period it may achieve still more by reducing the subsisting obstacles to social progress; disproportion of wealth distribution, nerve-wearing struggle for sustenance and wealth, the employment of ingenuity in the service of unscrupulous greed, the contempt of poverty and all the ancient sentiments of jealousy, malice, and hatred in the scarcely modified forms they assume at present. If we be pessimists, however, and deem that the ancient sentiments are in-

eradicable and that whatever progress may be effected in social reform, they must still remain endemic in human nature, then the advent of a felicitous age must be indefinitely postponed.

But supposing that an even balance is maintained between man and environment, that the conduct of man should prove to be perfectible, that the human intellect remain sound, that the discords which Metchnikoff alludes to between the nature of human beings and the manner of their nutrition and being, be removed by the diffusion of knowledge; supposing, also, that the state attained were the most pleasurable which humanity can reach; are we to conclude that this stationary state would continue to afford pleasure to man as we now know him, or must we think that it would eventually grow wearisome and thereby cease to be a pleasurable state, or can we conjecture that a new type of humanity would be evolved?

There are few means of answering such questions adequately. It is known that the physical effect of any one pleasure, if too long sustained, is to produce nerve exhaustion, but it is not known what the effect of a general state might be in which all noxious elements had been eliminated and in which social harmony and well-being were complete. It is possible that unless by the time that state was reached, the human race had evolved a type superior to that which we now know, the effect of perfectly harmonious conditions would tend to be destructive to the vigour of existence, but it is also possible that if that type had been evolved, such a state would not only be permanently livable, but would be the justification and reward of human effort.

It is conceivable also that the whole of the general advance in the application of means to ends which we call progress, may be leading to the formation of that superior type and that the germ-plasm is slowly effecting the required change, the desire for the accomplishment of which might be identical with the conscious yearning of humanity for a better state than that which it has hitherto known. The conditions of life have impressed upon the mind the need of ordered conduct and the institution of such conduct has given rise to comparisons.

It has been long seen that the quality of conduct may be improved. There has grown an uneasy consciousness of ethical defect with gradually some realisation of possible improvement and finally the desire for a better terrestrial state has become fixed and independent of religion which places that state in a conjectured second life.

Evidently if we use such terms as superior type, we must endeavour to assign to them some especial meaning. This can only be done hypothetically and although an hypothesis may be built upon certain ascertained facts, it can only have the value of speculation which may or may not be verified by experience. Anthropology has shown that man has not increased in stature in any very remarkable degree and the experience of life proves that his present stature is equal to his needs. Neither is he normally more muscular than any man of whom we have authentic records. The superiority therefore, must be physiological, mental and moral or ethico-social. There may be evolved a type exempt from disease, living in conditions of calm activity to an age above that reached in historic times, whose motives will be normal and harmonious, whose sensations will be completely pleasurable, whose forbearance will be perfect, whose knowledge will be supreme. He may be conceived of as wise, temperate, humane, peaceful, trustful, with a nerve system adapted to the circumstance of life, without fear of death, and with a true comprehension of himself and of his duty to his kind; a man, moreover of modified nutriment and sexual instincts, triumphing over his passions, finally a man incapable of wrong. This, unless we can conceive a still higher being, less material by reason of altered conditions of nutrition, assimilation and conversion, which seems impossible, is the highest type which may be evolved.

But if this superior being be hypothetical, we can at least be tolerably certain that the direction of conduct towards his standard, is a task within the power of the race, the more so as the undoubted tendencies to moral improvement which exist, do lead to such a standard. The passions of jealousy and hatred still exist, but except among the most uneducated, they do not generally lead to violence, and notwithstanding that in their present repressed state, they may be productive of suffering, the

suffering is of diminished intensity. One step is thus made in the higher direction. The desire of philanthropic work exists as philanthropic institutions prove and this is another step. Knowledge continues to increase and this is yet another. In spite of great inherent wickedness, men do evince a desire for a superior existence. In this desire is the prospect of the generation of a higher representative of the species.

Even if this higher type were reached, however, would it exist for as long a time as the world sustained life, or would it become extinct at its own apotheosis, owing to inertia in happiness or owing to a realisation of the impossibility of ever becoming other or more universal than itself? It is conceivable that a time might arrive when the knowledge and reason of the superior man might cause him to demand for life, even for felicitous life, a more intelligible end than that of living to enjoy. Superior reasoning powers might lead him to conclude that if no other purpose were revealed than that of perfect and pleasurable living, the state to which he had attained was devoid of meaning; that viewed in the light of reality, human life was but a vibration of matter which might as well not vibrate, a combination of atoms which might as well not combine, a sentience which need not feel, a cogitation which need not think. Even the love of man and woman and the desire of family to which that love is linked, might be lessened by the too strong realisation that the union of cells in which that love results, had no other object than to temporarily animate a certain quantity of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and other substances; that in short, his deepest affections and emotions ended in the production of matter held in suspension by the effect of an unknown cause, but ready to return to the inanimate condition from whence it sprang, on the cessation of the animating impulse.

For although man can easily conceive the world without life, he cannot conceive life without the world, and he may well realise that the world is independent of his presence in it and that it could pursue its rotatory and revolutionary activity equally well without his presence—his own chief action upon the earth's crust, agriculture and town-building, having no appreciable effect on cosmic conditions.

And if this realisation gave birth to a desire of gradual reabsorption into the fundamental matter of the world, the perfection of human type would then have led to the annihilation of the will to live and consequently to the extinction of human life, supposing such life to be no longer reproducible from lower forms. And this conjectural progression of events brings us back to an approximation to Buddhism which, in its essence, is destructive.

But this state of feeling need not necessarily be produced. There is no incongruity in the idea of a permanent state of human perfection as an ultimate goal for rightly-directed effort and it is possible to conceive that such a state is capable of lasting as long as the life of the world. Many elements of permanency may be added to it which we cannot now foresee. There may ultimately be experienced a perfect contentment with the lot of life and a resignation to the fatality of death. When these results are obtained, then, even if the definite purpose of existence still remain hidden or even if men become convinced that there is no such purpose, life will have become, in reality, a privilege.

We may proceed to a last enquiry. If other planets were known to be inhabited is it probable that the effect of that knowledge would be to add an additional incentive to existence, or would men find greater satisfaction in the idea of isolation in the universe? Such questions are less futile than they may at first sight appear. For if there were any prospect, however remote, of an extension of our human knowledge to conditions of rational life beyond our globe, the direction of the human aim would be somewhat different from what it would be were that prospect non-existent or were such a contingency held to be eternally impossible, as it virtually is at the present stage. In the former case, there would be a greater scope of aim. A desire or hope of extension would be formed which cannot be said to exist at present and there might be anticipations of new modes of conduct if it were ever possible to gain a knowledge of extra-mundane life. There would, at any rate, be an expectancy of revelation that might well tend to maintain the interest of existence which on one hypothesis we have seen to be a necessary factor of the progress towards happiness. The social

instinct of the race would be stimulated by such an expectancy, for there might arise a sense of cosmic companionship and the universe would appear to men less void of sympathy. In the latter case, that is were our planet known to be the only habitable one, then the tendency might be to experience the sense of isolation above alluded to and to realise that life was due to accident in a planet which, though only of the fourth magnitude in the solar system, happened to generate life by reason of its moisture, or to attribute the unique character of human life to the will of a creator, although the ancient geocentric conception of the world was more favourable to such a view. Evidently the accidental assumption is not of a nature to greatly promote the pride of humanity, while the creation theory, bestowing, as it does, existence upon our globe alone, is of an opposite tendency. It is not proved, however, that such pride is essential to human happiness and that a calm resignation to the ascertained and ascertainable principles of nature, is not equally efficient.

But in addition to these considerations, and in conclusion, it must be said that whether man continue to exist as he has hitherto existed, or whether his mental or moral horizon be extended or confined, he must never cease to be subject to the earth and to its fortunes. He may succeed in modifying or eliminating some of the more material features of his nature, he must always be fettered to the earth on which he came to life and beyond whose atmosphere he cannot breathe.

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